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RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE 
  2019 2020 2021 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)       
Private Consumer Expenditure 3.2 -9.2 5.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 6.3 10.0 2.5 
Investment 74.8 -17 8.0 
Exports 10.5 1.7 6.1 
Imports 32.4 -6.1 6.5 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 5.6 -1.8 6.3 
Gross National Product (GNP) 3.4 -2.3 5.2 
  
   
Labour Market 
   
Employment Levels (‘000)  2,322   2,013 2,239  
Unemployment Levels (‘000) 121 405 246 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 5.0 16.8 9.9 
        
Public Finances       
General Government Balance (€bn) 1.3 -25.4  -15.0 
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The Irish Economy – Overview 
 
The Irish economy is continuing to struggle with the impacts of COVID-19. As of 
September 2020, the adjusted unemployment rate was 14.7 per cent compared 
with 4.9 per cent in February. It is clear that there has been a significant amount of 
variation across the economy in terms of the impact of the pandemic. While 
domestic-focused sectors and those operating in arts, entertainment, 
accommodation and hospitality have suffered severely, certain exporting sectors 
(in particular medicinal and pharmaceutical activities) have continued to grow in 
Q2 2020 even during the lockdown. 
 
Based on the relatively strong export performance, we believe the headline GDP 
figure will now only decline by 1.8 per cent in 2020. However, consumption and 
investment are likely to witness declines of 9.2 and 17 per cent, respectively, with 
the unemployment rate set to be over 12.5 per cent by the end of the year. 
 
As well as the ongoing issues due to COVID-19, the Irish economy may also be the 
subject of additional contractionary pressures in 2021 because of a Disorderly 
No-Deal Brexit. In the Commentary Bergin and Garcia-Rodriguez examine the 
potential combination of an adverse Brexit outcome and the ongoing pressures 
due to COVID-19. 
 
Overall, our assessment is that in the absence of a trade agreement between the 
EU and the UK, the Irish economy will grow by just 3.3 per cent in 2021. If such an 
agreement is in place, the domestic economy could grow nearly twice as rapidly at 
6.3 per cent. 
 
The Commentary also publishes a number of Special Articles which deal with both 
the impact of COVID-19 on the Irish economy and housing sector, as well as the 
proposal of new indicators of economic welfare which are not as susceptible to 
distortions from the multinational sector as traditional, headline indicators. A 
Research Note is also published which examines the impact that the pandemic has 
had on Irish exports 
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• Overall, Irish GDP is set to contract by 1.8 per cent in 2020 and grow by 
approximately 6.3 per cent in 2021 under our Baseline scenario;  
• If a Disorderly No-Deal outcome occurs between the EU and the UK then 




The Irish economy is set to face two significant challenges over the next 12 to 18 
months; these are ongoing economic disruption stemming from the impact of 
COVID-19 and the possibility of a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom. Accordingly, in this Commentary, we evaluate the 
likely future path for the Irish economy between now and the end of 2021 in the 
following manner:  
• For 2020, we construct one forecast, which assumes that the current COVID-19 
conditions will continue until the end of the year. This means that the current 
set of restrictions will be in place for that period; 
• For 2021, our Baseline forecast has two main assumptions. First, it assumes 
that COVID-19 related restrictions escalate and deescalate in different regions 
throughout the year. Second, it assumes that a free trade arrangement is 
agreed between the EU and the UK such that a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit is 
avoided. However, given the very real risk that a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit will 
occur, we also provide a second GDP scenario for 2021 assuming a WTO style 
relationship exists between the EU and the UK as a result. For the second 
scenario, we draw heavily upon the work of Daly and Lawless (2020) and Box 1 
in the Commentary by Bergin and Garcia-Rodriguez.  
 
For 2020, our forecasts indicate that the Irish economy will contract by just 1.8 per 
cent. This is a much better outcome for the year than had been envisaged in earlier 
Commentaries. Such an outcome is mainly due to the performance of the export 
sector, where there was a significant increase in pharmaceutical and medical 
related exports during the year. The relatively strong GDP numbers also mask the 
extensive economic disruption that has occurred across many sectors and is 
evident in the labour market and consumption data. In a Research Note in this 
Commentary, O’Toole (2020) notes that despite the GDP decline being relatively 
benign compared to other countries, the fall in household spending has been one 
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of the largest in the EU, while the disruption to many domestic sectors such as arts, 
accommodation, hospitality, and even the construction sector during the lockdown 
was high by European standards. In this regard, even with the better than expected 
GDP figures, the severity of the shock to household expenditure and domestic 
investment activity is closely in line with our previous considerations.  
 
For 2021, under our Baseline forecast we expect the Irish economy to recover quite 
strongly despite the ongoing presence of the COVID-19 restrictions. Consumption 
and investment are expected to grow in a robust manner while net trade is also 
expected to contribute to growth in 2021. However, both exports and imports are 
set to grow on a more modest scale than in recent years as the global economy is 
still set to experience reduced growth rates in the coming year. Overall, this results 
in an increase in Irish GDP of 6.3 per cent in 2021. 
 
Under our alternative scenario, where no deal is reached between the UK and the 
EU and as a result a WTO arrangement occurs, there is a significant short-term 
impact on the Irish economy. As outlined in Box 1 by Bergin and Garcia-Rodriguez, 
the impact of a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit has significant negative implications for 
the domestic economy, which tend to accumulate over the longer term. In the 
Commentary, we have taken these estimates and worked out what the impact of 
disorderly Brexit will be in the shorter term. A similar analysis was conducted in 
Economides and McQuinn (2019).1 Our analysis indicates that Irish GDP will now 
only grow by 3.3 per cent in 2021 in the event of no deal being reached between 
the UK and the EU. 
 
Note that in the following Box, the impacts of both COVID-19 and Brexit on 
headline economic variables is with respect to a no-pandemic baseline growth rate 
for 2020. The Box also considers a number of COVID-19 scenarios other than those 





1  Box 1 ‘A reassessment of the impacts of different Brexit type scenarios on the short-term forecast of the Irish economy’, 
in Quarterly Economic Commentary Spring 2019, Economic and Social Research Institute.  
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BOX 1 EXPLORING THE IMPACTS OF COVID-19, A HARD BREXIT AND RECOVERY PATHS FOR 
THE ECONOMY 
 
The COVID-19 public health crisis has precipitated a massive global and domestic economic 
shock. The economic outlook is extremely uncertain and depends critically on the 
development of the pandemic, the stringency of continued and/or new containment 
measures, the success of such measures in controlling the spread of the virus and the 
possibility of an effective vaccine. The economic impact of the pandemic and the 
associated public health measures is most noticeable in the labour market which has gone 
from a situation of essentially full employment at the beginning of the year to recording 
an unprecedented unemployment rate of over 30 per cent in April (when Pandemic 
Unemployment Payment recipients are classified as unemployed). More recently, the 
relaxation of the strict public health measures and the gradual opening up of the economy 
has seen this rate almost halve in August. It is also clear that the impact of the pandemic 
is very unevenly distributed across sectors. The Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) for the 
second quarter (when the strictest measures were in place) show that output in the 
non-traded sector (which is more reliant on domestic demand) fell by a massive 26.4 per 
cent compared to a fall of just 4.4 per cent in traded sector output, highlighting the dual 
speed nature of the economy. Some leading indicators of activity point to a rebound in the 
economy in the second half of the year but the strength and timing of any recovery is highly 
uncertain. 
 
In this Box, we explore a range of alternative scenarios for the Irish economy using our 
structural macro-econometric model COSMO. Our approach is to replicate the initial shock 
in H1 2020 in COSMO and to examine a series of alternative adjustment paths for the 
economy over the short to medium term. The pandemic is affecting the economy through 
a number of channels, mainly through lower consumption and employment, temporary 
closures and restrictions in some sectors, and lower growth in the international economy 
that affects global demand for Irish exports in some sectors. There is very limited research 
to draw on to calibrate potential adjustment paths, and there are a significant number of 
unknown factors, so we consider a range of COVID-19 scenarios that aim to capture more 
benign to more negative outcomes. We explore three main scenarios, labelled Recovery, 
Delayed Recovery and 2nd Wave; the scenarios differ in terms of the timing of the recovery, 
whether there is some permanent loss in output and whether there is another resurgence 
of the virus. We also investigate another threat facing the economy, the possibility of a 
No-Deal Brexit where the UK leaves the EU in January 2021 without a free trade agreement 
in place. The international modelling work generally characterises the pandemic as a 
temporary shock with severe short-run impacts that may have medium-term 
consequences; while Brexit is probably best described as a long-run permanent shock that 
has highly uncertain short-run impacts.  
Scenarios 
For each scenario, our counterfactual is a no-pandemic baseline which assumes a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) between the UK and EU being in place by the beginning of 2021. 
Each of the alternative scenarios can be compared to this no-pandemic baseline to provide 
estimates of the potential impact of the COVID-19 shocks. The main assumptions 
underpinning each scenario are as follows: 
Q uarter l y  E conomi c  Commentary  –  Autumn 2020  | 5 
 
 
• In each scenario, we use H1 data from the Quarterly National Accounts and Labour 
Force Survey to calibrate the shocks to output and employment in the non-traded 
sector and personal consumption. In the Recovery scenario, there is some rebound 
in non-traded output and employment in Q3 2020 (an improvement of 
approximately 20 per cent over the Q2 levels) and output and employment return to 
no-pandemic baseline levels by Q4 2023. We offset the initial shocks to consumption 
in H2 and let the model determine the path for consumption thereafter. In the 
Delayed Recovery scenario, continued uncertainty and/or the continuation of new 
public health measures results in the pace of the recovery being weaker. In this 
scenario, the offset to the consumption shock is prolonged until the end of 2021. 
Furthermore, we assume output and employment in the non-traded sector return to 
95 per cent of no-pandemic baseline levels by Q4 2024. This scar, or permanent loss 
of output and employment, is difficult to calibrate but recent research suggests there 
could be some permanent losses in output. In the 2nd Wave scenario, we assume a 
second wave of the virus in Q4 2020, the economic impact of which is equivalent to 
three-quarters of the shock observed in Q2 2020. We assume that the timing of the 
recovery is in line with the Recovery scenario but we incorporate the same scar as in 
the Delayed Recovery scenario. It is possible in the 2nd Wave scenario that the scar 
or permanent loss to output could be larger if consumers and firms significantly 
adjust their behaviour (e.g. firms may continue to delay investment decisions, 
consumers may engage in more precautionary savings) in anticipation of further 
public health restrictions. 
• In COSMO, lower output will indirectly lead to lower investment. However, due to 
the uncertainty facing firms we also directly shock investment in the traded and 
non-traded sectors so that investment falls by around 30 per cent in Q2 2020. We 
assume that much of this represents delayed investment decisions and offset or 
neutralise around two-thirds of the shock in 2021. We apply the same shock to each 
scenario. 
• The global nature of the pandemic will affect Ireland through a change in external 
conditions. We incorporate NIESR’s analysis (Hurst et al., 2020)2 which examines the 
international impact of the virus using their global model NiGEM. Their international 
shock includes reduced consumer spending, an increase in business uncertainty, a 
reduction in hours of work due to illness, and a temporary lockdown of economies. 
Recent data show that the export sector has held up pretty well in H1 and it appears 
that the sectoral structure of Irish exports is helping to alleviate the worst impacts of 
the pandemic. As a result, we scale back (to 75 per cent) the world demand shock in 
the Recovery and 2nd Wave scenarios. In the Delayed Recovery scenario, we assume 
a protracted recovery in world demand where it returns to the no-pandemic baseline 
by Q4 2022. 
• Each scenario includes the government support measures in terms of transfers/ 
income supports, extra government spending in health and other business and 




2  Hurst, I., I. Liadze, B. Naisbitt and G. Young (2020). ‘A preliminary assessment of the possible economic impact of the 
coronavirus outbreak: update’, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, NiGEM Observations, No. 18, 
27 March. 
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dampen the negative impact of the crisis and arguably increase the likelihood of a 
more rapid recovery in the economy.  
• Finally, migration has traditionally been one of the mechanisms through which the 
Irish labour market has adjusted to shocks. However, given the nature of the public 
health shock it is reasonable to assume that this mechanism may be closed off 
because of uncertainty, lower confidence, travel restrictions etc. In each scenario, 
we assume there is no net migration in 2020 and thereafter it is set equal to the 
no-pandemic baseline levels, implying that migration will not act as an adjustment 
mechanism for the labour market as it has done in the past.  
 
Scenario Results 
Figure A shows the level of GDP in the no-pandemic baseline and the three scenarios (LHS) 
and the percentage deviation from no-pandemic baseline of GDP for each scenario (RHS). 
The negative economic impacts peak in Q2 of 2020 and the economy rebounds thereafter 
but at different speeds in each scenario. Compared to the no-pandemic baseline, our 
results suggest a strong reduction in output in 2020 of around 7 per cent in the Recovery 
scenario, 8 per cent in the 2nd Wave scenario and 9.5 per cent in the Delayed Recovery 
scenario.3 In the Recovery scenario, output remains below no-pandemic baseline until the 
middle of 2023 and surpasses the no-pandemic baseline slightly over the medium term as 
downward pressure on wages helps to improve competitiveness. In the 2nd Wave and 
Delayed Recovery scenarios, the permanent loss of output in the non-traded sector means 
that although output largely recovers it remains below the no-pandemic baseline over the 
medium term.  
 
FIGURE A    COVID-19, IMPACT ON GDP 
   
 





3  These scenario results are presented relative to a no-pandemic baseline, thus they capture both the kinds of fall in 
activity discussed elsewhere in the Quarterly Economic Commentary and also the loss in activity associated with the 
fact that prior to the pandemic the economy had been expected to grow at a benign pace over the short to medium 
term. 
Q uarter l y  E conomi c  Commentary  –  Autumn 2020  | 7 
 
 
Table A shows the main results for key aggregates for each scenario. The shocks to 
consumption and employment have more severe effects for non-traded output than 
traded output. In each scenario, the shock to the international economy is more muted 
than the domestic shocks so the ultimate impacts on exports and traded sector output are 
relatively weaker, indicating the traded sector is helping to lessen the negative effects of 
the pandemic. Our results indicate that the large shocks to employment will take some 
time to unwind, and even with a relatively strong recovery, employment remains below 
no-pandemic baseline until the middle of 2023, 2024 and 2026 in the Recovery, 2nd Wave 
and Delayed Recovery scenarios respectively, while the unemployment rate returns to no-
pandemic baseline a few quarters after. Although the pandemic has a considerable 
negative impact on output in the short run, it is important to stress that the economy will 
grow over the medium term; in each of the three scenarios the implied growth rate over 
the 2023-2030 period is around 4 per cent per annum. 
 
TABLE A   IMPACT OF THE DIFFERENT COVID-19 SCENARIOS, DEVIATION FROM NO-PANDEMIC  
BASELINE 
 Recovery Scenario Delayed Recovery 2nd Wave 
 2020 2021 2022 23-30 2020 2021 2022 23-30 2020 2021 2022 23-30 
Percentage deviation from no-pandemic Baseline level: 
GDP -7.0 -3.9 -2.0 0.9 -9.5 -8.8 -6.8 -1.4 -8.0 -7.2 -4.4 -0.4 
GVA, Traded 
sector -4.5 -2.0 -0.8 0.6 -8.5 -9.3 -7.0 -0.6 -4.5 -2.0 -0.7 0.8 
GVA, Non-traded 
sector -16.0 -10.9 -6.3 -0.2 -16.1 -12.9 -10.6 -5.5 -18.2 -18.8 -13.0 -5.3 
Consumption -8.9 -4.1 -4.2 3.5 -12.8 -10.0 -9.1 0.5 -13.8 -18.3 -12.0 2.3 
Employment -16.0 -9.9 -4.8 2.2 -17.2 -15.1 -11.2 -0.9 -17.2 -14.6 -8.6 0.1 
Exports -5.0 -2.3 -0.9 0.6 -9.5 -10.5 -8.0 -0.8 -5.0 -2.3 -0.9 0.9 
Deviation from no-pandemic Baseline: 
Unemployment 
rate 11.0 6.5 3.3 -1.4 11.9 10.3 7.8 0.8 11.9 10.0 5.9 0.0 
General 
government 
balance, % GDP 
-6.6 -2.4 -1.6 -0.4 -7.4 -3.6 -2.9 -1.3 -7.2 -4.0 -2.6 -0.9 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
The recovery from the pandemic will also be influenced by the outcome of Brexit. Our 
no-pandemic baseline assumes a FTA agreement being in place and here we consider the  
impact of a No-Deal outcome. We leverage previous research,4 which found a No-Deal 
Brexit could lead to a 5 per cent loss in output after ten years compared to a situation 






4  Bergin A., P. Economides A. Garcia-Rodriguez and G. Murphy (2019). ‘Ireland and Brexit: Modelling the impact of Deal 
and No-Deal scenarios’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Special Article, Spring.  
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and Lawless (2020)5 which finds there is limited overlap in the sectors exposed to the 
different shocks, suggesting that potential interaction effects do not magnify the impacts 
of adding the Brexit shock to that of COVID-19. We consider two No-Deal outcomes with 
similar long-run impacts, but which differ in the adjustment to this long-run relationship. 
The adjustment to this long run occurs in a smooth or orderly fashion in the No-Deal 
scenario but there are additional negative effects in the short run in the Disorderly No-Deal 
scenario, driven by factors such as disruption at ports and airports in terms of dealing with 
new Customs requirements. The results from layering on the No-Deal Brexit scenarios to 
the Recovery scenario are shown in Figure B. The graph shows a No-Deal Brexit will cause 
long-term economic loss, close to 1.7 per cent after ten years relative to the no-pandemic 
baseline (which assumes a FTA agreement), while a disorderly exit would also lead to 
significant short-term losses. 
 
FIGURE B    COVID-19 AND NO-DEAL BREXIT: IMPACT ON GDP 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
Conclusions 
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the necessary public health measures introduced to 
mitigate its effects led to significant economic losses during the first half of 2020. 
Anticipating how and when the economy will recover from this shock is extremely difficult 
due to the unprecedented nature of the situation and there is a significant number of 






5  Daly, L. and M. Lawless (2020). ‘Examination of the Sectoral Overlap of COVID-19 and Brexit Shocks’, ESRI Working 
Paper, No. 677. 
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In this Box, we generate three scenarios which portray a range of potential adjustment 
paths over the short to medium term. These scenarios include a more rapid recovery, a 
delayed recovery with some long term scarring and a recovery following a second wave in 
the second half of 2020. In the Recovery scenario, the economy returns to the no-
pandemic baseline by the middle of 2023, whereas in the Delayed Recovery scenario the 
return to no-pandemic baseline takes two more years and some output and employment 
is permanently lost. The Box also explores the potential effects of a No-Deal Brexit on the 
potential recovery. While a No-Deal Brexit will produce long-term economic losses, a 
disorderly exit could also have significant short-term effects. 
 
This Box was prepared by Adele Bergin (ESRI), Abian Garcia Rodriguez (ESRI), Luke Rehill 
(Department of Finance) and Éamonn Sweeney (Department of Finance). 
 
Sectoral impact of COVID-19  
To date, the impact of COVID-19 on the Irish economy has been severe in aggregate 
terms. However, there have been significant differences in its impact amongst the 
different sectors of the economy. Figure 1 plots the year-on-year output growth 
rates for the NACE 2 sectors for the Irish economy in Q2 2020.  
 
FIGURE 1 ANNUAL CHANGES (%) IN SECTORAL OUTPUT VALUE: Q2 2019 – Q2 2020 
 
 












Manufacturing Construction Distribution & Transport
Information & Communication Financial & Insurance Real Estate Activities
Professional Public Admin Arts & Entertainment
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From the graph it is clear that sectors such as Arts and entertainment, Professional, 
admin support services, Construction, Distribution and transport, and Hotels and 
restaurants were impacted the most severely, while other sectors such as Financial 
and insurance and Public administration were less affected. This is borne out by 
the discussion in both the labour section and the public finances section where the 
labour market implications of COVID-19 for the public finances are discussed.  
 
The sectoral patterns above can also be seen in a cross-country context (Figure 2). 
The significant performance of the Industry sector relative to other European 
countries is a particular feature of the Irish economy over the lockdown. The more 
domestic-focused sectors actually experienced larger declines than other 
countries.  
 
FIGURE 2 ANNUAL CHANGES (%) IN SECTORAL OUTPUT VOLUMES: Q2 2019-Q2 2020:  
IRELAND VS EU27 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat.  
Note:  W,R,T,A,F is Wholesale, retail, transport, accommodation and food services; RE is Real estate; P,S,T,A,S is Professional, scientific, 
technical, administration and support services; PA is Public administration; A,E,R, is Arts entertainment and recreation. 
 
The manufacturing sector registered an increase of 17 per cent in output terms 
between 2019 and 2020. This sector is dominated by multinational firms, with 
many of the largest pharmaceutical firms located here. Many of these firms are 
producing products which are central to the international response to COVID-19. 
This is one of the reasons why Irish exports grew slightly through Q2 2020 despite 













All Industry W,R,T,A,F ICT FinInsur RE P,S,T,A,S PA A,E,R
EU IE
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As manufacturing accounts for approximately 40 per cent of Irish output, it is one 
of the main reasons why the pandemic has impacted the Irish economy to a lesser 
extent than comparator EU countries. The relative impact of the pandemic can be 
compared in a cross-country context from Figure 3 which compares the quarterly 
growth rate for Q2 2020.  
 
FIGURE 3 QUARTER-ON-QUARTER CHANGES (%) IN GDP FOR SELECTED EU COUNTRIES: Q2 2020 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat and QEC Calculations.  
 
Ireland along with the Netherlands has the smallest decline on a quarterly basis 
when compared with other European countries. The outcome for Ireland is all the 
more notable given that the economy actually grew quite significantly in Q1 2020. 
 
A cross-country comparison of the sectoral performance of the Irish economy over 
the lockdown is presented in O’Toole (2020) who traces the relatively benign 
impact of the economic shock to the specific performance of a small number of 
export sectors.  
 
Estimating the impact of COVID-19 on real activity in the domestic economy is 
clearly complicated by the distortionary transactions from certain multinational 
firms. In the present year, for example, there was a significant increase in 
intellectual property products (IPP) related capital investment in Q1 2020, however 
this was followed by a substantial reduction in this activity in Q2. While some of 
the reason for this fall off was due to COVID-19, in the main they appear to be 







Euro area Germany Ireland Spain France
Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal United Kingdom
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extent to which the treatment of IP by certain large firms operating in the Irish and 
Dutch jurisdictions is now having non-trivial implications for Euro Area wide data 
as well as for national data. 
 
BOX 2  THE TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP): HOW EURO AREA DATA ARE NOW 
BEING DISTORTED 
 
The implications of certain multinational decisions for the Irish National Accounts has 
attracted a significant amount of attention amongst domestic policymakers and academics 
(FitzGerald, 2018). In response to the distortionary impact on GDP as well as other key 
macroeconomic aggregates such as investment, imports and exports, the Irish Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) has published a number of new indicators that seek to provide a 
more accurate assessment of underlying Irish economic activity. One such indicator is 
adjusted Gross National Income or GNI* (see Lane, 2017, for more details on this). Of 
course, GDP and GNP are still important indicators for issues such as the EU fiscal rules and 
contributions to the EU budget. 
 
However, while the implications for domestic policymakers of these distortions are 
significant, recent analysis suggests that issues particularly to do with the treatment of 
investment in intellectual property (IP) by certain large firms operating in the Irish and 
Dutch jurisdictions are now having non-trivial implications for Euro Area data (see Setser, 
2020). Given that the monetary policy decision of the European Central bank (ECB) is 
primarily influenced by Euro Area data, this could lead to significant and important 
decisions concerning Euro Area policy rates being made on somewhat misleading 
information. 
 
To provide some context for this, following Setser (2020), it is telling to observe the 
growing relevance of certain Irish and Dutch macroeconomic data on the corresponding 
Euro Area aggregates. In Figure C, real investment in Irish and Dutch intellectual property 
is expressed as a ratio of Euro Area GDP. From 2010 onwards, it is clear that this ratio is 
typically in the order of 0.1 and 0.3 for Ireland and the Netherlands respectively. Certain 
large transactions in the Dutch economy in 2015 and in Ireland in 2017 cause the ratios to 
increase substantially. In reality, these transactions are to do with certain subsidiaries of 
multinationals based in these countries acquiring the intellectual property of a 
non-resident company. Under certain tax arrangements based on the use of full capital 
allowances for expenditure on intellectual property, large companies can use massive 
intra-group loans to purchase the IP, with substantial deductions on the interest paid for 
these loans reducing significantly the taxable income of these entities. Both Ireland and 
the Netherlands had such tax arrangements in place during the period in question (see 
Clancy, 2018, amongst others for more on this). 
 
To understand the implications of these transactions on Euro Area data, in Figure D two 
series for Euro Area domestic demand are plotted where domestic demand is defined as  
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private and government consumption and investment. The two series are the official 
estimate and that estimate excluding Irish and Dutch investment in IP. 
 
FIGURE C IRISH AND DUTCH INVESTMENT IN IP AS A % OF EURO AREA GDP 
 
 
Sources:  Eurostat and Authors’ calculations. 
 
FIGURE D  ANNUAL CHANGE IN EURO AREA DOMESTIC DEMAND WITH IRISH AND DUTCH 
INVESTMENT IN IP REMOVED (%) 
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Clearly stripping out the Irish and Dutch data from the total provides a clearer picture of 
domestic developments in the Euro Area economy. For instance, the decline in Euro Area 
activity evident since 2017 appears to be less dramatic; the official data would have 
suggested a sharp decline in 2018; however the adjusted data indicate that the decline is 
at a slower (but still persistent) rate. 
 
FIGURE E  YEAR-ON-YEAR CONTRIBUTION OF NET TRADE TO EURO AREA GDP WITH IRISH AND 
DUTCH NET TRADE EXCLUDED (%)  
 
 
Sources:  Eurostat and Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure E illustrates the degree to which these fluctuations also have implications for Euro 
Area trade data. In this case, the two series plotted are the official contribution of net trade 
to Euro Area GDP and an adjusted series with the trade data for Ireland and the 
Netherlands omitted. Again, it is evident that the official data suggest that trade is making 
a much greater contribution since 2015 than what the adjusted data would indicate. 
 
All of this raises a number of important points: 
1. In order for monetary policy at the Euro Area to be conducted in as efficient a 
manner as possible, it may be necessary for new macroeconomic indicators to be 
provided by Eurostat. This exercise could mirror the efforts currently underway in 
the CSO.  
2. Amongst other issues, this will enable a more accurate characterisation of cross-
border flows in foreign direct investment (FDI), which is also obviously distorted 
by these transactions. 
3. Information revealed in National Accounts can reveal evidence of profit-
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4. In a post-Brexit European Union, Ireland’s strategy on corporation tax is likely 
to come under increased scrutiny and pressure from our European partners. It 
is important that Irish authorities avoid any tax arrangements that 
multinationals can use to significantly reduce their global tax liabilities. 
 
References: 
Clancy E. (2018). ‘Apple, Ireland and the new Green Jersey tax avoidance technique’, 
blogpost: https://www.socialeurope.eu/apple-ireland-and-the-new-green-jersey-
tax-avoidance-technique. 
FitzGerald J. (2018). ‘National accounts for a global economy: the case of Ireland’, 
Quarterly Economic Commentary, Special Article, Summer. ESRI.  
Lane P. (2017). ‘The treatment of global firms in National Accounts’, Economic Letter, 
01/EL/17, Central Bank of Ireland.  
Setser B.W. (2020). ‘Leprechaun adjusted Euro Area GDP’, blogpost available online at 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/leprechaun-adjusted-euro-area-gdp. 
 




Household sector consumption  
Key Points 
• Consumption expenditure fell by nearly one-fifth cumulatively between Q1 and 
Q2 2020; 
• The fall in consumption was the third largest of 23 European countries; 
• Spending rebounded as the economy reopened but the recovery has been 
uneven; 
• Local lockdowns and further restrictions will limit the recovery and we expect 
consumption to be over 9 per cent lower in 2020 relative to 2019; 
• A strong recovery can be expected in 2021 as long as more extreme restrictions 
can be avoided for a significant period. 
 
 
The impact of the economic shock associated with COVID-19 can be clearly 
demonstrated in personal consumption expenditure on goods and services. As 
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noted in previous research such as Coffey et al. (2020)6 and McQuinn et al. (2020a; 
2020b),7 the decline in household spending in Ireland was driven by a number of 
factors including: a) the change in behaviours by households before the public 
health restrictions, in which they attempted to avoid infection; b) a reduction in 
expenditure over the strict lockdown phase as businesses were closed and sales 
opportunities curtailed and c) the extent to which the economy was reopened with 
increased opportunities for consumers to undertake expenditure.  
 
The fall in expenditure can clearly be seen in the Quarterly National Accounts. 
Figure 4 presents the real growth rate of expenditure on goods and services on a 
quarter-on-quarter and a year-on-year basis. The quarter-on-quarter drop in 
Q1 2020 was 3.5 per cent, while the quarterly drop in Q2 was 19.6 per cent; 
therefore, on a cumulative basis consumption fell by nearly one-quarter between 
the end of 2019 and the middle of 2020. The year-on-year drop in Q1 2020 was just 
over 2.6 per cent and over 22 per cent in Q2. The closest fall in magnitude during 
the financial crisis was in Q1 2009 when the growth rate dropped by 2.7 per cent 
quarter-on-quarter and 4.8 per cent year-on-year. This highlights the scale and 
rapidity of the current crisis.  
 
FIGURE4  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES: CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED GROWTH RATES 
 
 





6  Coffey, C., K. Doorley, C. O’Toole and B. Roantree (2020). ‘The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on consumption and 
indirect tax in Ireland’, ESRI Budget Perspectives 2021 Paper 3.  
7  McQuinn, K, C. O’Toole, M. Allen-Coghlan and C. Coffey (2020a). Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring. Economic 
and Social Research Institute. 
McQuinn, K, C. O’Toole, M. Allen-Coghlan and C. Coffey (2020b). Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer, Economic 
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Some cross-country context for the size of the decline in consumption is provided 
in Figure 5, which presents the cumulative quarter-on-quarter changes across Q1 
and Q2 2020 for Ireland and selected other European economies. Naturally, the 
scale of the consumption decline will depend on (i) the severity of the public health 
restrictions, (ii) the degree to which incomes and the labour market adjusted (and 
were supported by policy), (iii) the severity of the disease outbreak and (iv) the 
relative changes in households’ own behaviour. The fall in consumption in Ireland 
over the period Q1 and Q2 2020 is the third highest of the selected countries, with 
only Spain and the UK experiencing a greater fall in expenditure by households.  
 
FIGURE 5 CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN CONSUMPTION FOR SELECTED EUROPEAN ECONOMIES 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. Consumption is the cumulative quarter-on-quarter changes for Q1 2020 and Q2 2020. Series: Final 
consumption expenditure of households, chain linked volumes (2010), seasonally- and calendar-adjusted data.  
 
Despite the rapid and severe decline in expenditure in the first and second quarter, 
real time indicators of expenditure such as retail sales data point to a sustained 
and strong recovery as the economy was reopened. Table 1 presents the year-on-
year change in retail sales by item for the period March to July 2020. While nearly 
all spending categories declined over the period March-May (with the exception of 
expenditure on food and beverages) a strong rebound is evident in June and July 
2020. Indeed, overall expenditure was nearly 4 and 6 per cent higher year-on-year 
in June and July respectively. It is likely some of this increase is due to deferred 
expenditure which was put off during the lockdown period. For example, 
expenditure on motor trades declined to such a degree in April and May that a 
rebound was always likely when trade was reopened.  
 
Despite the rebound, some areas of expenditure are still well below the levels seen 
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expenditure on books, stationery and newspapers remains 16 per cent, 11 per cent 
and 40 per cent below the July 2019 level in July 2020. For retail sales in bars, there 
was some recovery as establishments selling food were allowed reopen but sales 
in July 2020 were still over 50 per cent lower than the level 12 months previous.  
 
TABLE 1 YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES IN RETAIL SALES (VOLUMES) BY MONTH (%) 
 March  April May  June July 
Motor trades  -30 -81 -50 4 6 
Non-specialised stores  17 17 18 16 10 
Department stores  -28 -78 -54 -15 -16 
Food, beverages and tobacco in specialised stores 18 15 14 20 16 
Automotive fuel -15 -50 -37 -18 -11 
Pharmaceutical, medical and cosmetic articles 14 -15 -11 3 2 
Textiles, clothing and footwear -47 -82 -79 -17 4 
Furniture and lighting -16 -86 -66 13 21 
Hardware, paints and glass 12 -49 1 31 19 
Electrical goods  23 -34 -13 14 26 
Books, newspapers and stationery -29 -75 -83 -40 -40 
Other retail sales -4 -40 7 27 28 
Bars -58 -92 -92 -82 -53 
All retail businesses -11 -44 -25 4 6 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
The recovering trend in retail sales can clearly be seen in Figure 6 which presents 
the three-month rolling average of the year-on-year growth rates for all retail sales, 
retail sales excluding the motor trade, and household equipment. All items 
recovered strongly in June and July 2020.  
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FIGURE 6 ANNUAL GROWTH (%) IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2015=100), 
THREE-MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
To provide further insight into the trajectory of consumer spending for 2020, we 
explore recent trends in consumer sentiment. Figure 7 provides trends in 
consumer sentiment for Ireland, the UK and the EU27 for the period July 2019 to 
August 2020. The Index takes the value of 100 in January 2020. The onset of the 
pandemic is associated with a rapid and extensive drop in consumer confidence as 
households were subject to restrictions, job and income losses, and changed their 
behaviour in respect of the virus. Relative to the rest of the EU and the UK, the fall 
in consumer confidence in Ireland was greater (relative to January 2020) and the 
recovery has been considerably more muted. Indeed, consumer confidence in 
August 2020 declined relative to the July data which likely reflects the public 
discourse around the pick-up in infections through August. It may also reflect the 
fact that the deferred expenditure which likely drove the June and July figures was 
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FIGURE 7 CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS – IRELAND, UK AND REST OF EU (JANUARY 
2020 = 100) 
 
 
Source:  European Commission data and ESRI calculation.  
Note:  The positive/negative balances from the EU COF series are transformed by adding 100. We then set the base to 100 in January 
2020 with growth relative to this point i.e. ((Yt/YJan2010) -1)*100.  
 
Consumption forecasts 
At this juncture, quarterly data on consumption are available for Q1 and Q2 from 
the Quarterly National Accounts. In line with the trend in expenditure and 
consumer sentiment documented above, we provide a ‘bottom up’ figure for 
consumption for the second half of 2020 by following a similar approach to that 
developed in Coffey et al. (2020) and McQuinn et al. (2020a). The spending 
categories from the Household Budget Survey are linked to the CSO retail sales, 
Central Bank credit card data and selected other sources.8 The consumption data 
from the Quarterly National Accounts are used for Q1 and Q2 2020. To generate 
an estimate of consumption expenditure in Q3 2020, we use a combination of retail 
sales, card spending, consumer sentiment and other data to approximate how 
consumer spending has changed between the first and the third quarter of 2020.9 
For Q4 2020, we assume that consumption drops back from Q3 levels by just over 
4 per cent reflecting increased local lockdowns and restrictions such as the 
movement of Dublin to Level 3 on the risk scale in late September. This leads us to 
an overall annual decline in consumer expenditure of 9.2 per cent for 2020. 
 
For 2021, we assume that a strong rebound in consumption is driven by 




8  Other data sources include Ryanair and CSO data on vehicle registrations.  
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2020. An implicit assumption is that as long as households are ‘living with 
COVID-19’, behavioural adaptation as well as more targeted public health 
responses will facilitate increases in expenditure relative to the first half of 2020. 




• Exports performed relatively strongly in Q2 compared to other sectors of the 
economy, recording positive annual growth; 




While COVID-19 has had a severe negative impact on the Irish domestic economy, 
the overall impact on the traded sector has been much more muted. Relative to 
other sectors of the economy, the strong performance of the traded sector is the 
primary reason why the overall fall in GDP in the second quarter was not as severe 
as originally anticipated. 
 
Despite the unprecedented negative economic impact that COVID-19 has had on 
Irelands’ major trading partners, exports remained resilient through the first half 
of the year. Using the seasonally-adjusted series, export volumes grew by 0.1 per 
cent in Q2 2020 compared to the same period the previous year. While Figure 8 
shows that this growth rate is significantly lower than previous quarters, the fact 
that export growth was positive at all is remarkable in light of the current 
international economic situation. Taking a look behind the headline growth rate, 
there is a clear divergence in exports of goods and services. While on a seasonally-
adjusted basis exports of services fell by 8.0 per cent, exports of goods increased 
by 7.9 per cent over the same period.  
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FIGURE 8  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED EXPORTS, YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (VOLUME, %) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 9 shows the five largest commodity groups of merchandise exports. These 
statistics exclude goods related to merchanting and contract manufacturing and so 
give a better idea of the underlying trends in goods trade.10 By far the largest 
commodity group was medicinal and pharmaceutical products, which accounted 
for over 32 per cent of all goods exports in 2019. The primary reason why goods 
exports performed so well over the second quarter was the strong performance of 
this commodity group which grew by 30.5 per cent compared to the same period 
the previous year. Medicinal and pharmaceutical goods were highlighted as one of 
the few sectors that might benefit from the current crisis as a result of the 
increased international demand for healthcare products. This tallies with the 
findings of Leibovici and Santacreu (2020)11 who argue that countries who are net 
exporters of essential goods can experience gains in trade during a pandemic. 
Looking at the next largest export groups it is clear the pandemic has had a much 
more negative impact on their performance. Organic chemicals, machinery and 
transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured articles all declined over 
the same period by 11.2, 16.8 and 23.6 per cent respectively. More detail on the 
relative impact of these items can be found in the Research Note within this 
Commentary where O’Toole (2020) documents the link between the specific 





10  For more on this see:  
 https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/geid/explaininggoodsexportsandimports2012-2016. 
11  Leibovici F. and A.M. Santacreu (2020). International Trade of Essential Goods During a Pandemic, Federal Reserve 
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FIGURE 9  MERCHANDISE EXPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUP (VALUE, € MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
In terms of the exports of services, it is also the case that one component of 
services is far larger than all others. In this case computer services are by far the 
largest component, accounting for over 47.1 per cent of all service exports in 2019. 
In Q2 2020 the value of computer services grew by 4.3 per cent compared to 
Q2 2019. Despite this, overall service exports declined for the period as a result of 
the poor performance of most other components, most notably business services.  
 
FIGURE 10  SERVICE EXPORTS BY COMPONENT (VALUE, € MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
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Both Figure 9 and Figure 10 highlight the performance of the largest components 
of service and good exports, namely computer services and medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products, in the robust performance of exports over the second 
quarter. This was enough to offset the deterioration in the performance of most 
other components of goods and services exports over the same period. Therefore, 
despite a collapse in external demand for the majority of internationally traded 
sectors, overall exports remained positive for the quarter. Given that Q2 is 
assumed to be the nadir of the pandemic crisis for both Ireland and its main trading 
partners, many of these export components should see some improvement during 
the remainder of this year and into 2021. These developments bring back into 
focus just how reliant the Irish economy is on a small number of sectors which in 
turn are dominated by a small number of firms. 
 
Imports 
There was a sharp decline in imports in Q2 2020, down over 37 per cent compared 
to the same period the previous year. A significant decline was not unexpected 
given the fall in household consumption. However, a substantial proportion of this 
decline was due to a fall in the imports of capital investment. This category can be 
highly volatile from quarter to quarter. While imports and investment are often 
linked in this regard and net out in terms of overall impact on GDP, when looking 
at imports in isolation the importation of intellectual property and aircraft related 
to leasing can often distort the Irish data.  
 
FIGURE 11  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS, YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (VOLUME, %) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
While imports are expected to remain muted this year in light of falling investment 
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the imports of some goods and services which are used in the production process. 
Table 2 shows the performance of the largest components of imports not related 
to intellectual property and aircraft related to leasing. Aside from tourism and 
travel, which has collapsed as a result of international travel restrictions, other 
components of imports have been robust. 
 
TABLE 2  SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED IMPORTS, YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (VOLUME, %) 
Import Category Share of Total Imports 2019 % 
Growth in Q2 2020 
% 
Business services other than R&D and operational leasing 14.8 8.6 
Financial services 3.8 6.5 
Insurance 2.0 9.3 
Tourism and travel 1.8 -96.4 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 1.8 7.5 
Organic chemicals  1.2 63.5 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Given the most recent data, forecasts for export growth this year have been 
revised upwards: growth for 2020 is now forecast at 1.7 per cent while growth for 
2021 is also expected to be strong at 6.1 per cent. The growth in 2021 reflects the 
recovery in sectors which suffered a sharp decline in 2020 and are set to experience 
growth as the international climate improves. Meanwhile imports are expected to 
decline by 6.1 per cent this year but increase by 6.5 per cent next year as 




• Significant decline in modified Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation in 
Q2 2020; 
• Lockdown results in collapse in building and construction activity in Q2;  
• Recent Purchasing Managers Indices for manufacturing and services indicate 
potential signs of recovery. 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the increased level of uncertainty created by the pandemic and the 
ensuing lockdown have had a significant negative impact on Irish businesses. This 
was shown in the first Business Impact of COVID-19 Survey administered by the 
CSO in April which revealed that nearly one-in-four businesses in the country had 
ceased trading at that time. There has been a more optimistic outlook of late with 
the most recent survey in August showing that over 96 per cent of businesses 
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responded that they are currently trading. However, nearly a third of these 
reported that they were trading at reduced capacity. These figures indicate that 
while business conditions have improved since the strictest period of lockdown 
was lifted, we still remain a long way from pre-pandemic conditions. This has 
obvious repercussions for investment as businesses which are uncertain about 
their future prospects are unlikely to engage in long-term capital expenditure.  
 
In a Special Article in this Commentary, Martinez-Cillero et al. (2020) assess the 
number of SMEs that will face losses through 2020 given the COVID-19 pandemic. 
They find that nearly one-in-two firms faced losses during the lockdown and that 
up to €15 billion in losses could be accumulated through to year end. These 
devastating economic losses are likely to deter all but the most insulated of firms 
from investing.  
 
In Q2 Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (GDFCF) fell by 73 per cent compared 
to the same period the previous year. However, headline investment figures are 
often distorted by the activity of multinational firms which result in large 
fluctuations in investment from quarter to quarter. Modified GDFCF provides a 
better indication of underlying investment in the Irish economy by removing the 
distortionary impacts of investment in intellectual property and investment in 
aircraft related to leasing. In Q2 2020 modified GDFCF formation decreased by 
24.4 per cent compared to the same period the previous year (Figure 12). This is 
comparable to figures seen in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis when underlying 
investment dropped by nearly 30 per cent. Part of this decline was explained by 
the fall in investment in buildings and construction, which declined by over 35 per 
cent in Q2. Although statistics on investment in machinery and equipment were 
not released for this period, it is likely investment in these assets also declined 
sharply. Previous research has highlighted the correlation between machinery and 
equipment investment and businesses confidence, which has been significantly 





12  O’Toole, C. (2020). ‘Box 2, Global uncertainty and the impact on Irish aggregate investment’, in Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Summer 2020, Economic and Social Research Institute.  
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FIGURE 12  MODIFIED GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 13 shows the number of housing completions in the State since 2012. There 
had been a gradual increase in the number of completions over the past decade as 
supply increased to meet the level of structural demand, estimated to be in the 
region of 35,000 new homes a year. This trend had been forecast to continue in 
2020 with 24,500 completions projected at the start of the year. However, as a 
result of economic disruption caused by COVID-19, this figure has been reduced to 
17,000. Already there was a significant decline in completions in Q2, down by over 
30 per cent compared to the same period the previous year. This decline is likely 
related to the physical restrictions that were in place in late March and April which 
stopped all work on construction sites. Even though construction sites have 
reopened in recent months, building capacity is likely to remain below 
pre-pandemic levels due to social distancing measures and additional safety 
protocols which have been put in place. Going forward supply may remain subdued 
as investment is curtailed in an environment of high uncertainty.  
 
While pre-pandemic we forecast that there would be around 28,000 completions 
in 2021, this has now been reduced to just over 20,000. The issue of falling supply 
has been noted in the Special Article by Allen-Coghlan, McQuinn and O’Toole 
(2020), who posit that the most significant effect the pandemic will have on the 
housing market is to exacerbate the current imbalance between supply and 
demand. Uncertainty around COVID-19 is likely to lead to a reduction in investment 
in new building projects in the short term which in turn will lead to a fall in housing 
supply in the future. When the demand for housing begins to increase as 
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FIGURE 13  HOUSING COMPLETIONS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Figure 14 shows the Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) for both manufacturing and 
services. The PMI is based on a monthly survey of senior executives at private 
market companies across five fields, namely; supplier deliveries, inventories, order 
backlogs, new orders and employment levels. The indices give an indication of 
underlying business conditions and sentiment. An Index value of over 50 indicates 
an expansion in the sector relative to the previous month, while a value below 50 
indicates a contraction. The PMI for both manufacturing and services plunged in 
April as the lockdown took effect across the country. The Manufacturing Index 
which had been around 50 for the previous 12 months declined to 36 in April. There 
was an even greater fall in the services sector which declined to just under 14. The 
greater decline in services is unsurprising given the widespread shutdown of 
non-essential domestic services in April such as restaurants, pubs, hairdressers etc. 
Since April both sectors have experienced a rapid recovery. As of August, the 
indices are above 50 indicating that business conditions are improving on the 
previous month. However, further improvements may be halted as a result of the 









2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Actual Forecast
Q uarter l y  E conomi c  Commentary  –  Autumn 2020  | 29 
 
FIGURE 14  PURCHASING MANGERS INDEX 
 
 
Source:  Markit Purchasing Managers Index.  
 
Investment in both machinery & equipment and buildings & construction are 
expected to remain subdued over the rest of this year and through 2021 as 
uncertainty remains. Despite most businesses resuming trading, reduced capacity 
and increased uncertainty mean investment in capital expenditure is likely to be 
well below the level it was at pre-pandemic. Overall, investment is expected to 
decline by 17.0 per cent this year before recovering some of this loss in 2021, 
growing by 8.0 per cent.  
 
The investment forecast for 2021 is also based on the assumption that there is a 
free trade agreement between the EU and UK in place in January next year. In the 
event of a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit the level of investment will be lower again. 
Work by Daly and Lawless (2020)13 shows that sectors that would be most exposed 
to a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit are also those that have been least impacted by 
COVID-19, for example financial services and agriculture. This means that in the 
event of a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit, while there will not be a multiplicative effect 
of both crises on individual sectors, there will be a greater spread of sectors that 
are exposed to some form of risk. It should be noted that over the long term, Brexit 
may result in increased FDI to Ireland as a result of firms relocating from the UK, 
and Ireland generally being seen as a more attractive investment opportunity than 





13  Daly, L. and M. Lawless (2020). ‘Examination of the sectoral overlap of COVID-19 and Brexit shocks’. ESRI Working Paper 














• Unemployment rate was 14.7 per cent in September 2020; 
• 450,800 people were either on the Live Register or claiming the PUP in August;  
• Approximately 360,000 were being supported by the TWSS in August; 




The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Irish labour market has been swift 
and unprecedented. In September, the unemployment rate was 14.7 per cent. This 
is up from 4.9 per cent in February but marks a significant decline from a peak of 
30.4 per cent in April. Figure 15 illustrates the substantial rise in unemployment, 
both in terms of its rapidity and scale. 
 
FIGURE 15 UNEMPLOYMENT BY MONTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Seasonally-Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Rate Series and the COVID-19 Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Rate Series. 
Central Statistics Office.  
Note:  The COVID-19 Adjusted Monthly Unemployment rate is used from March onward, rather than the traditional Monthly 
Unemployment Rate.  
 
As well as the changes in unemployment, the level and composition of those 
employed has also changed. According to the Labour Force Survey there were an 
estimated 2,222,500 people at work in the State in Q2 2020. This is down by 77,600 
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of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Irish labour market as it has been determined 
using strict classification criteria set by the ILO. In light of this, a COVID-19 adjusted 
estimate of employment has been produced. As of June 2020, the CSO estimates 
that 1,783,567 persons aged 15 and over were in employment.14 The number of 
people ‘Away from Work’ (employed but not working) also illustrates the impact 
of the pandemic on the labour market. In Q2 2020 the number of those ‘away from 
work’ was up by 276.7 per cent year-on-year.15  
 
In the previous Commentary Roantree illustrated how younger workers were 
disproportionately impacted by the pandemic in terms of joblessness. In this 
Commentary we focus more on the impact across sectors. Employment in some 
sectors has been more severely impacted than others by the pandemic. Sectors 
such as ‘Public administration and defence’ and ‘Education’ have largely escaped 
the substantial falls in employment between Q1 and Q2 2020 witnessed in sectors 
such as ‘Administrative and support services’ and ‘Accommodation and food 
services’ brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
The CSO has carried out research using administrative data from Revenue based 
on a sample that excludes the self-employed and firms with fewer than three 
employees. Based on this sample, the CSO estimates that the percentage fall in 
employment from Q1 to Q2 2020 for the ‘Accommodation and food’ sector was 
61.2 per cent, while the fall for the ‘Administrative and support’ sector was 
17.1 per cent. On the other hand, employment in ‘Public administration and 
defence’ and ‘Education’ only fell by 5.7 per cent and 6 per cent respectively.16  
 
The vast majority of those who lose their jobs as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic 
are entitled to some form of State support and the scale of the employment shock 
can be seen in the number of people either on the Live Register or availing of the 
Pandemic Unemployment Payment. The number of people on the Live Register or 
claiming the PUP peaked at over 816,800 in April. In August of this year it stood at 
450,800; this compares to the 199,100 on the Live Register in August 2019. These 
figures do not include the number of people being supported by the Temporary 
Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) as they are still in employment. This scheme allowed 
employees, whose employers were negatively impacted by the pandemic, to 
receive supports directly through their employer’s payroll system. The scheme ran 
from 26 March 2020 to 31 August 2020. It is estimated that 360,000 employees 




14  For more information see:  
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/lfs/labourforcesurveylfsquarter22020. 
15  For more information see:  
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/br/b-lfs/labourmarketinsightseries1q22020. 
16  For more information see:  
https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/br/b-lfs/labourmarketinsightbulletinseries2.  
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Exchequer of operating the TWSS for its duration was approximately €2,853 million 
(Revenue Commissioners, 2020).  
 
While the TWSS was active, approximately 125,100 people transitioned from the 
PUP to the TWSS and approximately 23,200 individuals transitioned from the TWSS 
to the PUP. Approximately 242,400 individuals moved from the TWSS to non-TWSS 
employment.17 This shows the significant role the wage subsidy scheme has played 
in helping individuals retain/regain their jobs during the pandemic. The 
Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS) replaced the TWSS from 1 September 
2020 although the TWSS and the EWSS operated in parallel throughout July and 
August. By mid-September approximately 34,300 employers had registered with 
Revenue for the new scheme. Figure 16 shows the number of individuals on the 
Live Register, the number claiming the PUP and the number of employees being 
supported by the TWSS by week from March to September.  
 




Source:  Central Statistics Office and Revenue Commissioners.  
Note:  18 May (red line) was the beginning of Phase 1 of ‘The Roadmap for Reopening Society and Business’, while Phase 2 and Phase 3 
began on 8 June (green line) and 29 June (blue line) respectively. 
 
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been unequal across sectors and time, 
with some sectors able to return to work sooner than others in line with the phased 
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food’, ‘Information and communication’ and ‘Construction’ – are presented in 
more detail below. Figure 17 shows the number of people claiming the PUP and 
the number of people being supported by the TWSS in a given week for the 
‘Accommodation and food’ sector. For comparative purposes, it also shows the 
number of people in employment according to the Q1 2020 Labour Force Survey. 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the same for the ‘Construction’ and the ‘Information 
and communication’ sectors.18  
 
The ‘Accommodation and food’ (A&F) sector has been one of the most severely 
impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. In Q1 2020 there were an estimated 173,900 
people working in the sector. At the end of April, 127,000 people from the sector 
were claiming the PUP. This is 73 per cent of those working in the sector in 
Q1 2020. The numbers had fallen to 63,700 people, or 37 per cent, of Q1 2020 A&F 
workers by the end of July. However, the number of those from the sector being 
supported by the TWSS over the same period more than doubled – growing from 
30,527 to 81,941 from the end April to the end of July. This shows the significant 
role the TWSS has played in helping PUP claimants from this sector to return to 
work. The number of those in the A&F sector being supported by the TWSS or 
claiming the PUP was 157,527 at the end of April (91 per cent of Q1 2020 A&F 
workers). By the end of July this had fallen slightly to 145,641 (84 per cent of 
Q1 2020 A&F workers). 
 
FIGURE 17 ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD – NUMBER (‘000) ON PUP, TWSS AND IN SECTOR 
 
 





18  The number of people being supported by the TWSS in a given sector is taken from the CSO while a combination of the 
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The Construction sector is an example of a sector that was hit quite severely in the 
early stages of the pandemic but has recovered far better than the 
‘Accommodation and food’ sector since then. In Q1 2020 there were an estimated 
148,600 people working in the sector. At the end of April, 78,500 people from the 
sector, or 53 per cent of Q1 2020 construction workers, were claiming the PUP. 
This had fallen to 24,300 people or 16 per cent of Q1 2020 construction workers 
by the end of July. At the end of April 38,396 people in the sector were being 
supported by the TWSS. Unlike the ‘Accommodation and food’ sector, this number 
has fallen over time and by the end of July only 29,474 people from the sector were 
being supported by the TWSS. The number of those in the Construction sector 
being supported by the TWSS or claiming the PUP was 116,896 at the end of April 
(79 per cent of Q1 2020 A&F workers). By the end of July this had fallen 
substantially to 53,774 or 36 per cent of Q1 2020 Construction workers. 
 
FIGURE 18 CONSTRUCTION – NUMBER (‘000) ON PUP, TWSS AND IN SECTOR  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and the Department of Social Protection and Employment Affairs.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, when compared to the ‘Accommodation and 
food’ sector, the ‘Information and communication’ (I&C) sector has fared far better 
throughout the pandemic. In Q1 2020 there were an estimated 128,500 people 
working in the sector. At the end of April, 11,300 people from the sector (9 per cent 
of Q1 2020 I&C workers) were claiming the PUP. This had fallen to 8,000 people or 
6 per cent of Q1 2020 I&C workers by the end of July. At the end of April 13,355 
people in the sector were supported by the TWSS. Similar to the ‘Construction’ 
sector, this number has fallen over time and by the end of July only 11,064 people 
from the sector were being supported by the TWSS. The combined number of 
those in the I&C sector being supported by the TWSS or claiming the PUP was 
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this had fallen to 19,064 or 15 per cent of Q1 2020 ‘Information and 
communication’ workers. 
 




Source:  Central Statistics Office and the Department of Social Protection and Employment Affairs.  
 
The figures above clearly illustrate the unequal impact the COVID-19 pandemic has 
had on the Irish labour market across the sectors. The sector specific nature of 
these job losses and the progressive nature of the income tax system in Ireland 
have combined to result in a fall of only 1.4 per cent in income tax for the year to 
August when compared to the same period in 2019.19 The sectors worst affected 
by the pandemic, such as Accommodation and food, had a higher share of low-paid 
and part-time workers and as such many of the workers in this sector did not pay 
high levels of income tax before the pandemic occurred. For example, in February 
2020, the Accommodation and food sector accounted for 7 per cent of employees 
but only 1 per cent of PAYE contributions. On the other hand, many of the workers 
that bear a significant PAYE liability are employed in sectors that were not severely 
impacted by the unemployment shock brought on by the pandemic. For example, 
employees in Public administration, Education and Health together accounted for 
29 per cent of employees in February 2020 and for 26 per cent of PAYE 
contributions while the ICT sector accounted for 4 per cent of employees 





19  For further information see: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/4181c-fiscal-monitor-august-2020.  
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We expect the unemployment rate to be 12.7 per cent in Q4 2020 under the 
current ‘Living with COVID’ approach. This accounts for local restrictions and 
lockdowns but crucially it assumes that there is no return to a strict nationwide 
lockdown in the rest of 2020. Should this occur the unemployment rate will most 
likely be higher. Phase 2 of the reopening of the economy began on 8 June. There 
were approximately 308,000 fewer people receiving the PUP by mid-September 
when compared to the first week in June. Should we return to a similar level of 
restrictions it is possible that many of these individuals may need to return to 
claiming the PUP. For 2020 as a whole, we expect the unemployment rate will 
average 16.8 per cent. Under our Baseline scenario for 2021, which assumes a 
trade deal is agreed between the EU and the UK, we estimate the unemployment 




• A substantial deficit is forecast for 2020; 
• Decline in income taxation receipts were not as great as expected;  
• Corporation tax receipts are likely to increase substantially again in 2020; 
• A significant deficit is also likely in 2021. 
 
 
Figure 20 plots the growth rates for the main taxation items for the period January 
to August from 2016 to 2020. Most items registered significant growth in January 
and February, before the impact of COVID-19 started to take effect in March and 
April.  
 
FIGURE 20 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%): JANUARY – AUGUST 
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For the year to date income tax receipts are down by 1.4 per cent with respect to 
the same period in 2019. As noted in the labour market section this highlights the 
sector specific nature of many of the job losses due to COVID-19 along with the 
progressive nature of the income tax system. It would appear that many of those 
jobs that were lost were either outside of the income tax system or had a low level 
of liability because they were in sectors with relatively high proportions of low 
wage or part-time employment. It is also worth noting that, according to data 
released by the Revenue Commissioners, the ten largest tax paying firms in the 
Irish economy had annual job growth of 11 per cent in both April and May. 
Therefore, this has resulted in the average tax liability per new job exceeding the 
average tax liability per lost job (April and May), further reducing the overall impact 
of job losses on aggregate receipts. This heterogeneity of performance in the 
labour market is further illustrated by the fact that PRSI receipts increased by 
almost 9 per cent for the year to August. 
 
As with previous years, corporation taxes continue to witness a significant increase 
in the present year with receipts up by over 27 per cent for the year to date. This 
contrasts sharply with the profile or expected level of these receipts published at 
the start of the year which indicated that a negative growth rate of 6.4 per cent 
was expected, leading to a tax take of €10.2 billion. The difference between the 
expected and actual receipts can be thought of as another ‘windfall’ amount for 
the Irish Exchequer. In effect, it means that the deficit, which is likely to be 
substantial anyway, could have been up to €2 billion higher had corporation taxes 
materialised as expected.  
 
The surge in corporation tax may be related to certain tax arrangements, which 
allowed multinationals who dealt in intellectual property (IP) to significantly 
reduce their global taxable income. A Box by McQuinn in the Output section of the 
Commentary highlights the implications of some of these transactions on Euro Area 
aggregate data as well as the Irish National Accounts.  
 
For the present year, the combination of the increased expenditure in areas such 
as social protection along with the overall decline in taxation revenues means that 
the Exchequer is likely to experience a deficit of €25.4 billion or 7.3 per cent of GDP. 
This will result in a significant increase in the national debt. In 2021, under our 
Baseline assumption that a free trade agreement will be achieved between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union, we also expect a sizeable deficit to occur. 
This is likely as the Government is committed to maintaining a number of the 
income support schemes until at least April 2021. This will result in a higher level 
of expenditure than would otherwise be the case.  
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We do expect to see most of the taxation headings registering positive growth in 
2021 as they recover from the declines most experienced in 2020. However, as can 
be seen from Table 3, which presents the actual level of taxation receipts for 2019 
as well as forecasts for 2020 and 2021, we believe that most tax aggregates will be 
lower in level terms in 2021 than they were in 2019. The exception is corporation 
taxes. Overall, we believe the deficit will be €15 billion in 2021 or 3.9 per cent of 
GDP. 
 
TABLE 3 ACTUAL AND FORECAST LEVEL OF SELECT TAXATION AGGREGATES (€ BILLION) 





Income 22.9 22.13 22.8 
VAT 15.1 10.58 14.18 
Corporation 10.9 12.52 12.52 
Excise 5.9 4.75 5.61 
 
Source:  Department of Finance and QEC.  
 
In terms of funding for the State, two bonds matured in the present year; one in 
April and one in October. Also, four of the remaining five tranches of the UK 
bilateral loan matured in 2020. In terms of its response to the COVID-19 situation, 
the stated policy of the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) is to use 
existing cash balances to meet part of the additional 2020 funding requirement. 
The NTMA has already borrowed €20 billion of the revised funding target 2020. 
It is also envisaged that short-term paper will also be an important funding source 
for the sovereign.  
 
We summarise the resulting implications for our forecasts of the debt-to-output 
ratios in Figure 21. By the end of 2020, we believe the debt-to-GDP ratio will be up 
to 67 per cent while debt-to-GNI* will have increased to almost 110 per cent. Both 
ratios will decline marginally in 2021 as the recovery in output will exceed the 
increase in the national debt.  
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FIGURE 21 DEBT-TO-GDP/GNI* (%) 
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COVID-19 continues to have a significant negative impact on many aspects of the 
Irish economy. Consumption and certain elements of investment have witnessed 
substantial downturns, while the labour market is currently experiencing 
unemployment rates of almost 15 per cent. However, despite the fact that many 
of our exporting firms have been negatively impacted by COVID-19, the export 
sector as a whole avoided a decline in Q2 2020 compared with the same period in 
the previous year.  
 
The strong contribution to economic growth of net trade in 2020 means that the 
Irish economy experienced a relatively small decline in headline GDP, compared to 
other EU countries in Q2 2020. In a Note to this Commentary, O’Toole (2020) sheds 
more light on the Irish macroeconomic performance in a cross-country context and 
links the relatively benign fall in GDP to individual, multinational-dominated export 
sectors. This, along with the expected recovery, particularly in consumption for the 
latter half of the year, means the Irish economy is set to experience a decline of 
1.8 per cent for 2020. While the decline in GDP is much less severe than we 
previously expected, the economic shock has been substantial for particular 
sectors and for many households. It is clear from the decline in household 
spending – which has been amongst the largest in the EU – and the increase in 
unemployment, that COVID-19 has had a major adverse impact on Irish economic 
life. 
 
The unique nature of the COVID-19 related economic shock has highlighted 
particular characteristics of the Irish economy. For example, despite the 
unemployment rate jumping to just above 30 per cent at one stage in the year and 
likely to be approximately 17 per cent for the year as a whole, income tax receipts 
were down by just 1.4 per cent for the year to August. This suggests that in the 
main, the labour market impact of COVID-19 appears to be concentrated in 
relatively low paid jobs. Many who lost their jobs may have been outside the 
income tax net altogether or work in sectors that have a high proportion of low 
wage and/or part-time employment. This contrasts with those employed in 
relatively ‘tax rich’ sectors such as FDI (manufacturing/ICT) and financial services. 
 
Forming an accurate assessment of the impact of COVID-19 is a complex challenge 
given the continued presence of distortions in the Irish National Accounts due to 
the activities of a select few multinationals. For example, the headline investment 
figure for the Irish economy experienced substantial volatility in the present year 
due to variations in capital investment related to intellectual property products 
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(IPP). In a Box to the Commentary, McQuinn highlights the impact that these 
distortions in the Irish and Dutch data are having on Euro Area data.  
 
Understanding the nature of the COVID-19 shock is important as the economy 
braces itself for the prospect of another adverse shock in the immediate future; 
namely that of Brexit. In the Commentary we draw on recent research by Daly and 
Lawless (2020) and on a Box in the Commentary by Bergin and Garcia Rodriguez, 
which uses COSMO, the macro-econometric model of the Irish economy, to assess 
the likely outcome for the Irish economy of a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit, given the 
COVID-19 downturn. Their analysis quantifies the significant impact on the 
domestic economy over the longer term of a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit. 
 
We therefore prepare two scenarios for 2021; one is where an agreement is 
reached between the European Union and the United Kingdom on a substantive 
trade arrangement from 2021 onwards (Baseline) and a second where a Disorderly 
No-Deal arrangement is assumed to take place from the outset of 2021. In both 
cases, the underlying assumption is that COVID-19 will remain in society and that 
certain COVID-related restrictions will stay in place for the duration of 2021. 
 
Our results indicate that under the Baseline scenario, the Irish economy will 
recover quite strongly in 2021 with GDP registering growth of 6.3 per cent. 
Consequently, GDP by the end of 2021 will be 4.5 per cent greater than that in 
2019. If a Disorderly No-Deal Brexit does transpire however, the domestic 
economy will register a much more modest growth rate of 3.3 per cent in 2021 as 
exports, in particular, are adversely impacted.  
 
While a number of the tax headings such as VAT, Customs and Excise Duty are likely 
to register significant declines for the present year, corporation taxes are set to 
register another year of substantial increases. For the year to August corporation 
tax receipts were up by over 27 per cent on the previous year. This may be related 
to the substantial increases in capital investment noted earlier. Importantly, from 
the perspective of the public finances, 2020 sees the end of the ‘Double Irish’ tax 
arrangement. This could have negative implications for future corporation tax 
receipts. 
 
From a general budgetary perspective, it will continue to be necessary to support 
the Irish economy with the various measures already in place as we move into 
2021. Taking the Baseline scenario presented in the Commentary, this means a 
deficit is again likely in 2021. This is particularly the case if there is a Disorderly 
No-Deal Brexit. However, given the underlying strength of the Irish economy and 
the likelihood that the economy will grow robustly once uncertainty concerning 
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the virus has passed, the policy of supporting the economy in the present manner 
is the correct approach. This will minimise the adverse impact of COVID-19 on the 
domestic economy in the short term and hasten the recovery in the medium to 
longer term.  
 
The impact of the COVID-19 related downturn on the financial performance of Irish 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is examined in a Special Article to the 
Commentary. Martinez-Cillero, Lawless and O’Toole (2020) use survey evidence on 
the extent of turnover and expenditure reductions for Irish SMEs due to COVID-19. 
This information is then used to calibrate a number of scenarios for a 
representative dataset of Irish firms. Martinez-Cillero et al. (2020) find that 
between two-in-five micro firms and one-in-two small/medium-sized firms faced a 
revenue shortfall from March to June 2020. This accounts for a revenue shortfall 
of between €6 billion and €10 billion for the period. Looking forward to the end of 
2020, scenario estimates for the gap are between €8 billion and €15 billion 
depending on the epidemiological situation. 
 
While it is certainly the correct approach at present to continue to support firms 
(either through ongoing wage subsidy arrangements, grants, or loan finance 
mechanisms such as the expanded credit guarantee scheme), the longer the 
economy continues to operate under COVID-related public health measures, the 
more difficult it will be for some firms to survive in the absence of policy supports. 
There will come a point where the tapering of policy measures will be necessary. 
At that stage a greater focus on the sustainability or otherwise of the enterprise 
will be needed to ensure the most efficient use of policy measures.  
 
As noted earlier, distortions in the National Accounts due to the activities of a few 
multinational companies make identifying the true impact of COVID-19 on the 
domestic economy particularly challenging. In another paper to the Commentary, 
FitzGerald (2020) argues that the best measure of economic welfare for those living 
in Ireland is Net National Product (NNP). Using new data FitzGerald shows the 
contribution to NNP by each industrial sector, broken down by foreign and 
domestically owned businesses. The growth rate of NNP and the contribution to it 
from the different industrial sectors and from foreign and domestically owned 
firms is analysed. The results suggest that the economic welfare of those living in 
Ireland has grown by around 5 per cent a year since 2013. The analysis in the paper 
shows that the foreign owned sector has contributed around 20 per cent of the 
growth in the economy since the recovery began. It also shows that the 
contribution from domestically owned businesses is spread across a range of 
industrial sectors. 
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In another Special Article to the Commentary Allen-Coghlan, McQuinn and O’Toole 
(2020) assess the implications for the Irish property market of COVID-19. The issue 
is addressed under the headings of housing demand, housing supply, affordability 
and the rental market. The paper draws on a number of studies conducted by ESRI 
researchers, which have examined the implications of COVID-19 on house prices 
(Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn, 2020),21 rent levels (Allen-Coghlan, M., C. Coffey, and 
C. O’Toole, 2020)22 and affordability in the rental sector (O’Toole, Slaymaker, 
McQuinn, Coffey and Corrigan, 2020).23 One of the conclusions of the paper is that 
arguably the main long-term consequence of COVID-19 on the property market is 
that the existing imbalance between supply and demand in the market may be 
exacerbated. Housing demand will likely recover quite quickly when the economy 
stabilises, particularly if the increased savings observed amongst households are 
used for house purchasing purposes. However, housing supply, which will also be 
impacted adversely by COVID-19, is likely to take longer to recover. Consequently, 
the paper argues, as previous Commentaries have, for a renewed commitment to 
the provision of social and affordable housing. This will help to offset any increase 






21  Allen-Coghlan M. and K. McQuinn (2020). ‘Property prices and COVID-19 related administrative closures: What are the 
implications?’, International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis, accepted. 
22  Allen-Coghlan, M., C. Coffe, and C. O’Toole (2020). Exploring the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Rental Prices in 
Ireland from January to June 2020: Early Insights from a Monthly Rent Index. Economic and Social Research Institute 
(ESRI) and Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
23  Coffey C., E. Corrigan, K. McQuinn, C. O’Toole and R. Slaymaker (2020). Exploring the short-run implications of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on affordability in the Irish private rental market. ESRI Research Series 108, Economic and Social 
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THE LOCKDOWN TALE OF TWO ECONOMIES IN IRELAND: HOW BIG 
TECH AND PHARMA BUCKED THE TREND 
 
* Conor O’Toole1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic represents the most severe, and rapid, disruption to the 
Irish and international economies in the post-World War Two era. Across the globe, 
authorities have been imposing public health restrictions which effectively close 
whole of sections of the economy in an effort to limit the transmission of the virus. 
While such measures have proven to be effective in many countries to ‘flatten the 
curve’, the economic cost associated with these lockdowns is high (IMF, 2020; 
Mandel and Veetil, 2020).  
 
In Ireland, the authorities introduced extensive restrictions on economic and social 
life which saw much of the economy put into a deep freeze before gradually 
opening in June and July 2020. Indeed, Ireland had one of the strictest and longest 
lockdowns as measured by the recently developed Oxford Stringency Index.2 Over 
the first and second quarters of 2020, consumer spending fell by nearly one-
quarter (in cumulative terms) and the COVID-19-adjusted unemployment rate 
peaked at just over one in every three workers.  
 
However, despite the international and domestic economy shock, the economic 
impacts on Ireland’s macroeconomy, as measured by the growth rate of gross 
domestic product (GDP),3 were relatively benign. Despite having the third largest 
consumption fall across 23 European countries, Ireland’s GDP decline was the sixth 
smallest, mainly due to robust export growth. As a small and highly globalised 
economy, Ireland’s growth is always sensitive to international trends. However, 
the relatively strong performance of Irish exports during the first half of 2020 bucks 
the international trends when export growth around the world was falling (as 
evidenced by declining exports in countries such as Germany).  
 
The aim of this Note is to explore the cross-country differences in the scale of the 




1  Corresponding author: conor.otoole@esri.ie. Thanks to Kieran McQuinn, Alan Barrett, Adele Bergin, Martina Lawless, 
Cathal Coffey and Matthew Allen-Coghlan for comments and suggestions.  
2  As measured by the Oxford Stringency Index (Hale et al., 2020).  
3  There has been considerable attention on GDP as an indicator of well-being in Ireland and alternative measures have 
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a cross-country context and to provide some evidence on the very unique structure 
of the composition of Irish exports which enabled these areas to buck the 
COVID-19 economic trend.  
 
A number of findings emerge. First, the performance of the industrial sector in 
Ireland has masked very large economic adjustments in other sectors. While 
industrial value added grew by 11 per cent cumulatively over the first half of 2020, 
value added in construction fell by over 40 per cent, and value added in arts, 
entertainment and recreation fell by nearly 75 per cent; both of these represent 
the largest declines of any EU country or the UK.  
 
This duality in performance can be traced back to Ireland’s export structure and its 
concentration in a limited number of areas. Based on 2019 data, 26 per cent of 
Ireland’s exports are computer services, a further 15 per cent are goods for 
processing, 11 per cent are medical and pharmaceutical goods and 7 per cent are 
organic chemicals. Only 3 per cent of export values were accounted for by 
transport, travel and tourism activities which have been severely affected by 
COVID-19.  
 
During the lockdown period, strong quarterly growth in exports of medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products, goods for processing (or contract manufacturing) and 
computer services outweighed very large declines in many other items (on a year-
on-year basis).4 Indeed, the value of tourism, travel and transport exports virtually 
collapsed (year-on-year in Q2 2020), but their contribution to the fall in overall 
export values (3 per cent) was completely outweighed by the growth in the value 
of medicinal and pharmaceutical product exports (3 per cent).  
 
A question arises as to whether these developments were part of multinational 
corporate activities without any real economic activity taking place on the island 
of Ireland. Goods for processing activity does not relate to a core activity 
undertaken in Ireland and could be seen as part of the unusual globalisation effects 
on the Irish economy (Lane, 2017; FitzGerald, 2015). However, the relatively good 
performance of computer services and medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
comes from areas of a real sectoral specialisation advantage for Ireland. Even if 
these sectors are not employment intensive, the contribution of these activities 





4  It is not unexpected to find major variations in output by sector during the lockdown period as some sectors continued 
to function as per public health advice while others were restricted in their operations.  
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The rest of this Note is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a short overview 
of the macroeconomic performance of the Irish economy during the lockdown in a 
comparative perspective. Section 3 contrasts the sectoral performance of the Irish 
economy with other European countries and Section 4 provides insights into the 
structure of Irish exports and their unique performance which allowed them to 
buck the international trend. Section 5 concludes.  
2. THE MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE IRISH ECONOMY 
THROUGH THE LOCKDOWN IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
While the difficulties in using traditional macroeconomic aggregates in Ireland 
(such as GDP and GNP) have been well documented in recent times (FitzGerald, 
2018; 2020), many forecasters, commentators and economic planners continue to 
glean insights into the trajectory of the Irish economy from trends in Quarterly 
National Accounts data in particular. Given the fast-paced nature of the current 
COVID-19 pandemic, the timely publication of economy wide statistics is extremely 
useful as a lens into recent trends. Figure 1 shows the relative macroeconomic 
performance of the Irish economy over the past number of years in comparison to 
the UK and the rest of the EU27.  
 
FIGURE 1 TRENDS IN GDP (CONSTANT PRICES – INDEX 100 SET IN Q4 2019) – Y AXIS INDEX 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat.  
Note:  Line above indicates pre- and post- pandemic (2019 and 2020). Oval shape indicates Q4 2019 = 100.  
 
The drop in GDP during the lockdown (Q1 and Q2 2020) is much more benign in 
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relative to expectations.5 Indeed, the relatively benign impact on Ireland from a 
macroeconomic growth perspective is surprising given the lockdown in Ireland was 
amongst the most severe in Europe and occurred for longer than in other countries 
(as measured by the Severity Index presented by Hale et al., 2020).  
 
FIGURE 2 TRENDS IN LOCKDOWN STRINGENCY INDEX – FEBRUARY TO JUNE 2020 
  
Source:  Hale et al. (2020). 
 
To provide a further cross-country perspective, Figure 2 presents the quarter-on-
quarter growth rate in Q1 and Q2 2020 as well as the cumulative quarterly growth 
rate for the two periods combined. The data are presented in this structure to 
attempt to capture the severity of the initial COVID shock relative to the 
pre-pandemic benchmark in Q4 2019. It is clear that the impact on Ireland is on the 
low end of the countries presented, with an impact closer to Denmark, Switzerland 
and Norway. The largest declines have been in Spain, the UK, Italy and France 





5  In the recent Quarterly Economic Commentary (Summer 2020), we forecast much more severe falls in GDP than 
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FIGURE 3 QUARTER-ON-QUARTER CHANGES IN GDP – Q1, Q2 2020 AND CUMULATIVE Q1+Q2 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. Data presented are cumulative quarterly growth ((Q2t/Q1t)-1) + ((Q1t/Q4t-1)-1) in 
seasonally-adjusted and calendar day adjusted value added volumes (chain linked € million). 
Note: Data seasonally and calendar days adjusted. 
 
This relatively benign impact on Ireland can be explained by the difference in how 
the pandemic has impacted on domestic consumption and exports. While 
consumption expenditure has dropped dramatically, exports have been much 
more robust. The scatterplots below show the cumulative change for the first half 
of 2020 (Q1 Q-on-Q change plus Q2 Q-on-Q change) in GDP on the horizontal axis 
and the cumulative change in consumption and exports on the vertical axis. It is 
clear that the Irish fall in consumption is one of the largest, and much greater than 
the GDP fall. Conversely, the export fall has been small relative to other countries 
and relative to the fall in GDP. As an economy, exports in Ireland are a much larger 
share of GDP (approximately 137 per cent of 2019 GDP) as compared to 
consumption (31 per cent of 2019 GDP).6 These figures are much higher than for 
the EU 27 at 51 and 52 per cent respectively and for the UK at 32 and 63 per cent. 
This makes Ireland’s economy much more sensitive to changes in exports (naturally 
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FIGURE 4 SCATTER PLOT OF GDP FALL AND CHANGE IN CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS 
Cumulative Change in GDP Q1 + Q2 2020   Cumulative Change in GDP Q1 + Q2 2020  
Versus Change in Consumption (Y Axis)  Versus Change in Exports (Y Axis) 
  
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data.  
Note: Orange dot indicates Ireland. 
 
Indeed, Figure 5 provides clearer evidence of the impact of the stringency of the 
lockdown measures in Ireland and its correlation with economic activity. The 
scatter diagram plots the average stringency by country over the period February 
to June 2020 (the period in which the pandemic began in Europe) on the vertical 
axis, and the cumulative quarterly changes in GDP and consumption on the 
horizontal axis. The line in the diagram is a simple linear fitted plot. The downward 
sloping trend line shows a highly negative correlation between stringency and GDP 
change. It is clear that the impact on Irish GDP is much less than would be expected 
by the stringency of the lockdown when compared to other countries (orange dot 
is well above the fitted plot line) while the impact on Irish consumption has a 
similar relationship to other countries (orange dot is closer to the fitted line).  
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FIGURE 5 SCATTER PLOTS OF GDP CHANGE, CONSUMPTION CHANGE AND STRINGENCY INDEX 
GDP Cumulative Change and    Consumption Cumulative Change and  
Average Level of Stringency Index  Average Level of Stringency 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data.  
Note: Orange dot indicates Ireland. 
 
For Ireland, the duality of the economic shock is notable. The domestic economy 
has been very badly affected by the pandemic with very large decreases in 
consumption. However, the export channel has held up extremely well and this has 
led to a much lower GDP adjustment than otherwise would have been expected. 
The rest of this Note explores the differences between sectors and export structure 
that can help shed further insight into this economic duality.  
3. A DEEPER DIVE INTO THE SECTORAL EXPERIENCE ACROSS COUNTRIES 
To provide further insight into the comparative difference between Ireland and 
other countries in terms of the macroeconomic adjustments from the pandemic, 
the following charts explore the differences across sectors on a cross-country basis. 
The figures presented in all charts are the cumulative quarterly changes in value 
added for Q1 and Q2 for each sector individually.7 The aim of this comparison is to 
explore just how different the economic adjustment was relative to other countries 
for different sectors of the Irish economy. The cross-country comparison includes 
27 countries; all EU members (excluding Slovakia for whom data on Eurostat were 





7  Quarter 1, 2020 quarter-on-quarter change plus Quarter 2, 2020 quarter-on-quarter change.  
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Comparisons across countries for the following sectors (available from the 
Quarterly National Accounts) are presented: 
• Industry; 
• Construction; 
• Wholesale, retail, transport, accommodation and food services; 
• ICT; 
• Financial and insurance services; 
• Real estate activities; 
• Professional, scientific and technical activities; admin and support services; 
and 
• Arts, entertainment, recreation, and extra territorial activities.  
 
To begin, the cumulative quarterly growth changes in value added for Q1 and Q2 
2020 are presented below for industrial activities. Of the 27 countries considered, 
15 countries experienced a decline in industrial value added of over 15 per cent. 
Italian industrial value added shrank by nearly one-third, and the French and 
Spanish value added declined by nearly one-quarter. In fact, all countries, with the 
exception of Ireland, experienced a decline in industrial value added; Ireland, by 
contrast, experienced double digit growth (11 per cent).  
 




Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. 
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We next consider the change in value added in the construction sector. In contrast 
to the industrial sector’s performance, the decline in Irish construction value added 
was nearly 40 per cent, the largest of any of the 27 countries considered. The UK 
and France also experienced very large drops in construction value added at 37 and 
35 per cent. Spain, Cyprus, and Italy also lost over a third of value added in the 
construction sector. A number of countries experienced growth in construction 
value added over the period including Denmark, Romania, Portugal, Estonia, 
Finland and Germany.  
 




Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. 
Note: Data seasonally and calendar days adjusted. 
 
While construction value added declined extensively, value added in real estate 
services did not decrease by such an extent, having declined only circa 5 per cent. 
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Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. 
Note: Data seasonally and calendar days adjusted. 
 
The next sector considered is a large composite sector including wholesale, retail, 
food, accommodation, transport and food services. The broad nature of this sector 
makes it somewhat more difficult to compare as it mixes items that we may 
consider to be insulated against the pandemic such as retail sale of food and 
groceries with services in the tourism and transport sector which are likely to have 
been very severely affected. Each of the European economies will have a differing 
reliance on these sectors which makes the comparison of this group more 
challenging.  
 
Value added in these sectors fell considerably in Spain and Malta, down over 50 per 
cent. This is unsurprising given the reliance of these economies on tourism 
activities. Value added in these sectors also dropped by close to, or over, one-third 
in a further ten economies including Ireland, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Austria, France 
and Belgium. The country with the smallest decline in value added in this sector 
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FIGURE 9 WHOLESALE, RETAIL, FOOD, ACCOMODATION, TRANSPORT  –  VALUE ADDED 
(VOLUMES), CUMULATIVE QUARTERLY CHANGES (Q1,Q2, 2020) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. 
Note: Data seasonally and calendar days adjusted. 
 
Ireland is well known for hosting some of the biggest technology companies and 
the value added in ICT is critically important for the Irish economic performance. 
Indeed, value added in ICT grew over the Q1-Q2 period in Ireland at over 3 per 
cent. This is the fourth highest of the countries considered, with Romania, Malta 
and Luxembourg the only countries with higher value added growth in ICT. The UK, 
Spain and France experienced 14, 16, and 9 per cent declines in ICT value added 
over the period respectively.  
 
FIGURE 10 ICT – VALUE ADDED (VOLUMES), CUMULATIVE QUARTERLY CHANGES (Q1,Q2, 2020) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. 
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The next sector considered is financial and insurance activities. During the first half 
of 2020, Ireland experienced the largest drop in value added in financial and 
insurance activities of any of the 27 countries considered. Cumulatively for Q1 and 
Q2, value added in this sector fell by 9 per cent in Ireland. The country which 
experienced the largest increase in output in this sector was Spain with 7 per cent 
cumulative growth across the quarters.  
 
FIGURE 11 FINANCIAL INSURANCE  –  VALUE ADDED (VOLUMES), CUMULATIVE QUARTERLY 
CHANGES (Q1,Q2, 2020) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. 
Note: Data seasonally and calendar days adjusted. 
 
Figure 12 presents the cumulative change in value added for the professional, 
technical, scientific, administration and other services sectors. Ireland experienced 
the second largest decline in value added relative to other countries at 33 per cent. 
Only Spain, with a drop of 34 per cent, posted a larger decline in value added in 
this sector. Eight countries experienced value added falls in this sector of upwards 
of one-fifth. Bulgaria was the only country to experience an increase in sectoral 
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FIGURE 12 PROF, TECH, SCIEN, ADMIN – VALUE ADDED (VOLUMES), CUMULATIVE QUARTERLY 
CHANGES (Q1,Q2, 2020) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. 
Note: Data seasonally and calendar days adjusted. 
 
The final sector presented covers arts, entertainment and recreation activities. 
Naturally, the lockdown measures which have limited households’ ability to travel 
far from their residence closed many public amenities, and restricted group 
entertainment activities will have a large impact on this sector. Indeed, Coffey et 
al. (2020) demonstrated the large decline in spending in this category for Ireland. 
While a decline in this area was to be expected, the fall in value added in this sector 
in Ireland was severe at 72 per cent; nearly three-quarters of value added in this 
sector was lost during the first half of 2020. This decline is far greater than for any 
other country, with Romania and Denmark the only other countries also losing 
more than 50 per cent of value added. The UK decline in value added in this sector 
was also extreme at 49 per cent. The dramatic decline in value added for Ireland in 
this sector highlights the severe challenge that firms operating in this area have to 
face to survive the pandemic. The phased reopening of the economy in Ireland 
continued to restrict activities in this area in order to help suppress the virus. This 
likely to have hampered the recovery of this sector in Ireland relative to other 
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FIGURE 13 ARTS, ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES – VALUE ADDED (VOLUMES), 
CUMULATIVE QUARTERLY CHANGES (Q1,Q2, 2020) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Analysis of Eurostat data. 
Note: Data seasonally and calendar days adjusted. 
 
To summarise the sectoral experience in Ireland, it is clear industrial and ICT 
activities bucked the trend while Ireland experienced very large declines in 
construction, financial and insurance services, wholesale, retail, accommodation 
and food, and in particular in the arts, entertainment and recreational activities 
sector. Indeed, the declines in Ireland for construction, financial and insurance 
services, and the arts, entertainment, and recreation sectors were the largest 
experienced by any country of the 27 considered.  
4. THE RESILIENCE AND CONCENTRATION OF IRISH EXPORTS 
The above sectoral analysis highlights the very robust performance of Irish 
industrial and ICT value added through the lockdown period. This section further 
investigates the specific trends occurring underlying these activities by providing 
detailed insight in the export patterns of Irish goods and services. As Ireland has a 
small domestic market, the large output of these sectors is naturally exported to 
other countries, and highlighting the trends in exports by product can shed more 
light on the extraordinary industrial performance through the lockdown.  
 
Indeed, the exceptional performance of the Irish export sector can be seen in an 
international context when contrasting the growth rate of exports (for goods, 
services and overall) with other European economies. Figure 14 highlights the 
trend in annualised quarterly growth in exports for Ireland, the EU 27, Germany 















-8% -5% -5% -4%
IE RO DK UK PL ES PT LV NL FR BE HR AT SI EL CY HU CZ FI EE DE LT IT SE LU MT BG
Q uarter l y  E conomi c  Commentary  –  Autumn 2020  | 61 
 
decline is much smaller in Ireland. Indeed, goods exports from Ireland increased by 
around 7 per cent on an annualised basis in Q2 2020. While services export growth 
was negative, the decline was much less severe than the other regions. 
 
The contrast with Germany is interesting in that Germany provides a good proxy 
for international trading activity. As a highly export-oriented economy, German 
activity tends to move in line with international conditions. The fact that Irish 
activity does not follow a similar pattern provides clear insights into the structural 
differences which are worth exploring in more detail. In particular, this allows us 
to consider how the goods exports performed so well on the back of the extremely 
difficult international trading conditions.  
 
FIGURE 14 TRENDS IN OVERALL EXPORTS FOR IRELAND AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES 
Exports of Goods and Services  Exports of Goods  Exports of Services 
   
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
 
To begin, it is useful to explore the structure of Irish exports to provide context for 
the discussion. For the full year 2019, Ireland exported approximately €448 billion 
worth of goods and services.8 Merchandise exports accounted for just over half the 
total at €227 billion while service exports accounted for €221 billion.9 Within these 
totals, particular product/service activities were very dominant. Of the €227 billion 
of goods exports, €152 billion was accounted for by international trade activities, 
by which activities are classified as having products which ‘moved across borders’. 
This represents 34 per cent of total exports. A further €68 billion is accounted for 
by goods for processing. Recent CSO research notes that goods for processing (or 




8  Data taken from National Income Accounts 2019 table N1905. Current prices.  
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abroad for further processing in another economy, (b) goods received from abroad 
for processing in Ireland, or (c) goods purchased abroad and further processed 
abroad. These activities accounted for nearly 15 per cent of total Irish exports in 
2019. For these activities, no trade has crossed the Irish State’s border but a change 
in ownership has occurred involving an Irish resident firm which brings the value 
of activity within the context of the Irish National Accounts.  
 
In terms of services activity, €117 billion of the total €221 billion is due to exports 
of computer services. These exports account for just over one-quarter of Ireland’s 
export activity. Activities such as transport, tourism and travel which are severely 
affected by the pandemic did not account for a large share of Irish export revenues, 
at just 3 per cent.  
 
TABLE 1  OVERVIEW OF TOTAL EXPORTS 2019 – BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DATA (€ MILLION) 
 € million % of Total 2019 
Total (A+B)  448,867  
Merchandise (A), of which: 227,497 51 
 International trade 152,679 34 
 Goods for processing 68,468 15 
 Other conceptual adjustments -7,128 -2 
 Merchanting (net export) 13,477 3 
Services (B) 221,370 49 
 Repairs and processing 2,477 1 
 Transport, tourism and travel 13,780 3 
 Financial and insurance 26,772 6 
 Computer services 117,099 26 
 Royalties/licences 10,614 2 
 All business services 43,792 10 
 Comms and other services  6,837 2 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Balance of Payments Data. 
 
The breakdown of exports by product or service for the 20 largest export items are 
presented in Table 2 using a bottom up approach.10 The items are ranked by their 
share of 2019 export values. The first result of note is that as well as computer 
services, two particular product items accounted for nearly 20 per cent of total 
exports in 2019 – these were medicinal and pharmaceutical products (11 per cent 




10  To measure total exports, the ‘international trade’ component in the balance of payments export data is replaced by 
the product specific export values from the merchandise trade (monthly) data. These figures are not identical therefore 
slight differences exist in the overall value of exports in this bottom up exercise. However this allows a calculation of 
the share of total from each of the individual items.   
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Nearly 60 per cent of total exports in 2019 were accounted for by four goods and 
service export categories. It can also be seen that medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products grew strongly in Q2 2020 during the lockdown, increasing 5 per cent in 
the quarter and 31 per cent on an annualised basis. Goods for processing also 
increased strongly over the lockdown at 9 per cent quarter-on-quarter growth. The 
negative effect of the pandemic on sectors such as transport and tourism can be 
seen by the major declines in transport services exports (down 72 per cent Q-on-
Q) and tourism (down 78 per cent Q-on-Q and 90 per cent Y-on-Y).  
 
TABLE 2  BREAKDOWN OF EXPORTS BY PRODUCT OR SERVICE FOR TOP 20 LARGEST ITEMS 
(SORTED BY 2019 SHARE OF TOTAL) 
 (1) (4) (5) 
 2019 Share Q2 Y-on-Y Contribution to Growth (Y-on-Y) 
Computer services 26 4 1 
Goods for processing 15 14 2 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products (54) 11 30 3 
Organic chemicals (51) 7 -16 -1 
Business services other than research and 
development and operational leasing 5 -18 -1 
Financial services 4 0 0 
Business services: Operational leasing 4 -9 0 
Merchanting (Net) 3 -2 0 
Royalties/licences 2 -15 0 
Insurance 2 5 0 
Electrical machinery, appliances etc., n.e.s. (77) 2 21 0 
Transport 2 -86 -2 
Essential oils, perfume materials, toilet preparations 
etc. (55) 2 -12 0 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. (89) 2 -18 0 
Professional, scientific and controlling apparatus (87) 2 -28 0 
Tourism and travel 1 -90 -1 
Office machines and automatic data processing 
equipment (75) 1 -7 0 
Business services: Research and development 1 -7 0 
Other transport equipment (79) 1 -76 -1 
Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. (59) 1 -25 0 
Overall 100 -1.711  
 




11  To calculate the changes and contribution to growth at a product level the individual items from the merchandise trade 
data are used on a monthly basis to gross up to the quarterly data. The total level of the grossed up monthly data is 
marginally different from the quarterly total international trade data from Table 2.1 of the Balance of Payments 
quarterly release. Therefore the year-on-year growth in export values presented differs from that calculated from the 
BOP release. The difference comes mainly from Q2 2020 which is €0.5 billion lower using the disaggregated data 
(growth difference -1.7 per cent to -1.4 per cent (using BOP)). 
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Column (5) in Table 2 highlights the contribution to the change in overall exports 
(in value terms) of change in each individual item.12 This provides a magnitude for 
how each individual item affects the total change in the value of goods and service 
items. Computer services export growth contributed 1 percentage point growth to 
the overall annualised change, medicinal and pharmaceutical product growth 
contributed a full 3 percentage points in growth to overall exports. In a sense, this 
fully counteracted the decline in transport, tourism and travel exports whose near 
decimation acted to drop overall exports by only 3 per cent in value terms.  
 
This relative performance-concentration argument can be more clearly seen in 
Figure 15, which presents a scatter plot covering all the product and service 
categories with the year-on-year growth rate in Q2 2020 (vertical axis) and the 
share of total exports in 2019 (horizontal axis). It is very clear that while exports 
fell dramatically for the vast majority of export items, the overall activity was 
masked by the relatively benign performance in the largest items (as discussed 
above).  
 
FIGURE 15 SCATTERPLOT OF EXPORT SHARE (2019) (X-AXIS) AGAINST Q2 2020 YEAR-ON-YEAR 
CHANGE (Y-AXIS) 
 




12  For example, the overall percentage change in total exports in value terms on a year-on-year basis to Q2 2020 is shared 
amongst the relative contributions of each individual item to that overall change.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This Research Note explores the macroeconomic performance of the Irish 
economy over the lockdown period in the first half of 2020 in a cross-country 
context. The main aim of the Note is to highlight the duality of the performance 
across sectors and to provide insight into how, despite one of the strictest 
lockdowns in terms of public health restrictions, the economic impacts on the 
overall macroeconomy were relatively benign.  
 
The research shows that, despite a drop in personal consumption expenditure that 
is one of the highest across the European countries examined, the concentration 
of Irish exports in computer services and pharmaceutical and medicinal goods 
ensured that overall GDP impact was much more muted due to the growth in these 
export products.  
 
While the impact on the economy of the pharmaceutical and computer services 
sector is disproportionate to its employment share, many of the companies in big 
tech and pharma are indeed large employers here in Ireland and do have a real 
presence on the ground. Growth from exports in this area are not therefore 
necessarily national accounting distortions from activities without an economic 
presence in Ireland (such as   contract manufacturing activities). The continued 
strong performance of these export areas is likely to influence the path of Irish GDP 
which may continue to outperform metrics such as unemployment and 
consumption which are arguably better measures of changes in national economic 
welfare. From a policy perspective, the importance of these multinational activities 
(in terms of employment and taxation) is likely to help boost the resources 
available to support the worst affected domestic sectors through the course of the 
pandemic. The resilience of our exports to the COVID-19-specific economic shock 
should be seen as a strength as the course of the pandemic continues. 
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The latest release by the CSO of the Institutional Sector Accounts provides 
important new data that provide a much clearer picture of recent developments in 
the economy. This paper argues that the best measure of the economic welfare of 
those living in Ireland is Net National Product (NNP). Using the new data this paper 
shows the contribution to NNP by each industrial sector, broken down by foreign 
and domestically owned businesses. The growth rate of NNP and the contribution 
to it from the different industrial sectors and from foreign and domestically owned 
firms is analysed. The results suggest that the economic welfare of those living in 
Ireland has grown by around 5 per cent a year since 2013. The analysis in the paper 
shows that the foreign owned sector has contributed around 20 per cent of the 
growth in the economy since the recovery began. It also shows that the 
contribution from domestically owned businesses is spread across a range of 
industrial sectors. Finally, the paper makes some suggestions for further data 
improvements. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 20 years the problems for policymakers in interpreting the Irish 
national accounting data have increased, making it very difficult to discern what is 
happening to the Irish economy. These problems have arisen because of the way 
globalisation is affecting the economy and they have posed special challenges, not 
only for those responsible for fiscal policy, but for those seeking to understand the 
key contributors to Irish growth. 
 
The traditional national accounting framework was developed in the first half of 
the twentieth century at a time of largely closed economies. Nearly all the output 
and income of an economy such as Ireland’s, then reflected in the GDP aggregate, 
was available to those living in that economy. Thus, GDP was also the best measure 
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However, globalisation has meant that an increasing share of the output and 
income arising in an economy, such as Ireland, belongs to the foreign owners of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in Ireland. However, the income 
available to those living in Ireland is also enhanced by the inflow of profits and 
wages from Irish companies and individuals operating abroad.  
 
Beginning in the late 1970s it was apparent that Gross National Income (GNI) was 
a better measure of the economic welfare of those living in Ireland than GDP 
because it excluded the profits of the foreign MNEs. These profits are repatriated 
to foreign owners and they are, as a result, not available to be spent by those living 
in Ireland, including the Irish government. GNI also takes account of profit inflows. 
 
This measure proved reasonably satisfactory for policymakers and the wider public 
until about 15 years ago. However, since the early 2000s a range of developments, 
arising from new dimensions of the globalisation of the Irish economy, began to 
muddy the statistical waters. These developments are discussed in detail in 
FitzGerald (2018) and FitzGerald (2020). 
 
For example, redomiciled PLCs, which are essentially foreign-owned funds 
operating in Ireland, receive their investment income here. However, because their 
foreign owners take much of the return on their investments in the form of capital 
gains, there is no income outflow corresponding to the investment income 
received. This raises Irish GNI, while the income so recorded is of no benefit to 
those living in Ireland. 
 
Further globalisation developments, including aircraft leasing operations in Ireland 
and, even more important, the location by foreign MNEs of much of their very large 
intellectual property in Ireland, have affected the traditional national accounting 
aggregate GNI. This has rendered it a very unsatisfactory measure of the economic 
welfare of those living in Ireland.  
 
These problems were brought to the fore with the publication by the CSO of 
National Income and Expenditure (NIE), 2015, which showed a 25 per cent growth 
rate for GDP in that year. It was apparent to all looking at these data that this 
increase in real GDP massively overstated the improvement in economic welfare 
of those living in Ireland. 
 
While some of these problems are affecting the interpretation of the National 
Accounts for other countries, their manifestation in the Irish National Accounts has 
been extreme by international standards. To deal with these problems the CSO has 
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taken the lead in developing additional measures and publishing a range of new 
information to help policymakers and the public at large understand what is really 
going on in the economy.  
 
Following on the experience with the National Accounts for 2015, the CSO set up 
the Economic Statistics Review Group (ESRG) to review the problems with the 
existing framework of accounts and to recommend how they could be best 
supplemented with additional information to provide a better understanding of 
what is happening in the Irish economy.  
 
The ESRG report, published in 2017, recommended a series of developments, most 
of which have now been implemented by the CSO.  
 
The first significant change was the publication by the CSO of an adjusted GNI 
measure – commonly referred to as GNI*. This removes many of the distortions in 
GNI, including the effects of depreciation of aircraft leasing operations and of the 
intellectual property of foreign-owned MNEs. It also excludes the income of 
redomiciled PLCs. 
 
While the GNI* measure was initially only available at current prices, in 2019 the 
CSO published an experimental constant price GNI* figure.2 While useful as a 
measure of what was happening in the aggregate economy, it did not give a good 
idea of what industrial sectors were fuelling the growth in the economy, and of the 
relative importance in that growth of foreign MNEs and domestic business. It also 
showed surprising volatility, suggesting a small fall in the volume of GNI* in 2015 
compared to the 25 per cent volume increase for GDP. 
 
However, at the end of 2019, as part of the Institutional Sector Accounts, the CSO 
published a full break-down by industrial sector of output for foreign-owned MNES 
and domestic business.3 At last, this makes possible a detailed analysis of the 
sectors that are growing rapidly and the relative importance of foreign MNEs. It 
also makes it possible to provide a good measure of the development of the 
aggregate economic welfare of those living in Ireland and how it has grown since 
2013. 
 
This article uses these new CSO data to better understand key developments in the 




2  https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/in/nie/in-mgnicp/ 
3  https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-isanff/isanff2018/ 
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by industrial sector and by ownership, foreign or domestic, to give a much better 
understanding of what is driving growth in the economy. The article suggests that 
NNP is a better measure of economic activity for this purpose than GNI*. In 
particular, NNP allows the separation out of all the activity of foreign MNEs which 
does not add to the economic welfare of Irish residents and, by excluding all 
depreciation, it gives a better indication of the long-term sustainable level of 
output. 
 
When the adjusted data are analysed, they show that foreign MNEs contributed 
about 20 per cent of NNP over the period 2013 to 2018. The stability over time in 
their contribution to the welfare of Irish residents contrasts with the big increase 
in their contribution to GVA over that period. The sectors where foreign MNEs 
made a substantial contribution to NNP were manufacturing, distribution, IT 
services and financial services. Interestingly the contribution to NNP of domestic 
firms in the IT sector was quite close to that for foreign MNEs, in spite of their much 
smaller GVA. Foreign MNEs accounted for 25 per cent of the wage bill over the 
period 2013-2018, significantly larger than their contribution to NNP.  
 
Finally, it is estimated that real NNP grew by an average of around 5.2 per cent a 
year over the period 2013-2018, very close to the growth rate in the experimental 
CSO GNI* aggregate. However, unlike GNI*, the contributions to this growth from 
different sectors can now be separately identified. 
 
Section 2 considers the best aggregate measure of economic welfare for those 
living in Ireland. Section 3 describes the new information available from the CSO. 
That information is used to develop an alternative presentation of the output and 
income tables of the traditional National Accounts in Section 4, showing separately 
the contributions of foreign-owned MNEs and domestic business. These new data 
are then used to consider the recent trends in the economy, showing the 
contributions to growth from the different industrial sectors. Section 5 describes 
some further developments of the National Accounts that could prove useful, and 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. MEASURING ECONOMIC WELFARE 
As discussed above, GDP, the traditional measure of national output and income, 
is no longer a good measure of the economic welfare of those living in Ireland. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the adjustments that are made to GDP in this paper to arrive at 
a more appropriate measure of economic welfare – Net National Product.4 
 
To facilitate the analysis, an adjustment is first made to how goods are priced – 
product taxes and subsidies are deducted to move from market prices to what are 
referred to as basic prices. This adjustment is done to simplify the calculations and 
it does not significantly affect the underlying measure of welfare. 
 
FIGURE 1 ADJUSTMENTS TO GDP TO MOVE TO NNP, 2018, € MILLION 
 
 




4  This aggregate measure does not give information on the distribution of that income. It also fails to capture many other 
factors which affect the welfare of individuals, such as life expectancy and it also does not take account of the 
environmental impact of economic development. 
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The second adjustment made is the deduction of depreciation. In producing goods 
and services some of the stock of capital is used up and must be replaced if 
production is to be maintained in future years. This adjustment for depreciation is 
quite large because of the movement to Ireland in recent years of substantial 
intellectual property (IP), owned by foreign MNEs. This capital is used by the 
foreign-owned MNEs, not only to produce goods and services in Ireland, but also 
to produce them elsewhere. While only the depreciation of certain foreign owned 
capital, such as IP, is deducted in deriving GNI*, in moving to NNP all depreciation 
is deducted. This reflects the fact that, as capital is used up (depreciated) in 
producing goods and services in the domestic economy, it must be replaced if that 
level of production is to be maintained, keeping the economic welfare of those 
living in Ireland unchanged. 
 
The statistical discrepancy in the National Accounts is added back in to maintain 
consistency with the detailed data derived from the CSO Institutional Sector 
accounts for the individual industrial sectors. 
 
The profits of foreign-owned MNEs, which accrue to their foreign owners, are 
deducted. However, the corporation tax paid on those profits is added back in as 
it accrues to the Irish government, to be used to enhance the welfare of those living 
in Ireland. 
 
An adjustment is then made for other factor flows, excluding the receipts of 
redomiciled PLCs. These other flows include dividend payments made abroad by 
Irish companies and dividends received from abroad by Irish residents. It also 
includes profits from abroad received by Irish owned MNEs, as well as wages 
received from abroad by Irish residents less wages paid to people living outside 
Ireland. In 2018 these net factor payments in and out of the country were quite 
small, as shown in the Figure. However, in other years they can be significantly 
larger. 
 
After these adjustments, the residual is NNP at basic prices, before the inclusion of 
the inflows of redomiciled PLCs. This is the measure of the economic welfare of 
those living in Ireland which is used in the rest of the paper. 
 
A key difference between the NNP measure suggested in this article and GNI* is 
that NNP adjusts for all depreciation, whereas GNI* only adjusts for depreciation 
on foreign-owned intellectual property, R&D service imports and leased aircraft. In 
addition, by focusing on NNP it is possible to decompose output by industrial sector 
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and by ownership, allowing one to clearly identify where the growth in the 
economy, that adds to the welfare of Irish residents, is coming from. This is not 
possible with GNI*.The next two sections exploit the advantages of this NNP 
measure to identify the contribution to NNP of each institutional and industrial 
sector, broken down by foreign MNEs and domestic business. 
3. DATA FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR ACCOUNTS 
The latest version of the Institutional Sector Accounts for Ireland contains 
important new information. For both the financial sector and the non-financial 
corporations sector, the accounts separate out foreign-owned MNEs, giving a full 
range of data for those sectors. In addition, the CSO has made available data on 
GVA, compensation of employees (COE) and Gross Operating Surplus (GOS) for 
each industrial sector, cross-classified by institutional sector. These data are 
available for the period 2013 to 2018. 
 
This is the first time that we have complete coverage of foreign-owned MNEs. 
Previous very useful CSO publications only covered the larger foreign MNEs, or 
certain industrial sectors. The latest release of data makes possible a much more 
detailed analysis of the role of MNEs in the economy and it helps us to build a much 
better picture of what is really going on in the Irish economy. 
 
This section uses the extensive new data released by the CSO to estimate the 
income and output available to those living in Ireland to spend or invest. In each 
case NNP, excluding factor inflows of redomiciled PLCs, is used as a summary 
measure of economic welfare. The resulting analysis, using the data from the 
Institutional Sector accounts, is consistent with the published National Accounts 
aggregates in National Income and Expenditure. 
 
Some limited imputation was needed to allocate depreciation and corporation tax 







5  The Data Appendix is available from the author.  
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TABLE 1 NNP AT BASIC PRICES, BEFORE ADJUSTING FOR THE STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY, 
€ MILLION 
Foreign MNEs 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
1. Compensation of employees 18,056 18,848 20,201 21,089 22,373 23,308 
2. Gross operating surplus/mixed income 52,654 59,552 117,723 118,073 131,425 145,830 
3. Consumption of fixed capital 14,710 16,135 42,730 49,244 57,244 62,279 
4. (2-3) Net operating surplus 37,944 43,417 74,993 68,829 74,181 83,551 
5. (1+2) Gross value added 70,710 78,400 137,924 139,162 153,798 169,138 
6. (5-3) Net value added 56,000 62,265 95,194 89,918 96,554 106,859 
7. Corporate taxes 3,329 3,427 5,202 5,615 6,258 7,936 
8. Factor flows - profit repatriations 
(allocation of primary income flows) 34,615 39,990 69,791 63,214 67,923 75,615 
9. (6-8) Contribution to NNP 21,385 22,275 25,403 26,704 28,631 31,244 
 
Domestic 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
1. Compensation of employees 52,591 54,250 57,588 61,579 65,778 69,986 
2. Gross operating surplus/mixed income 41,267 45,924 48,977 53,266 57,671 63,958 
3. Consumption of fixed capital 11,829 12,548 13,603 14,512 15,832 16,989 
4. (2-3) Net operating surplus 29,438 33,376 35,374 38,754 41,839 46,969 
5. (1+2) Gross value added 93,858 100,174 106,565 114,845 123,449 133,944 
6. (5-3) Net value added 82,029 87,626 92,962 100,333 107,617 116,955 
7. Corporate taxes 955 1,206 1,689 1,758 1,959 2,485 
8. Factor flows - profit repatriations 
(allocation of primary income flows) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9. (6-8) Contribution to NNP 82,029 87,626 92,962 100,333 107,617 116,955 
 
Total 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
1. Compensation of employees 70,647 73,098 77,789 82,668 88,151 93,294 
2. Gross operating surplus/mixed income 93,921 105,476 166,700 171,339 189,096 209,788 
3. Consumption of fixed capital 26,539 28,683 56,333 63,756 73,076 79,268 
4. (2-3) Net operating surplus 67,382 76,793 110,367 107,583 116,020 130,520 
5. (1+2) Gross value added 164,568 178,574 244,489 254,007 277,247 303,082 
6. (5-3) Net value added 138,029 149,891 188,156 190,251 204,171 223,814 
7. Corporate taxes 4,284 4,633 6,891 7,373 8,217 10,421 
8. Factor flows - profit outflows 34,615 39,990 69,791 63,214 67,923 75,615 
9. (6-8) Contribution to NNP 103,414 109,901 118,365 127,037 136,248 148,199 
10. Residual factor outflows excluding profit 
repatriations and redomiciled PLCs 1,022 -1,888 -3,176 -6,456 -1,327 280 
11. (9-10) NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 102,392 111,789 121,541 133,493 137,575 147,919 
12. Redomiciled PLCs 6,492 6,852 4,662 5,781 4,458 5,002 
13. (11+12) NNP 108,884 118,641 126,203 139,274 142,033 152,921 
 NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 102,392 111,789 121,541 133,493 137,575 147,919 
Foreign MNEs % of GVA 43 44 56 55 55 56 
Foreign MNEs % of NNP adjusted 21 20 21 20 21 21 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations. 
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Table 1 summarises the data for foreign owned MNEs and for the rest of the 
economy. The approach taken here is to replicate Table 2 in National Income and 
Expenditure 2018,6 first classifying by institutional sector rather than by industrial 
sector. The data are shown at basic prices. Profit repatriations are allocated to the 
foreign MNE sector, so that the contributions to NNP from the foreign and 
domestic sectors are separately identified. The residual factor flows are included 
in the third panel to arrive at NNP for the economy, excluding and including the 
income of redomiciled PLCs.  
 
In the first panel, the data for foreign MNEs are shown. Data are given on the wage 
bill and the gross operating surplus (GOS) and consumption of fixed capital 
(depreciation). Rows 4 to 6 then derive the net operating surplus (NOS) after 
deducting depreciation, gross valued added and net value added. Row 7 shows the 
corporation tax paid by these firms. Item 8 is the factor flows paid abroad by these 
firms – profit repatriations. These are the residual when corporation tax is 
deducted from the NOS for these firms. Some additional factor payments are 
received and paid by this sector.7 However, here these residual flows are shown as 
part of residual factor flows in panel 3 of the Table.  
 
The direct contribution of the foreign MNE sector to NNP is then the sum of the 
wage bill and the corporation tax paid by the firms, shown as item 9 in the first 
panel. 
 
The second panel shows a similar set of data for the domestic economy. Here, 
profit repatriations are zero because the businesses are Irish-owned. There are net 
factor flows to and from the sector, such as dividend payments and profits received 
from abroad. These factor flows are included in the residual factor flows item in 
panel 3 of the Table. The contribution to NNP by the sector is equivalent to the 
GVA arising in the sector. 
 
The third panel shows the aggregates for the whole economy. Row 10 shows the 
residual factor flows, excluding the receipts of redomiciled PLCS, and row 11 shows 
NNP before the inclusion of the receipts of the redomiciled PLCs. This measure of 
NNP is used in the rest of the paper as the best summary measure of the economic 




6  https://statbank.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=N1802&PLanguage=0 
 However, to facilitate the analysis by industrial sector in this article, these residual flows are treated as a single item 
when deriving NNP for the economy, rather than being separately allocated by industrial sector. 
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redomiciled PLCs to arrive at NNP at basic prices, consistent with the data in 
National Income and Expenditure.8 
 
The final panel of Table 1 shows the share of GVA and NNP accounted for by the 
foreign-owned MNE sector. On the basis of GVA, the MNE sector dominates the 
economy, accounting for over 50 per cent of GVA since 2015. However, when 
allowance is made for the factor outflows from this sector, its contribution to NNP 
is around 20 per cent. Also, as shown in the Table, the contribution of the foreign-
owned MNE sector to NNP has been steady throughout the period 2013 to 2018, 
in spite of the widely reported major expansion of the activity of these firms in 
Ireland over the period. 
4. CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
Current prices 
Appendix Table A.1 shows the NNP arising in each industrial sector at current basic 
prices, broken down by foreign-owned MNEs and the domestic sector. While the 
CSO has supplied data on this basis for the wage bill and the Gross Operating 
Surplus (GOS), it does not provide full details of the allocation of depreciation and 
corporate taxes across industrial sectors cross-classified by ownership. Where this 
detail was lacking, depreciation and taxes were imputed using a set of simple rules, 
described in the separate Data Appendix. 
 
Table 2 shows the growth rate at current prices for three different measures of 
NNP and for GNI*. The first row shows NNP after accounting for profit 
repatriations, but before including residual factor flows. The second row in the 
Table is the preferred measure of economic welfare, NNP before the factor inflows 
to redomiciled PLCs are included. The third item is NNP including the income of 
redomiciled PLCs. As can be seen from the Table the average growth rate between 
2013 and 2018 in the preferred measure is identical to that for GNI*. Also, the 
annual pattern of growth is rather similar, with a significant dip in the growth rate 
in 2017. In the case of NNP after accounting for profit repatriations and before 
taking account of residual factor flows, the average growth rate over the period is 
also very close to that of GNI*. However, there is little variation in the growth rate 
over the five years and there is no significant dip in 2017. This highlights the 





8  There is a small further residual item of around €100 million, which reflects the fact that there is a small difference 
between the net factor flows shown in the Institutional Sector Accounts and the flows shown in National Income and 
Expenditure. 
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TABLE 2 CURRENT PRICES, GROWTH RATE, % 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average Annual  2013-2018 
1. NNP after profit repatriations 6.3 7.7 7.3 7.2 8.8 7.5 
2. NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 9.2 8.7 9.8 3.1 7.5 7.6 
3. NNP 9.0 6.4 10.4 2.0 7.7 7.0 
4. GNI* - from NIE 8.6 9.4 8.0 4.7 7.3 7.6 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations and CSO National Income and Expenditure. 
 
TABLE 3 AVERAGE SHARE OF NNP, CURRENT PRICES, 2013-2018, % 
 Total Foreign Domestic 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.4 0.0 1.4 
Manufacturing 13.2 6.3 6.9 
Electricity, gas, and water 1.8 0.1 1.8 
Construction 4.4 0.2 4.2 
Distribution, transport, hotels and restaurants 19.0 3.7 15.3 
Information and communication 6.4 3.4 3.0 
Financial and insurance activities 9.6 4.1 5.5 
Real estate activities 8.8 0.1 8.7 
Professional, admin and support services 10.5 2.5 7.9 
Public admin, education and health 20.7 0.1 20.5 
Arts, entertainment and other services 2.6 0.1 2.5 
Factor income - profit repatriations 46.5 46.5 0.0 
NNP after profit repatriations 98.5 20.6 77.8 
Factor income - other, excluding redomiciled PLCs -1.5 -2.3 0.8 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 100.0 22.9 77.1 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations. 
 
Table 3 shows the average share of the different industrial sectors in NNP over the 
period 2013 to 2018, broken down by ownership. It shows that public 
administration, health and education accounted for 20 per cent of NNP and that 
the Distribution sector also accounted for nearly 20 per cent. Manufacturing was 
the next largest sector, accounting for 13 per cent of NNP.9  
 
Looking at the contribution of the foreign owned MNE sector, it was particularly 
significant in manufacturing (6 per cent of NNP), and the Distribution, Information 




9  Because these data are shown at basic prices, they do not include non-product taxes and subsidies. The foreign sector 
paid around €1 billion in non-product taxes in 2018. Thus, the figures here may slightly underestimate the contribution 
to NNP of the foreign sector. If the CSO published the data on the taxes and subsidies cross-classified by industrial 
sector, allowance could be made for this factor by moving from showing the data at basic prices to showing them at 
factor cost. 
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Table shows that in three of these sectors – Industry, Information Communications 
and Finance, foreign-owned firms account for roughly half of the NNP arising in the 
sector.  
 
In the case of the Information and communication sector, it is surprising that, while 
domestically owned firms account for only 15 to 20 per cent of the GVA in the 
sector, they account for just under half of the sector’s contribution to NNP. 
Domestic firms also account for around 45 per cent of the wage bill in the sector. 
These data suggest that more attention should be focused on the progress of the 
domestic firms in this sector, as they represent a significant share of NNP. 
 
The overall share of the financial sector in NNP, at almost 10 per cent, is rather high 
by international standards.10 However, this may be accounted for by the presence 
of quite a large share of foreign-owned companies, many of whom are providing 
international services. However, the foreign share of NNP has been around 40 per 
cent since 2016, lower than it was in 2013-2015. This is in spite of the influx of 
foreign financial firms to Ireland as a result of Brexit. This suggests that the 
contribution of recent arrivals to NNP has been small. 
 
TABLE 4 AVERAGE SHARE OF WAGES, 2013-2018, % 
  Total Foreign Domestic 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.8 0.0 0.8 
Manufacturing 12.8 6.5 6.3 
Electricity, gas, and water 1.4 0.1 1.3 
Construction 3.8 0.3 3.5 
Distribution, transport, hotels etc. 20.2 5.4 14.8 
Information and communication 7.2 4.1 3.1 
Financial and insurance 9.2 5.0 4.1 
Real estate activities 0.7 0.2 0.6 
Professional, admin & support 11.6 3.5 8.1 
Public admin, educ. & health 29.8 0.2 29.6 
Arts, entertainment etc. 2.4 0.1 2.3 
Total 100.0 25.5 74.5 
 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations. 
 
Table 4 shows the average share of wages by industrial sector and ownership over 
the period 2013-2018. The share of wages arising in foreign-owned firms is around 




10  For the EU15, GVA arising in the financial sector accounts for 5 per cent of GVA. 
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This partly reflects the fact that, as other CSO data suggest, the average earnings 
in foreign MNE firms are well above the economy average.11  
 
Table 5 in the Data Appendix shows corporation tax revenue as a share of the Net 
Operating Surplus (NOS) by institutional sector and ownership. The average rate of 
tax paid by foreign and domestic firms shown in this Table is then used to impute 
corporation tax payments across the different industrial sectors.12 Table 5 (below) 
shows that the tax rate has consistently been higher in the financial sector than 
elsewhere. This reflects the fact that the NOS is not a good measure of the tax base 
in the sector and also problems arising from FISIM (Financial Services Indirectly 
Measured). For the rest of the economy the average tax rate has ranged between 
7 per cent and 10 per cent. This is somewhat lower than the marginal tax rate of 
12.5 per cent, and it may reflect differences in the treatment of depreciation 
between the National Accounts and the tax system. 
 
TABLE 5 AVERAGE CORPORATION TAX RATE BY INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR, % 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Financial Domestic 7.6 8.6 12.3 15.5 18.8 21.2 
Financial Foreign 23.5 17.3 23.4 18.5 18.7 25.2 
Non-Financial Corporation Domestic 7.2 7.7 9.7 8.2 7.9 8.7 
Non-Financial Corporation Foreign 7.5 6.9 5.8 7.3 7.5 8.4 
Total 6.4 6.1 6.3 6.9 7.1 8.0 
Foreign 8.9 8.0 7.0 8.2 8.5 9.6 
Domestic 7.3 7.8 10.2 9.8 9.8 10.8 
 





11  https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-fdi/foreigndirectinvestmentinireland2017/awe/ 
12  Details are given in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 6 FOREIGN MNE SHARE OF NNP, % 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A) 2.0 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.4 
Manufacturing 46.5 45.1 51.3 45.6 47.7 48.7 
Electricity, gas, and water 3.5 4.1 4.3 5.5 5.4 3.9 
Construction (F) 6.3 5.1 4.3 4.4 3.9 3.7 
Distribution, transport, hotels and 
restaurants 21.0 19.8 19.5 19.7 18.9 18.6 
Information and communication 52.0 52.6 53.0 52.1 52.4 52.9 
Financial and insurance activities (K) 45.4 44.3 43.0 40.6 41.8 40.9 
Real estate activities (L) 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.2 
Professional, admin and support services 25.0 23.8 23.6 25.0 24.5 23.6 
Public admin, education and health 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Arts, entertainment and other services 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 
NNP excluding additional factor flows 20.7 20.3 21.5 21.0 21.0 21.1 
Factor income 29.7 43.0 62.0 57.2 20.2 -24.1 
NNP excluding redomiciled PLCs 22.5 23.3 24.9 25.2 21.7 20.3 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations. 
 
Table 6 shows how the share of the NNP in each sector that is accounted for by 
foreign MNEs has evolved over the period 2013-2018. In the case of 
manufacturing, the share has only shown a small increase, in spite of the huge 
increase in GVA arising in the sector due to relocation of activity to Ireland in the 
period from 2015. Except for the IT sector, where the foreign share has slightly 
increased over time, the other sectors where foreign MNEs account for significant 
activity have seen a limited reduction in their share. Thus, while the share of NNP 
in the economy accounted for by all foreign MNES has fluctuated over time, there 
has been relatively little change between 2013 and 2018.  
 
Constant price data 
The CSO has not published separate deflators for individual industrial sectors 
broken down by ownership. Here the aggregate deflator for each industrial sector 
is used to deflate the NNP data for both the foreign-owned MNE sector and the 
domestic sector. In many cases this simplification may not matter. However, 
because they are engaged in different sub-sectors of the manufacturing and IT 
sectors, the appropriate deflator for the output of foreign-owned MNEs may be 
different from that for domestically owned firms.  
 
The approach taken here means that the profit repatriations from foreign-owned 
MNEs are effectively deflated by the deflator for the relevant industrial sector, 
which seems appropriate. The implied deflator for net factor income from NIE 2018 
is used to deflate the residual factor flows. 
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While the approach taken here involves some simplifications, as shown below, the 
results of using these sectoral deflators look broadly consistent with the CSO 
constant price data, where available.  
 
Appendix Table A.2 shows the resulting data for each year and industrial sector, 
broken down by ownership, and these results are summarised in the Tables below. 
 
TABLE 7 GROWTH RATE, CONSTANT PRICES, % 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average Annual  2013-2018 
NNP after profit repatriations 4.6 3.2 6.1 4.0 7.0 5.0 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 7.2 3.2 7.8 1.6 6.3 5.2 
NNP 6.2 0.1 8.4 0.9 6.2 4.3 
GNI* from NIE 8.8 -0.4 8.7 3.7 6.3 5.4 
GNI from NIE 8.7 13.7 9.7 5.1 6.5 8.7 
GDP from NIE 8.6 25.2 3.7 8.1 8.2 10.5 
Modified Total Domestic Demand 6.3 5.3 6.1 3.5 1.7 4.6 
Employment 2.6 3.4 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.1 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations CSO National Income and Expenditure. 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, the average growth in the preferred measure of NNP, 
adjusted for redomiciled PLCs, is 5.2 per cent a year between 2013 and 2018. This 
is very similar to the growth rate of GNI* in the experimental CSO data over the 
same period. However, unlike the CSO figure for GNI*, the adjusted NNP figure 
shows less volatility over time.  
 
Also, it is interesting that the NNP measure which shows least volatility is that 
which just adjusts for profit repatriations, omitting the residual factor flows. This 
shows that the volatility in the adjusted NNP series, and also probably in the GNI* 
series, arises from the volatility in these residual factor flows. 
 
The growth in the CSO measure Modified Total Domestic Demand is also shown in 
the Table. It displayed somewhat slower growth than the modified NNP measure 
or the GNI* measure. This reflected the fact that the modified balance on the 
current account of the Balance of Payments moved into increasing surplus over the 
period, adding to the resources available to those living in Ireland. Thus, while the 
modified total domestic demand measure is a very useful summary statistic, it does 
not take account of developments in the Balance of Payments, which can have 
important implications for domestic economic welfare. 
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Table 7 also shows the growth rate for GNI and GDP at constant prices. As can be 
seen from these data, they showed a dramatically higher growth rate over the 
period. However, much of this measured increase in output did not directly benefit 
those living in Ireland, and hence GNI* and NNP are much more appropriate for 
measuring the development of domestic economic welfare. 
 
Table 7 also shows the growth in employment each year between 2013 and 2018. 
This series shows very little volatility. Over the full period 2013 to 2018, it indicates 
a growth in output per person employed of around 2 per cent a year.  
 
TABLE 8 AVERAGE GROWTH RATE BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 2013-2018, CONSTANT PRICES, % 
  All Sectors Foreign MNEs Domestic 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 8.9 1.8 9.0 
Manufacturing 7.3 8.3 6.5 
Electricity, gas, and water 0.3 2.7 0.2 
Construction 10.8 -0.3 11.4 
Distribution, transport etc. 5.9 3.3 6.6 
Information and communication 9.9 10.2 9.4 
Financial and insurance activities -0.1 -2.1 1.5 
Real estate activities 2.7 3.5 2.7 
Professional, admin and support services 8.2 6.9 8.6 
Public Admin, Education and Health 2.0 7.3 2.0 
Arts, entertainment and other services 5.9 1.5 6.0 
NNP after profit repatriations 5.0 5.1 5.0 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 5.2 3.3 5.7 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations. 
 
Table 8 shows the average growth rate by industrial sector over the period 2013 to 
2018. It shows that above average growth rates were experienced in agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction, information and communications and professional 
services. The growth in public administration and financial services was particularly 
low over the relevant period. 
 
While the growth in the output of the foreign-owned sector in manufacturing and 
information and communications was higher than for domestic firms, the 
domestically owned businesses in these industrial sectors also grew quite rapidly. 
 
Table 9 summarises the contribution to growth over the period 2013-2018 from 
each industrial sector, broken down by ownership. The foreign-owned sector in 
manufacturing contributed 10 per cent of the growth in the economy over the five 
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years. Foreign firms in the information and communications sector contributed 
7 per cent of the growth and foreign firms in the professionals and administrative 
service sector contributed 3.5 per cent of the growth.  
 
For domestically owned businesses the major contribution to growth was in the 
distribution sector (19 per cent) and professional and administrative services 
(13 per cent). Domestically owned manufacturing firms, construction firms and 
public administration all contributed between 8 per cent and 10 per cent of the 
growth in the economy. 
 
TABLE 9 CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH OF NNP, PERCENTAGE POINTS 
  Total Foreign Domestic 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  2.2 0.0 2.2 
Manufacturing 18.6 10.0 8.6 
Electricity, gas, and water 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Construction 9.8 0.0 9.8 
Distribution, transport, hotels and restaurants 21.7 2.4 19.2 
Information and communication 12.7 6.9 5.8 
Financial and insurance activities -0.1 -2.0 1.8 
Real estate activities 4.7 0.1 4.7 
Professional, admin and support services 16.7 3.5 13.3 
Public Admin, Education and Health 8.1 0.2 7.9 
Arts, entertainment and other services 2.7 0.0 2.7 
NNP after profit repatriations 97.1 21.2 76.0 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled PLCs 100.0 14.0 86.0 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations. 
 
While the foreign-owned sector of the economy contributes directly up to a fifth 
of the growth in the economy, it may have a wider indirect impact. This is because 
the sector buys services from other sectors in the domestic economy, such as legal 
and accounting services. 
 
The approach taken here has been to deduct the profit repatriations from foreign 
MNEs in arriving at their contribution to NNP in each industrial sector. However, 
the dividends paid by domestic firms and the profits received from abroad by Irish-
owned MNEs are included in the aggregate residual factor income item in the 
Tables shown here and in Tables A.1 and A.2.  
 
The institutional sector accounts provide information on total net factor payments 
by institutional sector, but not by industrial sector. If the data were available by 
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industrial sector it might be appropriate to include these residual factor payments 
in arriving at the NNP for each industrial sector.  
 
Then, in arriving at the constant price data for NNP, these residual factor payments 
would then be deflated by the deflator for the industrial sector in which they arise. 
This would certainly seem sensible in the case of the dividend payments paid by 
Irish firms – consistent with the approach on profit repatriations. It could be argued 
that it would also be the best approach in deflating the profits from abroad of Irish 
MNEs. 
 
The factor payments received by the household sector, principally the dividends 
received on institutional investment could then be deflated by the deflator for 
consumption. The factor payments paid by the government sector, principally 
national debt interest could be deflated by either the consumption deflator or the 
deflator for NNP. 
5. NEXT STEPS 
These new data, published by the CSO, represent a major step forward in 
understanding developments in the Irish economy. The analysis shown here could 
still be improved in a number of dimensions with some further data.  
• If the CSO could fill in some of the missing data for depreciation and 
corporation tax, this would allow some refinement of the analysis in this paper. 
However, it would be unlikely to change any of the conclusions. 
• It would be helpful if the CSO published their data on a constant price basis 
using appropriate deflators. This would provide a more robust estimate of the 
growth in NNP at constant prices. 
• It is important that employment data be published mirroring the industrial 
classification used here, with details of sectoral employment by ownership. 
This would allow a more robust analysis of trends in productivity in the 
economy. 
• It would be very helpful if some current indicators were developed which could 
help in forecasting key aggregates.  
• It would be desirable to carry these data back to the mid-2000s to allow 
appropriate economic modelling of the Irish economy. 
 
As discussed in this article, the new analysis that is made possible by the additional 
data provides a much more coherent picture of developments in the Irish economy 
over the last five years than is possible from the standard National Accounts. 
Instead of exceptional and erratic growth rates, as seen in the headline National 
Income and Expenditure data, the pattern shown here for NNP is smoother and 
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more plausible. Of course, that does not necessarily mean that the numbers are 
right, but it does suggest a greater degree of coherence with other data on 
developments in the economy, such as employment. 
 
The analysis in this paper suggests that an important factor in the volatility of key 
aggregates, such as GNI*, is the volatility in the residual factor flows. Separating 
these out, as in this paper, would give a better indication of the long-term trends 
in the domestic economy. 
 
Because of the huge gross flows into and out of the country in the form of goods, 
services and factor incomes, it would be exceptionally difficult to carry out the kind 
of analysis undertaken here for the expenditure side of the National Accounts. The 
modified total domestic demand measure is reasonably straightforward to derive, 
but that still leaves out the very important effects of developments in the external 
account on the economic welfare of domestic residents. 
 
Heretofore forecasts for the economy have concentrated on the expenditure side 
of the National Accounts. However, the problems with understanding the 
developments in the Balance of Payments mean that, for an economy such as 
Ireland’s, much more attention should be focused on forecasting output and 
incomes. 
 
Of necessity, the NNP data shown here are only available with a significant lag, 
being published in the second half of the year subsequent to the year to which they 
refer. While there is a wide range of short-term indicators available on items on 
the expenditure side of the National Accounts, it would be very helpful if better 
current indicators were developed which could help in forecasting key aggregates 
on the income and output side. For example, the long-running monthly output 
index could be extended and reweighted to better reflect trends in NNP. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper uses the new data published by the CSO in the Institutional Sector 
accounts to derive an adjusted NNP measure, showing the economic welfare of 
those living in Ireland. The contribution to this NNP measure can now be 
disaggregated by industrial sector, and also by nationality of ownership.  
 
The resulting analysis shows that foreign MNEs operating in Ireland contribute 
approximately 20 per cent of NNP and that this share has not varied much since 
the economic recovery began in 2013. The analysis also shows that domestic firms 
in the manufacturing and the IT and communications sector, while much less 
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important than the foreign firms when measured in terms of their contribution to 
GVA, make nearly as large a contribution to NNP. Also, the growth in the economy, 
contributing to the economic welfare of Irish residents has been spread over quite 
a number of sectors of the economy. 
 
The analysis in this paper developing a constant price NNP aggregate is consistent 
with the CSO’s new data for GNI* at constant prices, suggesting an average growth 
rate over the period 2013-2018 of a little more than 5 per cent. However, the 
analysis also suggests that the volatility seen in this measure is due to extreme 
volatility in factor flows other than profit repatriations. 
 
Given the importance of the new data published by the CSO in developing our 
understanding of the Irish economy, when the CSO publish their Institutional 
Sector Accounts for 2019 in the traditional format towards the end of this year they 
should, in addition, consider presenting these data in a similar framework to that 
used in this paper. 
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APPENDIX 1: NNP BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF ORIGIN AT BASIC PRICES 
 
The derivation of these data from the Institutional Sector Accounts and the 
National Accounts is shown in a separate Data Appendix in Excel format. 
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TABLE A.1 NNP BY INDUSTRY, CURRENT BASIC PRICES, BEFORE STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY, € MILLION 
  
  
All sectors Foreign MNEs Domestic 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 1185 1599 1493 1693 2587 2019 23 24 28 27 31 28 1161 1575 1464 1664 2556 1991 
Manufacturing 12872 14054 15757 18336 18187 20665 5986 6343 8083 8368 8679 10057 6876 7703 7669 9965 9502 10602 
Electricity, gas, and water 2484 2226 2147 2091 2010 2899 87 91 93 116 109 114 2399 2136 2052 1973 1901 2785 
Construction 3199 4151 4762 5553 7105 8125 201 212 205 246 275 300 3001 3938 4558 5307 6830 7824 
Distribution, transport, 
hotels etc. 20976 21938 23166 24484 26005 27177 4413 4354 4506 4819 4915 5055 16562 17586 18659 19662 21090 22122 
Information and 
communication 6073 6548 7374 8272 9435 10530 3158 3445 3905 4308 4942 5573 2916 3102 3468 3963 4495 4957 
Financial and insurance 10406 10917 12157 12328 12946 14018 4722 4838 5223 5007 5412 5730 5683 6078 6935 7321 7534 8287 
Real estate activities 8601 9536 10450 11630 11989 14246 101 121 140 146 171 175 8500 9416 10310 11484 11817 14071 
Professional, admin & 
support 9838 10963 12622 13612 15584 16544 2462 2612 2979 3408 3818 3908 7378 8351 9645 10204 11766 12638 
Public admin, education & 
health 24790 24878 25454 25924 26883 28211 146 152 163 184 198 214 24641 24726 25291 25740 26685 27997 
Arts, entertainment & other 2995 3094 2990 3124 3522 3765 85 83 78 76 81 86 2910 3014 2910 3048 3441 3678 
Factor income - profit 
repatriations 34615 39990 69791 63214 67923 75615 34615 39990 69791 63214 67923 75615 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NNP after profit repatriations 103421 109905 118373 127046 136253 148200 21384 22275 25404 26705 28631 31239 82026 87625 92962 100331 107616 116952 
Factor income - other, 
excluding redomiciled PLCs 1022 -1888 -3176 -6456 -1327 280 -1623 -3760 -4859 -7001 -1168 1139 2645 1872 1683 545 -159 -859 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled 
PLCs 102399 111793 121549 133502 137580 147920 23007 26035 30263 33706 29799 30100 79381 85753 91279 99786 107775 117811 
Redomiciled PLCs 6492 6852 4662 5781 4458 5002 0 0 0 0 0 0 6492 6852 4662 5781 4458 5002 
NNP 108891 118645 126211 139283 142038 152922 23007 26035 30263 33706 29799 30100 85873 92605 95941 105567 112233 122813 
Memo: Total Factor Flows 29145 31250 61953 50977 62138 70893 32992 36230 64932 56213 66755 76754 -3847 -4980 -2979 -5236 -4617 -5861 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations. 
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TABLE A.2 NNP BY INDUSTRY, CONSTANT BASIC PRICES, BEFORE STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY, € MILLION 
  
  
All sectors Foreign MNEs Domestic 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 1321 1815 1847 2130 2587 2021 26 27 35 34 31 28 1294 1788 1812 2094 2556 1994 
Manufacturing 14181 15745 14694 17861 18187 20210 6595 7106 7538 8151 8679 9836 7575 8630 7151 9707 9502 10368 
Electricity, gas, and water 2804 2525 1997 2038 2010 2848 98 103 87 113 109 112 2707 2423 1909 1924 1901 2736 
Construction 4734 5171 5611 6191 7105 7896 297 264 241 274 275 292 4440 4906 5370 5917 6830 7604 
Distribution, transport, 
hotels etc. 21070 22915 24503 25809 26005 28099 4433 4548 4766 5080 4915 5226 16636 18369 19735 20727 21090 22872 
Information and 
communication 6847 7238 7769 9188 9435 10958 3561 3808 4114 4785 4942 5799 3288 3429 3654 4402 4495 5159 
Financial and insurance 13716 12658 13865 12807 12946 13674 6224 5609 5957 5201 5412 5589 7491 7047 7909 7605 7534 8083 
Real estate activities 10864 11491 11646 11953 11989 12400 128 146 156 150 171 152 10736 11346 11490 11803 11817 12248 
Professional, admin & 
support 11242 12258 12924 13709 15584 16664 2813 2921 3050 3432 3818 3936 8430 9337 9876 10276 11766 12729 
Public admin, education & 
health 24900 25051 25732 25995 26883 27526 147 153 165 185 198 209 24751 24898 25567 25811 26685 27317 
Arts, entertainment & other 2655 2774 2920 3354 3522 3530 75 74 77 82 81 81 2579 2701 2842 3272 3441 3448 
NNP after profit repatriations 114334 119640 123508 131034 136253 145826 24396 24759 26185 27487 28631 31259 89927 94874 97317 103536 107616 114558 
Factor income - other, 
excluding redomiciled PLCs 1079 -1715 -1676 -3893 -784 146 -1714 -3416 -2565 -4221 -690 596 2793 1701 888 329 -94 -449 
NNP adjusted for redomiciled 
PLCs 113255 121355 125184 134926 137037 145680 26110 28175 28750 31709 29321 30664 87134 93174 96428 103207 107710 115008 
Redomiciled PLCs 6856 6224 2461 3486 2634 2616 0 0 0 0 0 0 6856 6224 2461 3486 2634 2616 
NNP 120110 127580 127645 138412 139671 148296 26110 28175 28750 31709 29321 30664 93990 99398 98889 106693 110344 117624 
 
Source: CSO Institutional Sector Accounts, Non-Financial and author’s calculations. 
 
Q uarter l y  E conomi c  Commentary  –  Autumn 2020  | 93 
 
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF COVID-19 ON THE IRISH PROPERTY 
MARKET: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
 
Matthew Allen-Coghlan, Kieran McQuinn and Conor O’Toole1 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we examine some of the potential channels through which COVID-19 
is likely to impact the Irish housing market and discuss some policy areas which 
may need refocusing or re-evaluation. Building on existing work by ESRI 
researchers, we examine the implications under the headings of housing demand, 
housing supply, affordability of prices and the rental market. While there is likely 
to be a significant number of effects across a wide variety of headings, the most 
long-lasting impact of the crisis is the potential exacerbation of the imbalance 
between housing demand and supply which already exists in the market. The most 
efficient policy response in that context is for an increase in the State provision of 
social and affordable housing over the short to medium term.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Along with the general economy, the impact of COVID-19 on different aspects of 
the Irish housing market is likely to be profound. As noted in a variety of 
publications by researchers working in the ESRI and elsewhere (see McQuinn, 
2017, for example), the Irish residential market has experienced unprecedented 
volatility over the past 25 years. It is evident that COVID-19 will exacerbate this 
volatility across a variety of headings in the housing sector.  
 
In this paper we will outline some of the major issues which are likely to impact the 
Irish housing sector due to COVID-19. The impact of the pandemic on different 
aspects of housing demand and supply is discussed as is the impact on affordability 
in both the rental and home ownership markets. We will also outline pressure 
points through which the COVID-19 shock may impact the credit market. 
 
To date, in light of the emergence of the pandemic, researchers in the ESRI have 
already produced three reports dealing directly with the impact of COVID-19 on 
the housing and rental markets. Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn (2020) look at how 
the shock caused by the virus on mortgage activity, incomes and supply is likely to 




1  The authors are economists at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). They can be contacted at: 
kieran.mcquinn@esri.ie. The authors are solely responsible for the views expressed in the paper.  
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prices to house prices declining by 12 per cent by the end of 2021. Allen-Coghlan 
et al. (2020) consider the short-term impacts of the pandemic on rental price 
developments as part of the ESRI/RTB Rent Index series and show a clear trend 
towards falling rental inflation.  
 
A separate report by Coffey et al. (2020a) looks at the impact of the pandemic on 
affordability issues in the private rental market. They found that contrary to the 
pandemic increasing affordability issues in the sector, affordability may have 
actually improved over the last few months as a result of the government income 
support schemes and falling consumer costs. 
 
These reports have primarily explored the shock of COVID-19 on the housing and 
rental sector from a short-term perspective, analysing how prices and affordability 
have been impacted by the initial lockdown instigated in the country in March. 
However, due to the uncertainty caused by the lockdown and the impact this will 
have on demand and supply, COVID-19 is likely to have significant long-term 
impacts on both house prices and rents, affecting the market for years to come. 
 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2 the impact of COVID-19 on 
housing demand is explored, in Section 3 we look at the impact of the pandemic 
on housing supply, Section 4 deals with issues around price and affordability in the 
housing market, Section 5 looks at the rental market, Section 6 concludes. 
2. HOUSING DEMAND 
The impact COVID-19 has had on the Irish labour market is unprecedented. In April 
2020, the unemployment rate spiked at 28.2 per cent, up from 4.8 per cent just 
two months earlier in February (Figure 1). This change in unemployment is unique 
both in terms of the rapidity and scale of the increase. While the labour market has 
recovered somewhat in the past couple of months as lockdown measures have 
been eased, the unemployment rate remains elevated at just under 17 per cent. 
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FIGURE 1  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%) 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office.  
 
Typically, such a large increase in unemployment would lead to a significant 
decrease in income which in turn would reduce the demand for housing. Kelly and 
McQuinn (2014), for example, observe a very close relationship between house 
prices and developments in the Irish labour market. However, as shown in Beirne 
et al. (2020) the immediate impact on incomes during this crisis has been largely 
offset by the introduction of extraordinary fiscal measures in the form of the 
Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) and the Temporary COVID-19 Wage 
Subsidy Scheme (TWSS). As a result, the direct impact of the labour market shock 
on housing demand may be muted in the short term.  
 
However, these support measures are set to be unwound over the next year. From 
September the welfare amount received will be dependent on an individual’s pre-
pandemic income and the supports are scheduled to be phased out altogether by 
April 2021. If unemployment rates remain elevated as income supports are 
curtailed, overall income in the country would likely decline which in turn would 
reduce the demand for housing. A critical question will relate to which households 
across the income distribution will face income shocks and how their demand for 
housing will change. Recent research by Beirne et al. (2020) and Coffey et al. 
(2020b) show considerable differences across the income distribution.  
 
Beyond the direct impact of the pandemic on the Irish economy, the increased 
uncertainty around COVID-19 is likely to have a contractionary impact on demand. 
The longer the virus persists and uncertainty about the future opening of the 
economy continues, the greater the adverse impact on housing demand. 
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house when there is such a high degree of uncertainty. Other practical 
considerations such as potential buyers being restricted from viewings of real 
estate are also likely to have impacted demand in the short term. 
 
Key Issues for Consideration 
- How will the labour market shocks translate into housing demand 
developments during, and in the aftermath of, the pandemic? 
- To what extent will uncertainty affect housing demand? 
 
Moving beyond the short term it is possible that the Irish housing market may 
experience a significant increase in demand when the pandemic is brought under 
control. Coffey et al. (2020b) show that as a result of the heightened uncertainty 
and the administrative closures which limited the ability of consumers to spend, 
consumption this year is likely to be significantly lower than previous years. 
Combined with the PUP and TWSS which have offset a significant decrease in 
income there is likely to be a large increase in savings this year. FitzGerald (2020) 
estimates that the savings rate in 2020 will be 19.7 per cent in comparison to 
10.5 per cent in 2019. When the uncertainty around the pandemic begins to 
subside this large increase in savings may in part be directed towards the housing 
market. This opens up the possibility of a surge in housing demand when concerns 
about the pandemic subside in the future. In many respects this is what occurred 
after the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Between 2008 and 2012, house prices fell 
significantly in the Irish market. However, by 2012, once economic conditions had 
stabilised and uncertainty had abated, demand recovered strongly. 
 
Housing demand will also be impacted through the credit channel, with COVID-19 
likely to impact on credit institutions in a number of different ways. As a result of 
the supports that have been put in place for mortgage holders and SMEs, loan 
repayments have been deferred. There is also likely to be increased uncertainty 
around the issuance of credit in an environment of increased unemployment and 
falling incomes. These issues are likely to have an impact on bank profitability and 
capital levels. As such this may give rise to the possibility of credit constraints, with 
households limited in the amount of credit that they can obtain relative to before 
the crisis. This in turn will reduce the demand for housing. Fitzpatrick and McQuinn 
(2007) estimated a significant mutually reinforcing link between house prices and 
mortgage credit in the Irish market. Figure 2 shows that already there has been a 
sharp decline in the value of new residential mortgage loans with the annual 
growth rate declining by 35 per cent in Q2 2020. While early indications are that 
mortgage approvals have increased from April, banks may tighten underwriting 
standards given the difficulties in assessing risk in the current climate. This may 
further increase credit access difficulties.  
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Where credit access difficulties become a binding concern for households 
(i.e. creditworthy households are unable to access sufficient credit), this may lead 
to a requirement for further policy interventions to deal with this market failure. 
The current Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan for first time buyers, which targets 
credit access issues for lower income households, may need to be revisited to 
ensure that it is dealing with the post-pandemic difficulties which certain 
households may have in accessing credit. This could be achieved through 
alleviating income constraints. It could be the case that the pandemic leads to 
more households facing wealth constraints in terms of saving for house purchase. 
If this occurs, then it may be necessary to provide a revamped equity scheme for 
first time buyers. While the Help-to-Buy Scheme is still in place, there is evidence 
that this scheme has been poorly targeted (to those with already low LTVs who are 
not constrained) (Parliamentary Budget Office, 2019),2 and many commentators 
have noted the scheme is likely leading to higher levels of inflation in the market 
given present levels of housing supply. However, if the evidence is clear that 
households are facing wealth constraints then some intervention to facilitate 
equity support is warranted. One offsetting effect may be the rise in savings which 
could provide many households with ample equity for house purchase. At the very 
least, a reassessment of credit access following the pandemic and the role of public 
mortgage and equity supports for first time buyers is required given the highly 
changeable context.  
 
Key Issues for Consideration 
- How will the lending market evolve in the context of the pandemic? 
- Do households face increased income or wealth constraints as a 
consequence of the pandemic and what is the appropriate policy mix 
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FIGURE 2  GROWTH RATE VALUE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS (%) 
 
 
Source: Banking and Payments Federation Ireland.  
 
Prior to the pandemic Bergin and Garcia-Rodriguez (2020) used a regional 
demographic model to determine the level of structural demand for housing at a 
local authority level up to 2040. Under their Baseline scenario urban areas are 
expected to continue to have the highest population share up to 2040 with the 
Mid-East region around Dublin expected to experience the fastest population 
growth relative to population shares. As a result, higher levels of housing demand 
are forecast in Dublin city, Cork county, south Dublin (SDCC), Dún Laoghaire-
Rathdown, Cork city, Meath and Kildare.  
 
One of the most significant impacts that the pandemic and lockdown have had on 
the labour market is the increase in the number of people working from home. 
While the permanency of this shift to remote working remains to be seen, many 
companies have already signalled that employees will be given greater 
opportunities to work from home going forward. This may reduce the need for 
workers to be located near city centres both as a direct result of remote working 
and also the knock-on effect of reduced economic activity in city centres. In turn, 
this may result in decreased demand for housing in urban areas where house prices 
and rents are currently highest. The existing, desired move towards higher density 
models of accommodation is likely to be more challenging as a result of COVID-19. 
Households, particularly those with children, may place more emphasis on green 
space and houses rather than apartments. If the pandemic leads to a systemic 
re-evaluation of households housing preferences, then this may alter the 
composition of demand. Future research could examine how such changes are 
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Key Issues for Consideration 
- How will the pandemic affect the structural demand for housing, in 
particular around migration?  
- Will the pandemic change housing type preferences and location choice 
due to more working from home possibilities?  
- Will such changes provide an opportunity for development in regional 
and rural locations? 
 
Figure 3 shows the ratio of transactions in 2020 compared to the same period the 
previous year. There was a clear decline in transactions in April and May relative 
to 2019. While the transaction rate is influenced by demand- and supply-side 
factors, some of the reduction in sales may be coming through reduced housing 
demand as incomes decline and households are more uncertain about the future.  
 
FIGURE 3  RATIO OF SALES TRANSACTIONS IN 2020 VS 2019 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Property Price Register.  
3. HOUSING SUPPLY 
Before the pandemic emerged, the Irish housing market was already faced with a 
significant problem of undersupply. Despite increases over the last number of 
years there were still only 21,000 housing completions in 2019. This is well short of 
the amount of housing needed to keep up with the level of structural demand, 
estimated to be in the region of 30,000-35,000.3 Issues of undersupply are likely to 
be amplified by the pandemic which will hinder both investment and construction 
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The immediate consequence of the lockdown was to put physical restrictions on 
the construction industry. Construction sites were closed for a number of weeks as 
part of the administrative closures instigated in late March. Despite the easing of 
these restrictions efficiency on sites is likely to be below the level it was at before 
the pandemic. This is due to the safety protocols which have been put in place such 
as the limitations on the number of workers on site at any one time. Further to this 
a number of building sites have already had to be temporarily closed as a result of 
workers testing positive for the virus. As long as these measures remain in place, 
efficiency in the construction sector is likely to remain below normal. A key 
question arises as to how productivity in the construction sector will be affected 
under an economic environment with ongoing lockdowns and infection risks. 
These issues will naturally raise the cost of development if such measures, for 
example, lead to fewer employees allowed on site. However, COVID-19 could 
increase the popularity of alternative construction practices such as off-site 
volumetric builds particularly in the context of large scale builds. 
 
Due to the nature of housing investment it may take a number of years before 
there is a return on the initial investment. Therefore, any uncertainty with regard 
to future market conditions is likely to reduce investment in housing today. A 
reduction in investment today will lead to a fall in new housing in the future. Thus, 
while a fall in uncertainty around the pandemic would likely result in an immediate 
increase in demand there is likely to be more of a lag for housing supply. As a result, 
the present imbalance in the market between demand and supply could be 
exacerbated over the coming years as supply lags behind a recovery in housing 
demand. This mismatch in terms of the recovery of supply vis-à-vis demand was 
observed post-2012 in the Irish market. However, for a comparable outcome to 
the financial crisis to materialise, the adverse effects of the pandemic would want 
to continue for a number of years. 
 
Key Issues for Consideration 
- How will ongoing public health restrictions affect productivity in the 
building industry? 
- How will uncertainty around the economic and epidemiological situation 
affect the supply of new housing? 
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FIGURE 4  HOUSING COMPLETIONS 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office.  
 
Another aspect of housing supply that may need an alternative set of scenario 
analysis following the pandemic is the issue of planning and demographic spread. 
While the current National Planning Framework and associated local county 
development plans are based off demographic projections built around strong 
economic growth, these results may now need to be accompanied by an 
alternative set of assumptions. It will not be possible to ascertain what the 
demographic impacts of the pandemic will be until the epidemiological situation is 
clearer but there may well be a range of additional questions that now need to be 
addressed from a planning and demographic perspective.  
 
Key Issues for Consideration 
How does planning policy react to changes brought on by the pandemic? 
- Is city-led development going to be as required going forward with a 
more agile “working from home” culture and can this be an opportunity 
for a rejuvenation of rural areas and provincial towns? 
- Is there the potential for surplus office accommodation in cities to be 
converted to residential accommodation? 
- Will lower density housing with fewer apartments be more preferential 
for households given concerns around outdoor space and green spaces? 
 
 
While city-led urban development is highly efficient from a public service provision 
perspective and spatial planning perspective, demand amongst households for this 
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placed on such development and may offer an opportunity for a more balanced 
spread of population on a regional basis.  
 
Investment and rental supply 
Another concern from the supply side in the rental market is the extent to which 
tenant protection mechanisms and price cap limitations feed through over time 
into supply impacts. The immediate crisis related measures in the rental sector 
which were enacted as part of the Emergency Measures in the Public Interest 
(COVID-19) Act 2020 removed eviction and price rise risk from the private rental 
sector for the period of the pandemic. This measure was entirely consistent (and 
warranted) with households being asked to restrict their movements to deal with 
the pandemic. While protections for households in arrears who had been affected 
by COVID-19 were continued to early 2021 as part of the Residential Tenancies and 
Valuation Act 2020, the extent to which these policies (and the longer-term rent 
control measures) add uncertainty and price risk for investors is an open question. 
The impact of the risk-return calculations of both household and institutional 
investors may lead to lower rental supply from private sources going forward. If 
these impacts delay project starts now, this could exacerbate supply bottlenecks 
in the future.  
 
A consequence of this may be that the pandemic results in a major increase in State 
provision of longer-term rental housing which can be targeted at providing 
affordable solutions for lower income households. However, the impact of the 
pandemic on investment in rental supply requires a detailed exploration. In 
particular, it may be necessary to estimate if the current legislation, which limits 
evictions, has a significant impact on future investment levels in the sector? In both 
cases, an increase in the State provision of rental housing is likely to be required 
and could form a cornerstone of any post-pandemic capital stimulus.  
 
Key Issues for Consideration 
- How do changes in pandemic-related tenancy legislation impact rental 
supply? 
- To what extent should the State step in to provide rental housing 
supply directly? 
4. PRICE/AFFORDABILITY IN THE HOUSING MARKET 
While house prices increased rapidly in the years following the nadir of the market 
in 2013, the inflation rate had fallen somewhat from 2019 onwards (see Figure 5). 
The stabilisation of house prices over this period reflected the fact that actual 
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house prices had converged with their fundamental values as a result of the rapid 
increase in prices in preceding years.4 
 
Since April 2020 the inflation rate has started to decline again, and in July 2020 
national house prices experienced the first negative year-on-year growth rate since 
May 2013. 
 
FIGURE 5  YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE INDEX:  
2013:01 – 2020:07 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office.  
 
Despite the moderation of house price inflation, affordability issues in the housing 
market remain. Research by Corrigan et al. (2019) show that affordability pressures 
in the housing market are not universal but rather pertain to specific groups. 
Unsurprisingly those on low incomes face the greatest challenges in this regard 
with mortgaged households in the lowest 25 per cent of the income distribution 
paying on average two-fifths of their income on housing costs. A more granular 
look at affordability for first time buyers by Allen Coghlan et al. (2019) found that 





4  For further information on house price sustainability in Ireland see: McQuinn et al. (2019). House price expectations, 
labour market developments and the house price to rent ratio: A user cost of capital approach and Allen-Coghlan M. et 
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Given the aforementioned impact that COVID-19 will have on housing demand and 
supply it is very likely that the pandemic will have a knock-on effect for house prices 
and affordability. 
 
Allen-Coghlan and McQuinn (2020) look at the implications for house prices due to 
the potential impact of the pandemic on incomes, credit and new housing supply. 
An inverted demand model for housing with a mortgage credit activity variable is 
utilised to analyse the historical relationship between prices and these three 
variables. The coefficients estimated from this model are then used in a scenario 
analysis where incomes, credit and supply are modelled over the next two years. 
Three scenarios are put forward representing different recovery paths for the Irish 
economy; the Baseline, Benign and Severe. The Baseline is a counterfactual 
scenario where there was no pandemic. Under this scenario house prices were 
estimated to increase by just over 1 per cent this year and just over 3 per cent in 
2021. Under the Benign scenario there is a significant contraction in the economy 
in Q2 2020 due to the lockdown restrictions imposed by the government. However, 
after this period, as the restrictions are gradually lifted, the economy recovers 
rapidly and by 2021 the economy has recovered to the level expected under the 
Baseline scenario. Here house prices in Q4 2021 are forecast to be the same level 
they were in Q1 2020, the period just before the pandemic. In the Severe scenario 
where the impacts of the pandemic stretch beyond 2020, house prices decline by 
over 12 per cent by the end of 2021 relative to Q1 2020.  
 
While the short-term impact on prices will likely be dominated by demand-side 
factors of falling incomes and reduced credit access, longer-term prices are likely 
to be more influenced by supply-side factors which, as discussed, tend to have a 
lagged effect. This means that we could possibly experience a sharp increase in 
house price inflation when demand initially begins to pick up again. 
 
Key Issues for Consideration 
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FIGURE 6 FORECASTS OF HOUSE PRICES (REAL) UNDER THREE SCENARIOS: 2019Q1-2021Q4 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Note:  All data are in index form with 2019Q1 set = 100. 
 
While a short-term decline in house prices may be a relief to those currently 
seeking to buy a home, the pandemic will not be a panacea for affordability issues 
in the housing market. The negative impact of COVID-19 on the Irish labour market 
has not been evenly distributed across sectors or demographics. In a Box in the 
summer Commentary Roantree (2020) has shown that young workers have been 
disproportionately impacted by COVID-19. It is also clear from the labour market 
data that employees in lower paid sectors such as hospitality and tourism have 
been much more adversely impacted than those in higher paid sectors such as 
finance and ICT. As the work by Corrigan et al. (2019) showed, those in lower 
income groups were disproportionally impacted by affordability issues in the 
housing market before the pandemic. Allen-Coghlan et al. (2019) showed that 
there were significant affordability issues for first time buyers in the housing 
market, particularly in the GDA and urban areas generally. While government 
supports have prevented a significant drop in incomes for these groups so far, if 
the negative labour market shock persists then the very groups that were facing 
the most significant affordability issues before the pandemic may be even more 
negatively impacted in the years to come.  
5. RENTAL MARKET 
While there was some moderation in house price growth over the past year, rental 
prices have continued to increase rapidly. Figure 7 presents the RTB Quarterly Rent 
Index up to Q1 2020, before the lockdown took effect. The annualised growth rate 
of rents increased by 5.4 per cent in Q1 2020 nationally while the annual growth 
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FIGURE 7 RTB/ESRI RENT INDEX ANNUAL GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source: ESRI/RTB Rent Index. 
 
In order to explore the early impact of the pandemic on the rental market, the ESRI 
and RTB undertook a short-term analysis of monthly rent prices and transactions 
from January to June 2020 using a hedonic regression model (Allen-Coglan et al., 
2020). The results of this are presented in Figure 8. Rent price growth has 
moderated somewhat since the pandemic began, declining by 2.7 per cent 
between March and April. The initial price decline was even more significant in 
Dublin where prices fell by 4.5 per cent between March and April. National month-
on-month declines were registered in three of the four months since March 2020.  
 
However, it should be noted that these price trends were based on early 
provisional data received by the RTB. These data do not include the total number 
of rental transactions that took place over this period as registrations with the RTB 
are often made in the months following the commencement of a tenancy. In order 
to assess the full impact of the pandemic on the rental market, we will need to wait 
until the regular quarterly RTB Rent Index for Q2 is released. Further downward 
pressure on rent prices may come as a result of the Residential Tenancies and 
Valuation Act 2020 which provides a limitation on price increases for tenants 
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FIGURE 8 SHORT-TERM INDEX OF RENT PRICES 
 
 
Source: ESRI/RTB Rent Index. 
Note: * Data only available for tenancies commencing over the first 16 days of the month. 
 
Figure 9 shows the number of tenancy registrations each month. Between March 
and April there was a significant decline in the number of tenancies registered with 
the RTB. While in March there were over 7,000 registrations, in April this had fallen 
to less than 4,000. The number of new registrations also remained subdued in May. 
The fall in registrations is consistent with the restrictions on economic and social 
life brought in to stop the spread of the COVID-19 virus. 
 
FIGURE 9 NEW AND RENEWAL TENANCIES REGISTERED WITH THE RTB 
 
 
Source: ESRI/RTB Rent Index. 
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Coffey et al. (2020b) looked at how COVID-19 would impact on affordability in the 
rental sector in the short term. The paper focused on households which were not 
in receipt of rental supports such as the Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) or Rent 
Supplement. The paper used two metrics to determine affordability (1) the ratio of 
rental payment to net income of the household and (2) a residual income ratio 
which takes the income left after the rental payment is made and determines 
whether it is sufficient to cover a minimum required level of expenditure. They find 
that while prior to the lockdown one-third of renters already experienced 
affordability issues, on an aggregate basis the immediate impact of the pandemic 
would not have made these affordability challenges any worse. This is primarily 
due to the extraordinary income supports which were put in place in the form of 
the PUP and the TWSS. As a result of these supports, they actually find a fall in 
affordability pressures among households. However, they also find that renting 
households were more likely to work in sectors affected by the pandemic and the 
income shock experienced by renters was greater than that for homeowners.  
 
This paper also looked at how the pandemic affected missed rental payments. 
While model estimates based on the relationship between affordability stress, 
unemployment and rental payment difficulties suggest that there is likely to be an 
increase in missed payments, this will be reduced somewhat by consumption 
expenditure falling more rapidly than incomes. Model estimates suggest that 
missed payments will increase slightly from just under 10 per cent to just under 
11 per cent. 
 
Over a longer time period the pandemic is likely to worsen affordability issues in 
the rental market. Incomes are likely to rebound slower than rising costs in areas 
such as transport and childcare costs. COVID-19 is having the most significant 
impact on those in the accommodation and food service sectors, where 15 per cent 
of workers in these sectors live in private rental households compared to more 
than three times as many as in mortgaged households. As the income supports are 
removed any sluggishness in the recovery of incomes in these sectors will 
exacerbate pre-existing affordability challenges in the rental sector. 
 
Work by Cronin and McQuinn (2016) has shown that restrictions in credit also have 
implications for tenure choice, leading to an increase in demand for rented 
accommodation. If there is a decline in the provision of credit going forward due 
to the pandemic then, ceterus paribus, we would expect to see greater demand for 
rental properties relative to owner-occupying which again could put upward 
pressure on rental prices.  
 
These considerations reinforce the discussion above regarding the supply of rental 
properties given changes to the legislative agenda and the ongoing affordability 
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challenges. If fewer households are able to afford the transition from renting to 
owning this will exacerbate the affordability issues in the rental sector. 
6. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Given how fast moving and changeable the situation with regard to COVID-19 is 
regarding the broader economy, it is likely there are many aspects of the housing 
market that we have not explored that will be impacted by COVID-19. One such 
issue that may require additional analysis to understand its role in a post-COVID 
environment is the generalised goal of improving energy efficiency in the housing 
stock. The retrofitting of private housing may be more difficult to achieve if 
households become credit constrained or face a reduction in living standards due 
to the deterioration in labour market conditions. Incentivising investment through 
the private sector may need additional policy intervention if private households 
are unable or unwilling to finance such investment going forward.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
COVID-19 has already had an unprecedented impact on the Irish economy and this 
has extended to the housing and rental markets. While government support 
schemes are likely to keep incomes stable in the near term, as these measures are 
unwound and the labour market struggles to recover, incomes are likely to fall, 
putting downward pressure on housing demand. The extensive and prompt 
introduction of the different household income supports has to date insulated the 
housing market from some of the most adverse consequences of COVID-19. 
 
The fall in economic activity is also likely to lead to credit constraints which will also 
reduce the level of demand. These credit constraints may be compounded by any 
increases in the provisioning for impaired loans the domestic financial sector has 
to undertake due to the crisis. 
 
While there has already been a fall in the number of housing completions due to 
reduced efficiency in the construction sector, the most significant impact on supply 
may not be seen for another year. In the face of a high level of uncertainty today 
investment is likely to be curtailed, meaning as demand starts to pick up the level 
of supply will not be there to meet it, amplifying the existing undersupply in the 
Irish market. 
 
Ultimately, over the longer-term, this is likely to be the main impact on the housing 
market of COVID-19; an increase in the imbalance between the supply and demand 
for properties in the Irish market. Consequently, one of the most appropriate policy 
responses is for an increase in State provision of social and affordable housing. An 
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increase in the supply of such housing at this point would help to reduce the extent 
to which the imbalance would be exacerbated by the present crisis. Ultimately, 
facilitating cheaper, more efficient housing supply is the primary policy concern in 
the housing market over the medium term.  
 
At a more speculative level, the potential increase in the number of people who 
can and will work from home in the future may have significant implications for the 
housing market and the general economy over the longer term. In practical terms, 
this may mean that much of the longer-term analysis, which has already been 
conducted concerning the structural demand for housing at both a national and 
regional level, now needs to be accompanied by an alternative set of scenarios. 
More broadly, the impact of COVID-19 may lead to an additional set of questions 
examining the possibility of better regional and rural distribution along with a new 
consideration of the future purpose of towns and cities. 
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COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND SMES REVENUES IN IRELAND: WHAT’S 
THE GAP? 
 
Maria Martinez-Cillero, Martina Lawless and Conor O’Toole1 
ABSTRACT 
The COVID-19 economic crisis has caused an unprecedented economic shock for 
the Irish SME sector. In this paper, we assess the financial resilience of Irish SMEs 
and explore the extent to which they have faced revenue shortfalls (where revenue 
falls below expenditure on a monthly basis) since the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic. We also undertake a forward-looking exercise which attempts to 
quantify SME revenue shortfalls to the end of 2020 under three scenarios. We 
found that between two-in-five micro firms and one-in-two small/medium-sized 
firms faced a revenue shortfall from March to June 2020. This accounted for a 
revenue shortfall of between €6 billion and €10 billion for the period. If firms’ own 
cash resources bridge the gap, then between €2.2 billion and €4.3 billion remains 
unaccounted for. Looking forward to the end of 2020, scenario estimates for the 
gap are between €8 billion and €15 billion, depending on the epidemiological 
situation. Own fund usage can reduce this to between €4 billion and €8 billion, 
depending on the scenario.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic represents the most severe economic shock to the Irish 
economy in living memory. The speed and scale of the disruption to economic and 
social life are outside any experience bar wartime. While dealing with the health 
implications of the pandemic was the highest priority, the economic cost of the 
restrictions is substantial. An early estimate of the potential scale of the shock 
forecast for 2020 is provided by McQuinn et al. (2020), who suggest the economy 
could contract by between 9 and 17 per cent depending on the epidemiological 
situation with respect to COVID-19.  
 
The outlook for the economy as it exits the initial lockdown phase depends on 
continued suppression of the virus, which gives rise to considerable uncertainty on 
the scale of the economic impact and the necessary policy interventions. 




1  This work is part of a joint research programme on Taxation, the Macroeconomy and Banking between the ESRI, 
Department of Finance and Revenue Commissioners. We would like to thank everyone involved in the programme for 
helpful comments. In particular we would like to thank Eric Gargan, John Palmer and Fergal McCann for insightful 
comments. We would also like to thank the CSO and Chambers Ireland for provision of data. The views are those of 
the authors and not of the participating institutions.  
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revenue losses and liquidity shortfalls of the Irish small and medium enterprise 
(SME) sector. We do this both for the period of the stringent restrictions 
throughout the second quarter of 2020 and also across several outlook scenarios 
for the rest of the year. 
 
The SME sector makes up the vast majority of firms operating in Ireland and 
employs over one million people (68.4 per cent of total employment) according to 
the CSO (2019). While much of the prospects for the sector over the coming 
months depend very much on epidemiological developments and the scale of the 
economic shock, the resilience of individual firms and the SME sector as a whole 
also depends on the financial position entering the crisis.  
 
The paper therefore begins with a description of the performance of the SME 
sector before it entered the crisis period. To do this, we used detailed survey data 
on profitability, indebtedness, cash holdings and payment arrears across firms to 
gauge their potential resilience or vulnerability to a severe shock to their revenues. 
We particularly focused on the relationship between expenditure and turnover 
across SMEs and how much capacity did SMEs have to absorb shocks through their 
build-up of internal funds before the crisis hit. Following the description of the SME 
sector’s performance entering the crisis, we calculated the potential impact in 
terms of revenue shortfalls over the lockdown period in the second quarter of 
2020. We combined estimates of the range of turnover reductions from surveys 
carried out by the CSO and by Chambers Ireland with expenditure reductions 
coming from support schemes such as an illustrative wage subsidy (like the 
Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) or the Employee Wage Subsidy Scheme 
(EWSS) which replaced it in July 2020) and reductions in other input costs. It must 
be noted that we did not try and directly model either of these exact wage 
subsidies in operation, as we do not have employee level data which would allow 
us to do a microsimulation exercise. Instead, we used an illustrative subsidy that is 
based on the average earnings per employee at the firm. We used this survey 
evidence on the extent of turnover and expenditure reductions to calibrate a 
number of scenarios for our detailed firm dataset. This allowed us to examine how 
widespread revenue gaps were across firms and how these compared to the 
reserves that firms had in place to cope with a negative shock. We also aggregated 
across firms to build up a total estimate of the revenue shortfall for the SME sector 
as a whole – both including and excluding the sector’s own internal funds 
resources. The combination of granular data on cash holdings and the up-to-date 
input of turnover and expenditure shocks from the CSO allowed us to extend 
earlier work on liquidity for SMEs in the COVID-19 period (McGeever et al., 2020). 
 
The estimates for the revenue shortfalls over the lockdown period have been 
extended to cover the full year 2020 under a range of different scenarios. Our 
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central scenario is a gradual return to normal turnover for most firms by the end 
of the year with some ongoing public health measures (like physical distancing) 
continuing. A more optimistic scenario is for a rapid improvement in turnover 
throughout the third quarter, and a more pessimistic scenario has restrictions in 
place and has turnover improve somewhat in the third quarter of 2020 – but then 
stay at this level for the final quarter as well, although without returning to a full 
lockdown. These scenarios were used to calibrate the financial evolution of firms 
in the SME survey and results were then aggregated to give an overall indication of 
the range of potential shortfalls and the capacity of firms to survive them.  
 
The results are subject to considerable uncertainty, particularly in the case of the 
forward-looking scenarios which depend to a large extent on health developments 
and the control of the pandemic. Our key results suggest that between 40-55 per 
cent of micro enterprises experienced a revenue shortfall for three months to 
mid-June 2020. The median revenue gap per month for these firms was between 
€3,000-€3,500. For small/medium-sized firms, between 43-60 per cent of these 
firms faced a revenue gap with a median size ranging from €30,000 to €40,000 per 
month. Approximately one-in three micro firms, and two-in-five small/medium-
sized firms, did not have sufficient own resources to cover the three-month 
revenue gaps.  
 
Our next step was to aggregate these figures to provide estimates of the revenue 
gap for those firms who experienced a loss. It must be clearly noted at the outset 
that such a process is complicated using survey data and can lead to considerable 
uncertainty around any point estimate. Furthermore, our revenue gaps only relate 
to SMEs with a turnover less than €50 million due to the survey design. Our 
estimates would probably underestimate the gap (potentially by some margin) if 
larger medium-sized firms were to be included. Aggregating our figures for the 
revenue gap provides an estimate of between €6 billion and €10 billion as a result 
of the pandemic for the second quarter of 2020. Some of this can be covered by 
SMEs’ existing internal resources but, even assuming a full running down of SME 
cash resources, a revenue shortfall of between €2.2 billion and €4.3 billion remains. 
This is not to say that having SMEs use all internal funds in this way is desirable, 
particularly as it would have knock-on implications for their ability to invest and 
grow in any recovery phase, but it does show that some absorptive capacity existed 
within the sector prior to the shock. 
 
The range of estimates for the full year effect is much wider given the importance 
of the health developments in determining the recovery path. In our base scenario, 
assuming a steady recovery over the second half of the year, the shortfall in SME 
liquidity is between €8.1 billion and €12.3 billion, however this declines to between 
€3.9 billion and €6.7 billion if SMEs use their own reserves fully. In an optimistic 
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scenario of a more rapid return to near normal turnover levels, this revenue gap is 
between €7.4 billion and €10.7 billion (when accounting for own resources the 
figures are between €3.6 billion and €5.7 billion). A slower recovery would increase 
the shortfall considerably to between €9.5 billion and €14.9 billion. Depending on 
the scenario, the gaps are approximately €4.8 billion and €8.25 billion when 
accounting for own funds, as firms have to bridge a longer period of low turnover, 
and as any internal resources that helped to cushion the initial impact are run 
down.  
 
It should be noted that the estimates of gaps or shortfalls presented in this paper 
should not be seen as the required level of government support. Rather, they are 
estimates of the revenue gaps that firms will face under various economic 
scenarios. There is a very large range of options which can be drawn upon to bridge 
these gaps including the cash reserves that firms have on their balance sheet, 
drawdowns of existing loans, new lending from the private sector etc. 
Furthermore, if the economic shock persists many companies may not survive, and 
company closure will be one economic adjustment mechanism for firms with 
revenue gaps. State support (be it guarantees on loans, grants or equity transfers) 
will all be considerably important but will not on their own fully bridge the gaps 
suggested in this paper. Indeed, a large range of state supports have already been 
introduced, such as the enhanced credit guarantee scheme, lending facilities 
through the SBCI and a range of restart grants. These policies can act to address 
firms who have a revenue shortfall. However, the optimal policy response to the 
current crisis is beyond the scope of this paper but requires considerable detailed 
research and analysis over the coming months. 
 
The rest of the document is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the financial 
position of SMEs prior to the pandemic; Section 3 outlines our estimates of the 
scale of the shock and liquidity gap; Section 4 attempts to provide an aggregation 
of the firm level gaps; Section 5 presents forward looking estimates out to the end 
of 2020, while Section 6 concludes.  
2. FINANCIAL POSITION OF SMES PRIOR TO THE PANDEMIC 
This section documents the structure of the SME sector and its financial position 
before the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic hit. The primary data source we used 
for the analysis of SMEs in this paper is the Credit Demand Survey (CDS), carried 
out twice a year by the Department of Finance. The survey is documented in detail 
in Gargan et al. (2018) and Martinez-Cillero et al. (forthcoming). It contains a wide 
range of financial and credit indicators, which we briefly overview here. Table 1 
shows averages of selected indicators of the financial situation of SMEs in Ireland 
in 2018, the latest year for which data are available in the CDS. We display this 
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information by size2 and sector categories. The chosen indicators show that 46 per 
cent of SMEs hold some external debt and, of these firms with debt, the average 
ratio of debt-to-turnover is 16 per cent. The share of firms with debt is quite 
noticeably higher amongst medium firms than micro and small firms, which may 
indicate that it is easier for firms to access finance once they reach a certain scale 
or that debt financing has played a role in investing to expand operations. The 
extent of the debt held as a percentage of turnover is also larger for the medium-
sized firms. Across sectors, the share of firms with debt is highest in hotels and 
restaurants and manufacturing.  
 
Seven-in-ten firms made a profit, a share that is slightly higher amongst small and 
medium firms relative to micro firms but not substantially so. The percentage of 
profitable SMEs is slightly lower for the sub-sample of firms which have debt. The 
ratio of debt-to-turnover is steady across most sectors with the exception of hotels 
and restaurants where the ratio is considerably higher than average at 42 per cent. 
The share of firms making a profit is lowest in this sector at 58 per cent and the 
share of firms that have missed a payment on debts is highest. This is a serious 
concern in the context of vulnerability to the COVID-19 shock as the hospitality 
sector has been subject to the most stringent restrictions and is likely to have to 
deal with limitations on activity due to social distancing requirements for the 
longest. On the demand side, households are also likely to be more restrained in 
their activity to engage with this sector while the threat of infection continues to 





2  Throughout this report, size categories are defined in terms of number of employees. Micro firms employ between 0-9 
people, Small firms employ between 10-49 people, and Medium firms employ between 50-249 people.  
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TABLE 1  AVERAGE FINANCIAL INDICATORS BY FIRM CATEGORY 






% Firms with 
Debt,  




Total 46.0 15.6 69.4 67.6 4.5 
Size categories       
Micro 40.8 14.0 65.5 60.8 6.3 
Small 46.7 14.1 71.6 68.1 3.4 
Medium 55.9 25.7 72.5 77.1 3.0 
Sector categories      
Manufacturing 50.8 12.5 68.4 63.1 4.6 
Construction & Real estate 42.9 12.5 60.3 59.1 3.7 
Wholesale & Retail 45.6 12.4 71.3 68.8 5.1 
Hotels & Restaurants 54.1 41.6 58.3 56.1 6.1 
Professional, Scientific and 
Technical 42.5 13.5 77.3 76.6 4.8 
Other 43.4 22.2 72.9 74.8 2.3 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note:  The Debt/Turnover ratio distribution is capped at 5. The mean Debt/Turnover ratio is calculated using only firms with debt. Debt 
numbers include those whose debt has been imputed and therefore can differ to previous (or different metrics) estimated using 
this specific survey. For more information please contact the authors for clarification.  
 
We next looked at the relationship between expenditure and turnover across SMEs 
and how much capacity SMEs have available to absorb shocks in terms of internal 
funds.3 In order to explore the relation between annual turnover and annual 
expenditure we built a ratio as total annual turnover/total annual expenditure. An 
additional ratio built as the share of total annual cash and cash equivalents to total 
annual expenditure was also computed. The latter ratio indicates the overall 
capacity of SMEs to deal with potential income shocks by covering their annual 
expenditure using their available cash reserves alone.  
 
The histograms in Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the total distribution of each ratio 
while the subsequent tables show the medians across firm groups. The histograms 
show that both ratios are extremely skewed, which is why the median is used in 
the tables following as the better representation of the standard firm experience. 
However, in later aggregations, we switched to using means to capture the fact 
that large revenue and liquidity gaps, even in a small number of firms, affect the 





3  Outliers have been removed in all continuous variables used to obtain the statistics presented (i.e. turnover, debt, cash 
and cash equivalents and expenditure). Observations are considered an outlier if they are above of the upper/lower 
1 per cent of the distributions. 
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FIGURE 1 RATIO OF TURNOVER TO EXPENDITURE  
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note: Upper end of the distribution is capped at 15. Bin width is 0.2. 
 
FIGURE 2 RATIO OF CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS TO EXPENDITURE 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note: Upper end of the distribution is capped at 2. Bin width is 0.4. 
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The median values of the total annual turnover/total annual expenditure and total 
annual cash and cash equivalents-to-total annual expenditure ratios are presented 
in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. Table 2 also includes the percentage of firms 
for which annual turnover was higher than annual expenditure in 2018, the most 
recent year of available data. Turnover was 60 per cent higher than expenditure 
for the SME sector overall and approximately 90 per cent of firms had turnover 
greater than expenditure. The difference in this ratio between firms with debt and 
those without debt is fairly modest, with firms with no debt having a slightly higher 
ratio of turnover to expenditure but also being slightly more likely to have turnover 
not exceeding expenditure. Across firm sizes, micro firms have greater ratios of 
turnover to expenditure and are also marginally more likely to have turnover 
exceed expenditure.  
 
TABLE 2 MEDIAN TURNOVER/EXPENDITURE RATIO, BY CATEGORIES 
 Turnover/Annual Expenditure % Firms Turnover > Expenditure 
  All Debt No debt All Debt No debt 
Total 1.59 1.56 1.65 89.9 92.5 88.5 
Size categories       
Micro 1.88 1.75 2.00 91.4 93.6 90.2 
Small 1.45 1.45 1.50 88.7 90.9 87.4 
Medium 1.33 1.36 1.25 88.9 93.4 84.3 
Sector categories       
Manufacturing 1.50 1.56 1.33 84.3 79.9 88.8 
Construction & Real estate 1.67 1.43 1.87 93.6 96.4 92.7 
Wholesale & Retail 1.79 1.75 2.00 90.2 96.1 87.6 
Hotels & Restaurants 1.80 1.83 1.79 92.1 93.4 89.8 
Prof. & Scientific & Technical 1.52 1.45 1.80 91.8 94.0 90.6 
Other 1.33 1.38 1.33 87.6 92.3 83.9 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note:  The upper end of the distributions of the Turnover/Annual expenditure ratio is capped at 15.  
 
A key indicator of financial resilience that we used to indicate ability to absorb 
shocks was the extent of cash and cash equivalents held by SMEs. Table 3 shows 
how much cash SMEs hold relative to their annual expenditure. The median firm 
holds enough cash or equivalent to cover 10 per cent of their annual expenditure. 
Firms with outstanding debt understandably hold less in cash reserves, at 6 per 
cent of annual expenditure compared to 18 per cent for firms without debt to be 
serviced. Micro firms tend to hold greater cash (which may be a reflection of their 
more limited access to external financing) than small and medium firms. In contrast 
to their higher levels of vulnerability shown in the earlier tables, the hotel and 
restaurant sector does have a more substantive buffer of cash and cash equivalents 
relative to turnover than most other sectors.  
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TABLE 3 MEDIAN CASH/EXPENDITURE RATIO, BY CATEGORY  
 Cash-Cash equiv./Annual expenditure 
 All Debt No debt 
Total 0.10 0.06 0.18 
Size categories    
Micro 0.13 0.07 0.22 
Small 0.10 0.06 0.18 
Medium 0.10 0.06 0.15 
Sector categories    
Manufacturing 0.10 0.06 0.13 
Construction & Real estate 0.10 0.06 0.12 
Wholesale & Retail 0.09 0.05 0.18 
Hotels & Restaurants 0.14 0.06 0.42 
Prof. & Scientific & Technical 0.15 0.10 0.22 
Other 0.07 0.05 0.13 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note: The upper end of the distribution of the Cash-Cash equivalent/Annual expenditure ratio is capped at 2. 
 
FIGURE 3 NUMBER OF MONTHS THAT CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS CAN COVER EXPENDITURE 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
Note: Bin width is 1. Capped at 24 months. 
 
Another way of representing the shock absorption capacity of firms, in a more 
tangible sense, is to calculate the number of months that the cash reserves of a 
firm can cover their regular expenses. This is done by dividing the cash and cash 
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equivalent amount by average monthly expenditure.4 The total distribution of the 
number of months is displayed in the histogram in Figure 3, again showing a very 
strong level of skewedness across firms. The percentage of firms that do not have 
enough cash reserves to cover even a month of their monthly expenditures in 2018 
is shown in Table 4. This table also provides the percentage of SMEs that reported 
having zero cash reserves. Close to half of SMEs have cash reserves that fall short 
of a single month’s average expenditure. Unsurprisingly, the median number of 
months cash that SMEs have which can cover monthly total expenditure is just 
above one. In addition, 4 per cent report no cash reserves available at all. Medium 
firms have slightly less cash cushions than smaller firms relative to their 
expenditure levels.  
 
TABLE 4 MEASURES OF CASH RESERVES, TOTAL AND BY CATEGORY  
 





No. Months Cash can 
Cover Expenditure 
(Median) 
Total 45.4 4.1 1.25 
Size categories    
Micro 42.6 4.6 1.50 
Small 46.6 4.9 1.20 
Medium 48.7 1.6 1.15 
Sector categories    
Manufacturing 49.3 6.6 1.15 
Construction & Real estate 47.8 4.5 1.17 
Wholesale & Retail 47.4 3.1 1.08 
Hotels & Restaurants 35.3 2.0 1.71 
Prof. & Scientific & Technical 34.1 5.0 1.75 
Other 54.8 4.5 0.80 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
3. ESTIMATING THE EXTENT OF THE SHOCK AND REVENUE SHORTFALLS 
Having provided an overview of the health of SME finances entering the current 
crisis, this section examines the extent of the shock and how it might impact firms. 
In particular, our aim is to give an estimate of the typical revenue shortfall or gap 
firms may be facing and the size of this on an aggregate scale. We define revenue 
shortfall (gap) as the case whereby revenues drop below required expenditure on 




4  To obtain monthly expenditure we divided total annual expenditure provided in the CDS by 12. We recognised that 
this even annual assumption will not be reflective of the seasonality of many SMEs’ actual activity. 
5  Expenditure in this case is both fixed and variable expenditure and we allow this to decline (as well as revenue 
adjustments) in line with the falls in expenditure for both non-personnel and personnel costs as outlined in the recent 
CSO survey. While we do not specifically model issues like loan repayment breaks or rate deferments, if such items are 
part of the firm’s reported expenditure in the survey, we allow these to change in line with how firms report their 
non-personnel expenditure has changed since the pandemic began. 
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calculate how many firms have revenue fall below expenditure in each shock 
scenario and how much of this shortfall can be covered with their existing cash 
resources. From a policy perspective, we were also interested in how these 
aggregate across the entire SME sector, although the idiosyncratic nature of firm 
exposure and vulnerability along with the skewed distribution of SME financial 
structures demonstrated in the previous section gives considerable uncertainty 
bands around any aggregate values.  
 
In order to test how SMEs in our survey data would react to the extent of the shock 
posed by COVID-19, we set up a basic simulation exercise. In this section, we 
focused on the ‘lockdown’ period and presented estimates for the second quarter 
of 2020 (running from mid-March to mid-June in our simulation), which we 
calibrated using two different surveys of firms’ experiences. We then looked at 
extending the simulation to cover a range of scenarios for the economy over the 
second half of 2020.  
 
Our overall strategy was to take the SME structure and financial position from the 
2018 survey return and subject them to the following simulated shocks and then 
examine how this affected the financial position of the firms in the survey. The 
steps are summarised here and are described in more detail in the rest of the 
section:  
1. Applied a turnover shock to firms calibrated by survey evidence from the CSO 
and Chambers Ireland. Shocks differ across sectors but were applied randomly 
across firms within a sector. 
2. Applied a reduction to personnel costs to firms utilising a wage subsidy scheme 
(such as the TWSS/EWSS). We used CSO data on how many firms used the 
TWSS scheme and calculated firm-level usage based on employment levels 
collected in the CDS survey and other CSO data on the share of personnel to 
total costs in SMEs, in order to apply the relevant salary thresholds. 
3. Applied a reduction in non-personnel expenditure based on CSO survey 
responses to questions on non-personnel expenditure changes due to 
COVID-19 reductions in activity.6  
4. Calculated how many firms these shocks applied to, how many had turnover 





6  An important limitation of this analysis was that we could not distinguish between permanent expenditure foregone 
(because the business was not operating and did not need to use intermediate inputs for example), and expenditure 
reductions that are delayed (such as debt payment breaks) that firms will need to repay later.  
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5. Provided an illustrative example by multiplying by the total number of firms 
from the CSO business demography data, to aggregate the average revenue 
shortfall to a SME total estimate for the whole economy. 
Turnover shock simulation:  
The first step was to simulate reductions in firm 2018 turnover reported in the CDS. 
We used two different sources to do this, the first based on the results of the 
Business Impact of COVID-19 Survey, carried out by the CSO,7 and a second version 
based on adapting the CSO results to take into account a survey by Chambers 
Ireland of their members’ experience. We drew on the CSO survey as our baseline 
dataset as it was the most comprehensive survey conducted to date and is 
repeated for each month April, May and June providing both reductions in turnover 
and expenditure by sector. This allowed us to create a shock for the three months 
April-June which is the average of the reported shocks.  
 
The reason for using the Chambers Ireland survey was that the CSO noted their 
estimates are likely to be affected by sample selection, whereby firms that were 
closed during the lockdown may not have answered the survey. This, therefore, 
would make their scenario more benign than was the case. The Chambers Ireland 
survey data for April showed a more extreme shock than the CSO’s and we used 
these relativities to adjust the sample for a more severe scenario, as it is likely that 
a more extreme shock would capture firms who were closed. 
 
Table 5 displays the results on the percentages of SMEs that reported their 
expected impact of COVID-19 restrictions on turnover averaged over the relevant 
CSO survey waves and varying by broad sector. As the survey requested firms to 
indicate bands of turnover reduction, we based the simulations on the midpoint 
percentage of each turnover bracket (as displayed in column 2). We allocated the 
turnover reductions randomly across the firms in the survey by sector. There were 
no data to date to ascertain which firms in the sectors had been most affected. This 
means that 13 per cent of firms in industry were randomly chosen to have a 
turnover reduction of 87.5 per cent for example.  
 
Table 6 gives a similar picture for the response when CSO data are adjusted 
downwards by the relatively more negative survey responses from the Chambers 
Ireland data. We found that the worst affected sector in terms of turnover 
reduction was in accommodation and food, where the most stringent lockdown 
restrictions applied. Construction was also particularly heavily affected. For other 
sectors, the extent of the reduction in turnover was extensive but more varied 




7  https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/bic19/businessimpactofcovid-19survey16marchto19april2020. 
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lose turnover. Other sectors, while encountering many substantial reductions in 
activity, still show some firms with normal levels of turnover and in some cases 
with turnover increases. This is particularly the case for the wholesale and retail 
trade where some of the loss of the accommodation and food sector demand is 
likely to have been deflected to.  
 
TABLE 5 BASELINE SCENARIO USING CSO SURVEY OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES 
TURNOVER, BY SECTOR (Q2, 2020), PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES  
Survey bands of 
reduced turnover 
Simulated 




& Food Other 
75-100% < normal 87.5 13 41 18 79 20 
50-74% < normal 62.5 16 19 16 15 10 
25-49% < normal 37.5 26 21 21 6 17 
10-24% < normal 17.0 17 10 11 0 19 
Normal turnover   21 9 17 0 29 
More than normal  7 0 17 0 5 
 
Source: CSO data provided to authors for shares across sectors. 
 
TABLE 6 MORE SEVERE SCENARIO ADJUSTING CSO DATA IN LINE WITH – CSO ADJUSTED SURVEY 
OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES TURNOVER, BY NACE SECTOR (Q2 2020), 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES  
Survey bands of 
reduced turnover 
Simulated 




& Food Other 
75-100% < normal 87.5 22 50 27 87 29 
50-74% < normal 62.5 32 35 32 13 27 
25-49% < normal 37.5 24 15 18 0 14 
10-24% < normal 17.0 13 0 7 0 14 
Normal turnover   7 0 3 0 15 
More than normal  2 0 13 0 1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using CSO and Chambers Ireland data. The Chambers Ireland data are only used to re-allocate the CSO data 
i.e. the Chambers Ireland data show a larger shock than the CSO. All CSO figures are then grossed down by these factors in 
aggregate while the sectoral relativities are held constant.  
 
Expenditure reductions  
Striking demand reductions are evident across all sectors in the previous tables, 
reflecting the dramatic extent of the shock across all types of firm. To estimate how 
firms were able to absorb (or not) this level of turnover reduction, we allowed for 
a calculation of a fall in expenditure during this period. We applied various 
expenditure falls which varied for personnel and non-personnel costs. Although 
the CDS has overall expenditure data per firm, it does not have information on the 
types of expenditure (e.g. labour cost, materials, purchases, rent, mortgage etc). 
Therefore, we used CSO aggregate data to calculate a sector and size specific share 
of personnel costs of SME expenditure and applied this to the total expenditure in 
the CDS. 
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Personnel costs 
Two different personnel expenditure reduction channels were calculated. The first 
came from the explicit subsidisation of wages via a subsidy such as that which is 
available through the TWSS/EWSS schemes. These schemes were brought in to 
enable firms to retain employees despite the reduction to turnover.8 After 
obtaining monthly personnel expenditure per employee, we constructed an 
estimate of eligibility for an illustrative subsidy which was built to proxy the 
TWSS/EWSS introduced as part of the COVID-19 measure. It was not possible for 
us to explicitly model these schemes as we did not have employee level data that 
would provide us with their employment status (such as part time, full time etc.), 
or their wage level. To illustrate the impacts, we instead used a proxy scheme, 
which was based on the average employee wage per firm in our data. The 
implementation of this illustrative scheme across firms in the survey involved 
several steps.9 
• We calculated the 70 per cent cap of the personnel costs per employee for the 
scheme. 
• We limited this figure to a maximum of €1,640 each month for each employee 
when 70 per cent of costs go over that amount.  
• We applied usage of our illustrative scheme to firms based on sector-specific 
percentages of firms which availed from the TWSS, according to CSO survey 
data as displayed in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7 CSO SURVEY OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES BY NACE SECTOR (Q2 2020), 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES  
  Industry Construction Wholesale & Retail 
Accom. & 
Food 
Availed of Revenue COVID-19 TWSS 52.2 65.7 59.1 54.9 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
These percentages are applied to correspond with the firms which suffered the 
worse turnover shocks based on the two scenarios outlined above. This gave us the 
closest match to the actual share of SMEs that used the TWSS, as reported in the 
CSO COVID-19 impact surveys. In this regard, we do not explicitly model the 
assumption in the actual TWSS that firms have to have had at least a 25 per cent 




8  Details of the TWSS structure, eligibility and usage statistics are available from the Revenue Commissioner website 
https://www.revenue.ie/en/Home.aspx. 
9  The TWSS scheme relies on a worker’s previous wages and, as we do not have these data, we used an illustrative 
example which was based on average per employee subsidy. As we adjusted the rest of the personnel costs in line with 
the total reductions that firms themselves have indicated they achieved, this should capture issues such as top-ups 
above the TWSS. We did not model any tax implications for workers, for example PRSI, USC or income tax. Rather, we 
worked on a total gross wage bill per firm basis.  
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the proportions in Table 7. In practice, nearly all the firms in our data that receive 
a subsidy had a turnover shock greater than 25 per cent.  
 
The second channel again exploited the CSO survey. As firms have laid off workers 
and cut the wages of existing workers, as well as used the TWSS, we reduced the 
wage bill after TWSS by the proportions suggested in the personnel cost reductions 
provided in the CSO survey. Results are displayed in Table 8, by sector. The bands 
on expenditure reduction were broader than those asked relating to turnover. 
However, we applied the largest expenditure reductions to firms again on a 
random basis using the random split applied to the turnover scenarios, in order to 
assign higher unsubsidised personnel expenditure reductions to firms worse 
affected by the turnover reductions. 
 
While it is mentioned above, it must be reiterated here that our analysis is not 
meant as a microsimulation of the impacts of the TWSS scheme. As this scheme is 
applied based on each employee’s existing wage, we cannot use such a basis as we 
do not have individual employee-level data. Instead, our method provided an 
illustrative subsidy which is meant to somewhat mirror the TWSS. Our reduction in 
personnel costs then was a combination of an illustrative subsidy and then a 
decline in the rest of costs in line with the survey responses. In this manner, 
whether firms laid off workers or dropped the wages of existing workers did not 
matter for our analysis as we purely relied on firms indicated responses to how 
much their wage bill has fallen.  
 
TABLE 8 CSO SURVEY OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE, 
BY NACE SECTOR (Q2, 2020), PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES  
Survey bands of reduced 
personnel costs 
Simulated 




& Food Other 
50-100% < normal 75 4.9 11.4 13.9 64.4 6.6 
0-50% < normal 25 24.5 14.3 25.3 15.6 22.4 
No change or higher 
expenditure  57.1 45.7 51.0 20.0 60.1 
 
Source: CSO. 
Note: This excludes the share of firms who reported ‘Don’t Know’, so percentages do not add to 100 in all cases.  
 
Non-personnel costs 
Finally, we simulated two non-personnel reduction scenarios based on CSO 
published survey data, as displayed in Table 9. Since the expenditure information 
available in the CDS did not provide any details regarding the proportion of 
expenditure devoted to fixed costs (such as rent), or variable costs (such as 
purchases), we applied two reduction bands based on CSO survey data to account 
for the likely reductions in some of these expenditure items as a result of the slow 
down or cease in trading activity (see Table 9). We applied the non-personnel 
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expenditure reductions to firms on a random basis using the random split applied 
to the turnover scenarios, in order to assign larger expenditure reductions to firms 
more affected by the turnover shocks. 
 
TABLE 9 REDUCTIONS BASED ON CSO SURVEY OF IMPACT OF COVID-19 MEASURES ON SMES 
NON-PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE, BY NACE SECTOR (Q2, 2020), PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDING ENTERPRISES 
Survey bands of reduced 
non-personnel costs 
Simulated 




& Food Other 
50-100% < normal 75 11.4 7.2 5.5 48.9 18.0 
0-50% < normal 25 11.4 7.2 18.8 24.4 24.0 
No change or higher 




After applying the various reductions to the different items outlined above, firms 
in the CDS experienced the turnover and expenditure reductions outlined in 
Table 10 under each scenario (information on the percentage reductions by sector 
can be found in Appendix 1). Average turnover reductions were higher in the more 
severe calibration, as it is to be expected. Turnover reductions in this scenario were 
over 10 percentage points higher. Personnel expenditure was reduced by almost 
half on average, and total expenditure was reduced by almost one-fifth.  
 














Total 42.4 56.6 46.4 16.9 22.0 
Size categories 
Micro 40.4 55.1 46.0 13.9 18.0 
Small 41.6 56.4 46.1 16.2 23.3 
Medium 47.0 59.3 47.8 23.5 28.4 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
Estimated average revenue gap  
Having applied the reductions in turnover, personnel expenditure and 
non-personnel expenditure across the firms in the data, we then calculated the 
percentage of firms who have expenditure greater than turnover and the median 
and mean amounts of this revenue shortfall. There are four sets of results 
presented in Table 11 on these calculations. This table displays the selected 
statistics by size categories. A table displaying the same statistics by sector 
categories instead can be found in Appendix 1. The top panel shows the results 
where the shocks are based on the CSO survey data. The bottom panel shows the 
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results based on the more severe turnover shocks (i.e. calibrated based on the 
Chambers Ireland data). The personnel and non-personnel expenditure reductions 
were applied in the same way in both cases. For each of the two calibrations, we 
reported first the raw impact of the shock as the share of firms where revenue has 
fallen below expenditure and the size of the shortfalls. Secondly, we provided a 
figure for the share of firms who faced a revenue shortfall and who did not have 
sufficient internal cash resources to cover the gap for three months.  
 
In the baseline CSO calibration (top panel of Table 11), we estimated that 
approximately 39 per cent of micro firms and 43 per cent of small and medium 
firms had shocks large enough for expenditure to exceed turnover in the three-
month period of COVID-19 restrictions. If we base our estimates on the more 
severe scenario, these numbers increase to 55 per cent of micro firms and 60 per 
cent of small and medium firms. The size of the estimated shortfall in each month 
for the median micro firm is €3,000 in the CSO calibration and €3,500 in the severe 
calibration. Reflecting the highly skewed nature of the size and financial 
performances of firms (as shown in Section 2), the size of the revenue gap is much 
larger for the mean firm; more than three times as large in the case of micro firms, 
where the mean gap is €10,800 in the baseline CSO calibration and €12,600 in the 
severe calibration. The size of the shortfalls in both calibrations are larger for small 
and medium firms, with a median gap of €28,000 in the baseline CSO calibration 
and €38,000 in the severe scenario. The mean gaps are again approximately three 
times as large as the median. 
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TABLE 11 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE (GAP = REVENUE SHORTFALL) 
 Baseline CSO calibration 
 % Firms Expenditure > 
Turnover 
Median gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean gap  
(Monthly) 
Without use of firm cash    
Micro 39% 3,062 10,789 
Small/Medium 43% 28,125 91,291 
 % Firms Gap > Cash Median Gap (3 Months) Mean Gap (3 Months) 
Including use of cash    
Micro 28% 14,902 39,644 
Small/Medium 39% 78,460 290,715 
    
 Severe calibration10 
 % Firms Expenditure > 
Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
Without use of firm cash    
Micro 55% 3,573 12,610 
Small/Medium 60% 38,250 124,949 
 % Firms Gap > Cash Median Gap (3 Months) Mean Gap (3 Months) 
Including use of cash    
Micro 32% 24,881 47,873 
Small/Medium 41% 114,915 389,616 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
The next question is how much of these gaps remain if firms absorb some of the 
shortfall with their existing cash resources. We did this calculation by taking the 
firm-level gap just described and then subtracting the reported cash and cash 
equivalents. In the lower panel of Table 11, we report how many firms still have 
expenditure greater than turnover shortfalls after using their cash resources and 
how large this remaining shortfall is. In the CSO calibration, 28 per cent of micro 
firms and 39 per cent of small and medium firms still have a shortfall. The more 
severe scenario percentages reduce by more, bringing them closer to the baseline 
CSO numbers at 32 per cent of micro firms and 41 per cent of small and medium 
firms. We also re-calculated the median and mean revenue shortfall for the firms 
that were not able to cover the shortfall through their cash resources. In both 
calibrations, the size of the shortfall for firms that were not able to cover 
themselves out of cash resources was much larger than the initially calculated gaps. 
This is because it was primarily firms with smaller shortfalls that were able to cover 
themselves with internal resources and taking those firms out of the calculation 




10  Calibrated using the differences between the CSO and Chambers Ireland survey shocks.  
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4. ESTIMATING A TOTAL REVENUE GAP 
The next step was to attempt to calculate an aggregate amount for the shortfall in 
revenues in the total SME sector based on the firm-specific gaps estimated in 
Table 11. This exercise was important in terms of policy interest in the overall level 
of exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic amongst SMEs. A degree of caution was 
needed however, as the design of the survey works best in calculations based on 
proportions and was not intended for aggregation of monetary amounts. Indeed, 
the survey only captures firms with turnover less than €50 million by design. This 
therefore would bias downwards any estimates for the SME sector as a whole if a 
strict employee definition (based on less than 250 employees) were to be used. As 
there are limited national data on total SME turnover and expenditure (for the 
sample of firms less than €50 million for which our survey represents), the 
aggregation was based on numbers of active SMEs in the CSO sectoral business 
demography data. Further details regarding the CSO table were used to obtain the 
number of active firms, as well as a detailed sectoral overview provided in 
Appendix 2. As many of the financial variables are very skewed, this aggregation 
approach should be treated as a broad guide to relative magnitudes rather than as 
precise point estimates.  
 
The approach to aggregation for each of the calibration scenarios can be 
summarised as: 
A. Take proportion of firms who have a ‘revenue gap’ (turnover less than 
expenditure); 
B. Calculate mean level of gap for these firms for the three-month period; 
C. Get number of affected firms based on CSO business demography data (see 
Appendix 2).  
 
The aggregate gap is given by inputs (A x C) x B. As with the firm-level calculations, 
we performed the aggregation exercise both for calibrations based on baseline CSO 
and severe scenarios. We applied the aggregation for the total revenue gap as a 
result of the pandemic and also the gap that cannot be covered by existing cash 
resources of the affected firms. The totals for each case are presented in Table 12, 
along with the totals for micro firms and for small and medium firms separately. 
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TABLE 12 AGGREGATED MEAN REVENUE GAP FOR THREEE-MONTH PERIOD (€ BILLION) 
 Baseline CSO calibration Severe calibration 
No cash adjustment included (€ billion) 
Micro 3.27 5.32 
Small/Medium 2.63 5.01 
Total 5.89 10.34 
Adjusting for firm cash holdings (€ billion) 
Micro 1.11 2.13 
Small/Medium 1.10 2.15 
Total 2.21 4.28 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
The scale of the shock to the SME sector of the pandemic is evident in these 
calculations, even given the caveats regarding their precision. The raw impact on 
SMEs in the top panel of Table 12 is estimated to be between €5.9 billion (in the 
CSO-calibrated shock) and €10.34 billion (in the severe calibration). In both cases, 
the split in the aggregate amounts are close to 50:50 between micro firms and the 
small and medium group (although of course there are many more firms affected 
in the micro group but with lower average shortfalls due to their smaller scale).  
 
The cash holdings of the SME sector can absorb some but not all of these revenue 
shortfalls. The lower panel of Table 12 shows the remaining gap after all internal 
resources have been exhausted. This still leaves a revenue shortfall of between 
€2.21 billion and €4.3 billion depending on the shock calibration used. Again, the 
impact is roughly evenly split across the two broad size categories of firms. These 
impacts relate solely to the three-month period of restrictions on activity in the 
second quarter of 2020. The next section looks at a range of potential paths for the 
economy and SME sector for the second half of 2020 and how these revenue gaps 
may evolve. 
5. RECOVERY PATHS AND SME REVENUE GAPS 
The path of the economy over the second half of 2020 is highly uncertain with 
health developments the key driver and considerable risks around any scenarios. 
This section is therefore highly speculative, but we feel it should be useful to 
present a range of scenarios that give some broad parameters as to how different 
economic paths would impact on the SME sector.  
 
In line with McQuinn et al. (2020) we presented three broad scenarios: 
• Base scenario: Gradual recovery with ongoing public health measures (e.g. 
physical distancing); 
• Optimistic scenario: More rapid recovery towards normal turnover levels; 
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• Pessimistic scenario: Initial opening up but no further recovery. 
 
The way in which we implemented the scenarios in terms of turnover evolution for 
firms is shown in Table 13. For the annual estimates, we assumed that in the first 
quarter of the year firms operated normally. In the second quarter, we applied the 
turnover reductions described in the previous sections calibrated to either the CSO 
or Chambers Ireland surveys. Table 13 shows these in the ‘Q2’ column for the CSO 
calibration and the approach is identical for the Chambers Ireland (i.e. more 
severe) shocks.  
 
The scenarios begin in Q3 where all firms experienced a step improvement in 
turnover and then recovery paths diverge in Q4. In the base scenario, we applied 
a steady improvement in firm turnover but one that is relatively slow. We did this 
by moving firms gradually up through the turnover reduction categories by one 
step in each quarter. This means that the 13 per cent of firms that were hit with an 
87.5 per cent reduction to turnover in Q2 (the midpoint of the 75-100 range), have 
turnover that is 62.5 per cent below normal in Q3 and 37.5 per cent below normal 
in Q4. In this base scenario, 71 per cent of firms were back at normal turnover 
levels by Q4.  
 
In the optimistic scenario, we allowed a greater bounce back from the lifting of 
restrictions, with firms moving up one step in the turnover shock categories in Q3 
and then two steps in Q4. This meant that the firms which were worst affected 
from the lockdown period had turnover that was 62.5 per cent lower than normal 
in Q3 and 17 per cent lower than normal in Q4. In this scenario, 45 per cent of firms 
returned to near normal turnover levels in Q3 (as in the base scenario) and now 87 
per cent were back at normal levels by Q4.  
 
The pessimistic scenario has some recovery in Q3, at the same level as in the base 
case. However, the recovery then stalls (for example if restrictions were 
re-imposed), and in Q4 firms remained as they were in Q3, i.e. at far below normal 
turnover. This results in only 45 per cent of firms being modelled as back to normal 
turnover levels by Q4. Note that our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios did not 
take the form of extreme ‘best’ and ‘worst’ case outcomes, with the optimistic 
scenario leaving some firms still below pre-COVID-19 turnover levels by the end of 
the year and the pessimistic scenario did not envisage a return to the level of 
turnover reductions during the lockdown phase.  
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TABLE 13 TURNOVER EVOLUTION IN RECOVERY SCENARIOS (BASELINE CSO CALIBRATION), 
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDING ENTERPRISES (ALL SMES) 
Survey bands of reduced turnover Q2 Q3 Q4 
BASE SCENARIO 
75-100% < normal 23   
50-74% < normal 15 23  
25-49% < normal 20 15 23 
10-24% < normal 14 20 15 
Normal turnover or greater  28 42 62 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
75-100% < normal 23   
50-74% < normal 15 23  
25-49% < normal 20 15  
10-24% < normal 14 20 23 
Normal turnover or greater  28 42 77 
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
75-100% < normal 23   
50-74% < normal 15 23 23 
25-49% < normal 20 15 15 
10-24% < normal 14 20 20 
Normal turnover or greater  28 42 42 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
As turnover improves, we assume that firm expenditure also begins to increase 
(hence the scenarios are not simply scaled up versions of the one quarter estimates 
in the previous section). In terms of the illustrative wage subsidy scheme, we 
assumed that firms no longer qualify for the subsidy once they moved into the 
turnover category where turnover is 10-24 per cent below normal which 
approximates the qualification threshold for the scheme. For firms where turnover 
remained below this level, we assumed a subsidy scheme remained in place and 
applied this reduction in personnel expenditure across both remaining quarters for 
qualifying firms. Non-personnel expenditure was assumed to increase broadly in 
line with the recovery in turnover. Table 14 displays the average reductions in 
turnover and expenditure items for each scenario and each recovery simulation 
(sector-specific information in this regard can be found in a Table in Appendix 3).  
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Total 27.3 37.0 9.7 10.2 
Size categories    
Micro 25.7 36.0 7.7 8.1 
Small 26.3 36.7 9.3 10.9 
Medium 30.6 39.3 14.3 13.8 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Total 24.3 32.9 8.6 8.6 
Size categories    
Micro 23.2 32.1 6.9 6.9 
Small 23.8 32.7 8.2 9.2 
Medium 27.5 34.9 12.6 11.4 
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Total 31.3 42.8 11.1 11.4 
Size categories    
Micro 29.9 41.7 8.7 9.1 
Small 30.6 42.6 10.6 12.2 
Medium 35.3 45.3 16.5 15.2 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
For each of the scenarios, we applied turnover (and associated expenditure) 
evolutions as above using the CSO-calibrated shares of firms in each turnover 
reduction bracket and did the same for the shares reported by Chambers Ireland. 
For each scenario, we applied the initial shock of Q2 and then grew forward 
turnover and expenditure across the remaining quarters of 2020. We then 
calculated how many firms had expenditure fall below turnover for the entire 
period and by how much. As before, we also examined how much of the shortfall 
remained after firms had used their cash resources to cover as much of the gap as 
they could. Table 15 shows the results for the CSO calibrated turnover reductions 
and Table 16 shows those based on Chambers Ireland. These two tables display the 
selected statistics by size categories. Tables displaying the same statistics by sector 
categories instead can be found in Appendix 3.  
 
In our base case of steady growth, 21 per cent of micro firms and 25 per cent of 
small and medium firms had a revenue shortfall over the full nine-month period in 
the CSO calibration, (if you recall these percentages were 39 per cent and 43 per 
cent respectively for the Q2 shock in Table 9). The size of the gap spread evenly 
across the months are quite similar to the lockdown estimate for micro firms (both 
in terms of median and mean). The gaps are lower in magnitude for small and 
medium firms with a median of €20,000 per month in this base case compared to 
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€28,000 a month for the Q2 scenario in Table 11. Due to the distribution of SMEs 
being highly skewed (i.e. there is a very large number of micro firms compared to 
medium firms, for example) the medians and means presented display large 
differences. It is clear to the reader that this would have implications when 
performing the aggregation exercise presented below (based on means). 
Therefore, as noted in the previous section, the aggregate results should be treated 
as a broad guide to relative magnitudes rather than as precise point estimates. 
 
TABLE 15 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH 
SCENARIOS (BASELINE CSO CALIBRATION) 
 % Firms with  
Expenditure > Turnover 




No cash adjustment 
BASE SCENARIO    
Micro 0.21  3,859   9,222  
Small/Medium 0.25  20,934   71,620  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Micro 0.21  3,237   8,357  
Small/Medium 0.26  16,935   65,720  
PESSIMISTIC 
SCENARIO 
   
Micro 0.23  3,333   9,673  
Small/Medium 0.29  19,731   74,166  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Nine Months) 
Mean Gap 
 (Nine Months) 
Adjusting for firm cash holdings 
BASE SCENARIO 
Micro 0.41  30,399   79,042  
Small/Medium 0.47  243,734   781,306  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Micro 0.39  21,453   76,040  
Small/Medium 0.46  204,823   753,284  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO  
Micro 0.40  36,430   94,862  
Small/Medium 0.46  272,909   827,524  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
A return to growth is therefore crucial in restoring SME health, although this 
relatively slow path in our base case leaves a substantial portion of firms with 
expenditure below turnover and an accumulating gap to be covered. As our 
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios diverge only towards the end of the year, we 
did not find that they dramatically changed the shares of firms that have revenue 
shortfalls, although the size of the monthly gap was affected more noticeably. This 
is particularly the case when cash holdings were considered as more firms 
exhausted their reserves and were no longer able to bridge the revenue shortfall. 
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TABLE 16 PER CENT OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH SCENARIOS 
(SEVERE CALIBRATION) 
 % Firms with 
 Expenditure > Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
 No cash adjustment 
BASE SCENARIO    
Micro 0.27  4,412   10,272  
Small/Medium 0.34  30,343   85,822  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Micro 0.26  3,371   9,174  
Small/Medium 0.34  25,750   75,163  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Micro 0.30  4,723   11,030  
Small/Medium 0.40  31,771   91,958  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Nine Months) 
Mean Gap  
(Nine Months) 
 Adjusting for firm cash holdings 
BASE SCENARIO 
Micro 0.43  59,349   108,533  
Small/Medium 0.55  264,032   827,882  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Micro 0.41  46,031   98,625  
Small/Medium 0.52  202,281   743,404  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Micro 0.42  56,468   120,592  
Small/Medium 0.54  333,686   907,545  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
 
The final step was to examine how these different paths for the rest of 2020 
aggregate into an overall SME revenue and liquidity shortfall. This was done in the 
same way as for the single quarter aggregation described earlier and the results 
presented in Table 17. The total revenue shortfall (i.e. not considering any cash 
reserves that could be used to cover it) is €8.1 billion in our base case using the 
CSO-calibrated shock and €12.3 billion using the more severe calibration. Adjusting 
for cash reserves, the base scenario gives a liquidity shortfall of between 
€3.9 billion and €6.7 billion. In the more optimistic scenario, these revenue gaps 
are smaller (with a range of between €7.4 billion and €10.8 billion), as are the 
liquidity gaps. The gaps in the pessimistic scenario are correspondingly larger with 
the liquidity shortfall coming in between €4.8 billion and €8.3 billion.  
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TABLE 17 AGGREGATE MEAN GAP FOR 2020 UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH SCENARIOS 
(€ BILLION) 
 Base Optimistic Pessimistic 
No cash adjustment (€ billion) 
Baseline CSO calibration 8.12 7.44 9.56 
Severe calibration 12.32 10.75 14.92 
Adjusting for cash holdings (€ billion) 
Baseline CSO calibration 3.87 3.60 4.80 
Severe calibration 6.7 5.69 8.25 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In addition to the unknown path of the virus itself, which will determine much of 
the recovery outcomes, several other caveats applied to the analysis. The first set 
of limitations arose from the nature of the survey data we used to calibrate our 
scenarios and generate our picture of firm finances. Individual firms and sectors 
had different exposures to the shocks, different cost profiles and different 
underlying financial positions making one size fits all policy recommendations from 
the analysis difficult since the CDS can only generate an average picture. 
Implementing ongoing social distancing measures are quite different for small 
hospitality businesses than for office settings and these types of costs are not fully 
reflected in the scenarios presented. In addition, the total annual expenditure 
figure provided in the CDS may not provide a totally accurate representation of real 
firm expenditure, as there could be issues with how firms interpret this concept 
when asked. Therefore, some uncertainty in the revenue gap estimates presented 
could arise from the use of this variable. Indeed, the profit margin figures implied 
by the CDS are quite high, which may overestimate the extent to which firms have 
buffers available. Future work on this topic could benefit from using other sources 
of more accurate balance sheet data for Irish SMEs. 
 
Second, in all of our scenarios we included estimates of the extent to which the 
SME sector’s own internal resources could cover some of the shortfall. However, 
running down all internal funds is not an Optimistic outcome either for an 
individual firm or for the sector as a whole. While it helps to cushion the current 
blow, the longer-term outlook for the sector’s growth could be severely hampered 
in terms of limiting investment. Other work using the CDS by Martinez-Cillero et al. 
(forthcoming), shows many SMEs engaging in investment activities only when they 
had substantial internal resources available to finance it. The experience of the 
financial crisis may have left some scarring in terms of willingness to take on 
external debt, a consideration that is important both for the implementation of 
policies addressing the current crisis and for longer-term implications of having to 
meet the cost of the pandemic. 
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A third limitation is that we can only examine the impact on active firms and base 
this on their turnover levels prior to the crisis. The overall cost therefore does not 
include damage from lost potential growth opportunities, delayed or cancelled 
expansion plans or from potential entrepreneurs deciding not to enter the SME 
market in the current environment.  
 
Finally, our assumptions on expenditure reductions are implemented for each 
quarter but do not make any distinction between permanently foregone 
expenditure (e.g. inputs not needed due to lower activity levels) and expenditure 
that has been deferred but remains a liability to the firm (e.g. debt payment breaks 
or tax deferrals). A more in-depth investigation into expenditure categories that is 
not available in our current dataset would be needed to decompose expenditure 
further and gauge how much of the deferred expenditure may be a constraint on 
firm finances even as turnover recovers. 
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APPENDIX 1  SIMULATED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, BY SECTOR 
 















Manufacturing 34.2 50.4 38.5 11.2 15.5 
Construction 57.6 71.4 47.2 7.3 18.9 
Wholesale & Retail 36.6 51.5 48.1 8.7 12.4 
Hotels & Restaurants 80.5 84.3 64.5 43.7 52.4 
Other 34.1 50.6 41.3 20.3 24.1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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TABLE A1.2 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE  
 Baseline CSO Calibration 
 % Firms with  
Expenditure > Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
Without use of firm cash    
Manufacturing 0.39  19,604   63,920  
Construction 0.58  16,483   53,897  
Wholesale & Retail 0.38  17,221   56,267  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.61  18,337   59,852  
Other 0.32  16,516   54,004  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Three Months) 
Mean Gap  
(Three Months) 
Including use of cash    
Manufacturing 0.34  56,850   205,351  
Construction 0.44  48,937   174,088  
Wholesale & Retail 0.39  50,808   181,483  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.24  53,639   192,664  
Other 0.30  49,022   174,424  
 Severe Calibration62 
 % Firms with  
Expenditure > Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
Without use of firm cash    
Manufacturing 0.64  26,460   86,754  
Construction 0.73  22,142   72,766  
Wholesale & Retail 0.54  23,163   76,075  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.62  24,707   81,077  
Other 0.52  22,188   72,917  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Three Months) 
Mean Gap  
(Three Months) 
Including use of cash    
Manufacturing 0.34  84,304   273,424  
Construction 0.45  73,093   230,871  
Wholesale & Retail 0.43  75,745   240,936  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.29  79,754   256,154  
Other 0.32  73,213   231,328  
 





62  Calibrated using the differences between the CSO and Chambers Ireland survey shocks.  
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APPENDIX 2 NUMBER OF ACTIVE SMES IN IRELAND 
The NACE Rev. 2 sector-specific number of active enterprises used for the 
aggregation performed in this analysis is one of the business demography statistics 
published by the CSO.63 The detailed sector disaggregation provided in the CSO 
table allows us to map the number of active firms to the detailed sector breakdown 
in the CDS. 
 
Table A2.1 shows how SMEs are distributed across sectors, displaying CSO business 
demography data on the number of active enterprises in each sector and the 
shares accounted for by each size category. In all sectors, we find a preponderance 
of micro firms, varying from 80 per cent in the hotels and restaurant sector, which 
has one of the greatest shares of small firms, to a level of 97 per cent in 
construction and real estate. Construction and real estate sectors have the greatest 
number of micro firms in absolute terms as well, at over 70,000 of the total 311,000 
SMEs. Other substantial clusters are in transport, storage and communications and 
in the professional and technical sector. There is also a large number of firms 
classified as ‘other’, showing the diversity of activities in which SMEs are active. 
 
TABLE A2.1 NUMBER OF ACTIVE ENTERPRISES BY EMPLOYMENT SIZE AND SECTOR 
 Number of firms Sector share (%) 
 Micro Small Medium Micro Small Medium 
Manufacturing  14,085  1,500  511  87.5 9.3 3.2 
Construction & Real Estate (F, L) 70,270  1,949  193  97.0 2.7 0.3 
Wholesales & Retail 42,170  5,581  747  87.0 11.5 1.5 
Transportation & Storage (H) 24,613  957  139  95.7 3.7 0.5 
Information & Communication (J) 14,777  897  230  92.9 5.6 1.4 
Hotels & Restaurants (I) 15,328  3,212  621  80.0 16.8 3.2 
Prof., Scientific & Technical (M) 41,531  1,790  222  95.4 4.1 0.5 
Admin. & Support (N) 17,366  970  297  93.2 5.2 1.6 
Health & Social Work (G) 18,213  2,147  525  87.2 10.3 2.5 
Other (B, D, E, K-642, P, R, S) 53,324  2,892  418  94.2 5.1 0.7 
Total 311,677  21,895  3,903  92.4 6.5 1.2 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 




63  https://statbank.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=BRA11&PLanguage=0. 
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APPENDIX 3 SIMULATED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, RECOVERY SCENARIOS, BY 
SECTOR 
 









non-personnel Expenditure total 
BASE SCENARIO 
Manufacturing 20 31 6.5 6.7 
Construction  38 48 4.3 10.6 
Wholesale & Retail 23 33 4.2 5.0 
Hotels & Restaurants 56 60 27.1 27.4 
Other 21 32 11.8 10.7 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Manufacturing 18.4 28.0 5.7 6.0 
Construction  33.7 42.3 3.8 8.3 
Wholesale & Retail 20.5 29.4 3.8 4.4 
Hotels & Restaurants 49.9 52.8 23.7 21.9 
Other 19.2 28.9 10.5 9.2 
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
Manufacturing 23.9 36.7 7.4 7.8 
Construction  43.5 55.1 4.9 11.7 
Wholesale & Retail 26.7 38.6 4.6 5.5 
Hotels & Restaurants 64.0 67.7 31.3 29.7 
Other 24.5 37.6 13.6 12.1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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TABLE A3.2 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH 
SCENARIOS (BASELINE CSO CALIBRATION) 
 % Firms with 
 Expenditure > Turnover 




No cash adjustment 
BASE SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.23  15,128   50,405  
Construction 0.33  13,002   42,635  
Wholesale & Retail 0.24  13,505   44,473  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.24  14,265   47,252  
Other 0.19  13,025   42,719  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.23  12,278   46,216  
Construction 0.30  10,572   39,074  
Wholesale & Retail 0.23  10,976   40,763  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.29  11,586   43,318  
Other 0.20  10,591   39,150  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Manufacturing 0.25  14,156   52,238  
Construction 0.38  12,114   44,208  
Wholesale & Retail 0.26  12,597   46,107  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.31  13,327   48,979  
Other 0.21  12,136   44,294  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(9 Months) 
Mean Gap  
(9 Months) 
Adjusting for firm cash holdings 
BASE SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.38  171,200   542,536  
Construction 0.46  144,637   455,093  
Wholesale & Retail 0.50  150,920   475,775  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.45  160,420   507,049  
Other 0.41  144,922   456,032  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.33  142,477   523,021  
Construction 0.50  119,645   438,693  
Wholesale & Retail 0.48  125,045   458,639  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.43  133,211   488,798  
Other 0.39  119,890   439,599  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Manufacturing 0.38  192,506   578,419  
Construction 0.45  163,061   487,191  
Wholesale & Retail 0.48  170,026   508,769  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.43  180,556   541,396  
Other 0.41  163,377   488,171  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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TABLE A3.3 PERCENTAGE OF AFFECTED SMES AND GAP SIZE UNDER ALTERNATIVE HEALTH 
SCENARIOS (SEVERE CALIBRATION) 
 % Firms with  
Expenditure > Turnover 
Median Gap  
(Monthly) 
Mean Gap  
(Monthly) 
 No cash adjustment 
BASE SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.27  21,526   60,135  
Construction 0.38 18,298  50,728  
Wholesale & Retail 0.31  19,061   52,953  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.28 20,216  56,317  
Other 0.30  18,332   50,829  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.28  18,141   52,726  
Construction 0.35 15,355  44,510  
Wholesale & Retail 0.29  16,014   46,453  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.32 17,010  49,392  
Other 0.30  15,385   44,598  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Manufacturing 0.32  22,575   64,442  
Construction 0.42 19,207  54,365  
Wholesale & Retail 0.35  20,003   56,749  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.34 21,208  60,353  
Other 0.33  19,243   54,474  
 % Firms with  Gap > Cash 
Median Gap  
(Nine Months) 
Mean Gap  
(Nine Months) 
 Adjusting for firm cash holdings 
BASE SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.59  194,440   583,303  
Construction 0.49 168,953  493,733  
Wholesale & Retail 0.53  174,981   514,918  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.47 184,096  546,953  
Other 0.46  169,227   494,695  
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO    
Manufacturing 0.53  149,156   524,179  
Construction 0.50 129,701  443,894  
Wholesale & Retail 0.51  134,302   462,883  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.45 141,261  491,597  
Other 0.43  129,910   444,756  
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO   
Manufacturing 0.53  239,432   639,981  
Construction 0.47 204,914  541,993  
Wholesale & Retail 0.52  213,078   565,170  
Hotels & Restaurants 0.48 225,424  600,214  
Other 0.47  205,285   543,046  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of Department of Finance Survey Data. 
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Firm level microdata from the Department of Finance Credit Demand Survey. Used as 




This monthly survey was instituted by the CSO following the pandemic. We use these 
data for the months of April, May and June which are three separate survey returns. 
We averaged these across the three months. The data on turnover decline by sector as 
well as personnel and non-personnel cost declines come from these data. The share of 
firms using the TWSS also come from these survey returns.  
Chambers Ireland 
Survey Data  
We used the percentage decline in turnover from the April Chambers Ireland survey as 
our adverse turnover shock scenario. It is an overall figure not broken down by sector.  
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